49. And it is a mere apparent argument
49. And it is a mere apparent argument.
The argumentation by which it is sought to prove that that being whose nature is constituted by absolutely uniform light, i.e. intelligence, is differentiated by limiting adjuncts which presuppose an obscuration of that essential nature, is a mere apparent(fallacious) one. For, as we have shown before, obscuration of the light of that which is nothing but light means destruction of that light.--If we accept as the reading of the Sûtra 'âbhâsâh' (in plural) the meaning is that the various reasons set forth by the adherents of that doctrine are all of them fallacious. The 'and' of
the Sûtra is meant to point out that that doctrine, moreover, is in conflict with texts such as 'thinking himself to be different from the Mover'(Svet. Up. I, 6); 'there are two unborn ones, one a ruler, the other not a ruler' (I, 9); 'of those two one eats the sweet fruit' (V, 6); and others. For even if difference is due to upâdhis which are the figment of Nescience, there is no escaping the conclusion that the spheres of experience must be mixed up, since the theory admits that the thing itself with which all the limiting adjuncts connect themselves is one only.
But this cannot be urged against the theory of the individual soul being Brahman in so far as determined by real limiting adjuncts; for on that view we may explain the difference of spheres of experience as due to the beginningless adrishtas which are the cause of the difference of the limiting adjuncts!--To this the next Sûtra replies.