I. e. they both follow on devotion to worldly life.

I. e. in the way to final emancipation.

The enjoyment of supreme felicity, Brahmânanda (Sankara); the greatness consisting of a knowledge of Rik, Yagus, Sâman, and the substance of their teaching, which is worthy of a Brâhmana (Nîlakantha). See, too, Anugîtâ, p. 232.

Modesty = being ashamed of doing wrong; restraint (of senses) =mental restraint; and purity is both internal and external,--Sankara; knowledge is, of course, knowledge of the Brahman.

I. e. that spoken of in the last chapter.

Viz. mere silence, or the contemplation of the self after restraining all the senses. In the Brihadâranyaka-upanishad, Sankara (p. 605) renders the original word, mauna, to mean, 'The fruit of the destruction of the consciousness of anything other than the self.' And his commentator makes it clearer thus: 'The conviction in the mind that one is the self--the supreme Brahman--and that there is nothing close existing but oneself.'

I. e. the highest seat--the Brahman; for mind, sense, &c. are all non-existent there. Cf. Katha, p. 151, and Maitrî, p. 161

Cf. Kenopanishad, p. 39; Katha, p. 152; Taittirîya, p. 119.

'Taciturnity is his name,' says Nîlakantha.

Or, says Sankara, 'who is the author of the Vedas.'

I. e. 'with the Vedas,' says Nîlakantha, Om, the quintessence of the Vedas, being a name of the Brahman (as to which cf. Gîtâ, p. 79, and Maitrî, p. 84). Sankara takes the whole expression to mean gyotirmaya, consisting of light. Nîlakantha says this stanza answers the five following questions put in the stanza preceding, viz. of what use is taciturnity? which of the two is taciturnity? &c., as above. The first four questions are answered by the first two lines of this stanza--the substance of the answer being, that the use of taciturnity is to attain the seat which is not to be grasped even by the mind, that taciturnity includes both restraint of mind and of the external senses. By means of such restraint, the external and internal worlds cease to be perceived as existing, and the highest goal is attained.

This question arises naturally enough on Nîlakantha's interpretation of the preceding stanza, the meaning of which is in substance that the Vedas cannot grasp the Brahman fully, but they are of use towards a rudimentary comprehension of it, as is said further on, see p. 172 infra.

Cf. Svetâsvatara-upanishad, p. 339; see, too, Nrisimha Tâpinî, pp. 81-98.

I. e. one who parades his piety.

I. e. hypocritically.

I. e. do not rise to his memory--Nîlakantha, citing Gîtâ, p. 78 supra.

Scil. about the veneration due to one who has studied the Vedas--Nîlakantha, citing one or two passages in point.

The universe consists of 'names and forms,' the reality being the Brahman only. Cf. Khândogya, p. 407 seq.

Sankara refers to Taittirîya-upanishad, p. 68; Khândogya, p. 596 seq. &c.

Sankara takes this to mean 'sages,' who, according to him, state the difference. He quotes Parâsara for this.

I.e. the Brahman, that is to say, for attaining to it. Penance = kândrâyana and other observances; sacrifice = gyotishtoma, &c.

Cf. p. 158 supra, and Taittirîya-âranyaka, p. 888.

Cf. Svetâsvatara, p. 327; Mundaka, p. 323.

So Sankara. Nîlakantha takes the original word to mean 'the group of the senses,' and the whole phrase to mean 'enjoyments of sense.' Nîlakantha is supported by a passage further on, p. 167. But as to 'those who wish for heaven,' cf. Gîtâ, pp. 48-84.

I. e. in the form of merit, &c.

Cf. Gîtâ, p. 84.

Cf. Khândogya, p. 23. Brâhmanas = those that know the Brahman. See p. 171 infra.

I am not quite sure about the meaning of the original here. Ridha, which I have rendered 'developed,' Nîlakantha understands to mean 'what is performed merely for show.' What has been rendered 'well developed' in the text, Nîlakantha takes to mean performed from some desire,' &c.

Anger, desire, &c.

The original is kevala. Nîlakantha says it is so called as being a means of kaivalya, 'final emancipation.'

I. e. not that which is not free from sin, which latter is not developed at all.

All objects of enjoyment, Nîlakantha.

Cf. Brihadâranyaka, p. 899. Tapas is variously rendered. See inter alia, Prasna, pp. 162-70; Svetâsvatara, p. 307; Mundaka, pp. 270-280, 311-314; Khândogya, p. 136; Anugîtâ, pp. 247, 339.

I. e. Brahma-vidyâ, or science of the Brahman, Nîlakantha; the Brahman itself, Sankara.

I. e. lust.

Want of discrimination between right and wrong.

Desire to taste worldly objects.

For the loss of anything desired.

Desire to enjoy worldly objects. The difference between this and craving, according to Sankara, appears to be between merely tasting and continual enjoyment. According to Nîlakantha, the former is a desire which is never contented; the latter is merely a general liking.

Impatience of other people's prosperity; censoriousness being the pointing out of flaws in other people's merits; and reviling being an ignoring of the merits and merely abusing.

Scil. for attaining to the Brahman.

Some weak point by which they may attack a man.

Fickle in friendship, &c.

Such as a wife, &c.

Connected with this or the next world, Nîlakantha. This and a stanza further on I place within brackets, as it is not quite certain whether Sankara's copy had them, though they are now in some of our copies of the text with his commentary. See Introduction.

Cf. Mundaka, p. 319; Khândogya, p. 494.

See note , at page 165.

The wife having no other protector.

See note , at page 162.

Of pairs of opposites, such as heat and cold, &c.

Restraint of senses in presence of their objects.

Cf. Gîtâ, pp. 69, 70.

Which are serviceable in attaining the highest goal.

The original is the word 'taciturnity' as at p. 162 supra.

Offering one's acts to God (Nîlakantha), as to which cf. Gîtâ, p. 64. See also p. 182 infra for this stanza.

I. e. for objects of sense.

Ignorance.

Discontent even when one obtains much.

This is active; antipathy is passive only.

Of oneself, by brooding on evil. Cf. Taittirîya, p. 119. One copy of Sankara's commentary says this means 'thinking ill of others without cause.'

Of pairs of opposites.

Restraint of senses in presence of their objects.

I. e. of piety, knowledge, and indifference to worldly objects.

I. e. qualities which destroy it.

Scil. as defects of self-restraint, viz. untruthfulness, &c.

Scil. any distinction as to physical, mental, or that which is caused by superhuman agency.

Literally, 'all is conquered.' Everything that needs to be done is done. Cf. Kathopanishad, p. 155; Mundaka, p. 317.

Another interpretation of ishtapûrta is 'offerings to gods, and 'offerings to the manes;' a third 'sacrifices, &c., and works of charity, such as digging tanks and wells;' for a fourth, see Sankara on Mundaka, p. 291.

Each of the three classes mentioned contains two sub-classes, and so the six are made up. It is not quite easy to see the two heads under the third class; but perhaps indifference, and the consequent abandonment of desire, may be the two intended. To indicate that, I have adopted the construction which takes the words 'by means of indifference' with abandonment, instead of with 'gifts at Vedic ceremonies,' &c. Sankara seems to understand 'giving away of wealth' with the words 'by means of indifference,' and thus to constitute the second head under the third class. But he is not quite clear.

Concentration = fixing the mind continuously on some object, such as the being in the sun, &c.; contemplation is that in which one identifies oneself with the Brahman; reflexion as to what one is, whence one comes, and so forth.

Sankara says this may refer to the 'stealing' mentioned at p. 160. The life of a Brahmakârin is here taken to mean p. 170 continence by the commentators, as also at Mundaka, p. 311 inter alia. See also Khândogya, p. 533.

Son, wife, home, &c.; as to which cf. Gîtâ, p. 103, and Nrisimha Tâpinî, p. 198, commentary.

The eight mentioned already.

Cf. Taitt. Âran. p. 885.

Cf. Mundaka, p. 312; Sânti Parvan (Moksha), chap. 199, st. 64 seq. Immortality = final emancipation.

p. 165 supra.

Of penance, that is to say.

Cf. Gîtâ, p. 109 for the collocation.

Kathopanishad, p. 151; Maitrî, p. 161. Sankara, seems to take the five and the senses separately; the five meaning the five classes of sensuous objects.

Past losses and future gains, Nîlakantha.

Cf., as to this, Max Müller's Ancient Sanskrit Literature, p. 38 seq.; and Khândogya, pp. 164, 474, 493; Brihadâranyaka, pp. 456, 687, 926; Maitrî, p. 171; Nrisimha Tâpinî, p. 105.

The original is 'void of Riks.' The commentators give no explanation. Does it mean those who abandon the karma-mârga? Heretics who reject all Vedas are scarcely likely to be referred to in this way. Nîlakantha's interpretation of all this is very different. See his gloss.

Sankara gives various interpretations of this. Perhaps the best is to take it as meaning knowledge. 'The one knowledge--the one truth'--would then be like the famous text--Taittirîya, p. 56--'The Brahman is truth, knowledge,' &c.

For this phrase cf. Gîtâ, p. 73.

Those who do not understand the Brahman lose their natural power of obtaining what they wish, and so go in for various ceremonies for various special benefits. Cf. Khândogya, p. 541; Gîtâ, p. 47; and p. 184 infra.

Cf. Brihadâranyaka, p. 893.

Ibid. p. 636.

Literally, 'highest among bipeds,' a rather unusual expression.

Nîlakantha says, 'The part of the Vedas which teaches the p. 172 knowledge of the supreme is enough by itself for its purpose; it is not like the part about rites, &c., which rites must be performed before they serve any useful purpose.' The Gñânakânda is enough by itself for understanding the Brahman. Sankara compares Gîtâ, p. 113, and Katha, p. 102.

The Veda = the Brahman, as above, cf. Svetâsvatara, p. 372 and commentary; that which is to be known = the material world, which is a subject for human knowledge.

Scil. understands the Veda--the Brahman.

'The mind,' says Nîlakantha; literally, 'that which is to be understood.'

Because a real knowledge of it requires a knowledge of the Brahman. As to the next clause cf. inter alia Khândogya, p. 384; Brihadâranyaka, p. 450.

This is the converse of the last sentence, as to which cf. Brihadâranyaka, p. 925.

The supreme.

The apparent contradiction is explained in the next sentence.

I. e. the moon. This refers to the well-known sâkhâkandranyâya. As the small digit of the moon, which cannot be perceived by itself, is pointed out as being at the tip of a branch of a tree pointing towards the moon, so the Vedas are of use as pointing towards the Brahman, though inaccurately and imperfectly.

Scil. in the manner just indicated.

As giving an idea of the Brahman. The first step to a knowledge of the Brahman is to 'hear' about it from Vedic texts. Cf. Brihadâranyaka, p. 925.

Such as the body, the senses, &c., which must be distinguished as quite distinct from the self, though most often confounded with it.

Such passages, namely, as 'Thou art that, I am the Brahman,' &c.

About the objects of the senses.

Cf. Katha, p. 55.

Cf. Khândogya, p. 516. The Bhûman there is the same as the Bahu here, viz. the Brahman. Sankara says expressly in his comment on the Upanishad text, that Bahu and Bhûman, among other words, are synonyms.

Self-restraint, as explained before at p. 163.

Though this is not unimportant, as may be seen from the contrast between town and forest at Khândogya, p. 340. See also Maitrî, p. 100; Mundaka, p. 240. As to the 'highest sage,' see Brihadâranyaka, p. 899, where the passage about 'sacrifice, gift, penance' should be compared with Gîtâ, p. 122.

The construction in the original is not quite clear. I understand the sense to be as follows: In the science of the soul, the p. 174 analyser (the word is the same as the word for grammarian) is he who analyses objects, not words merely. Now the true analysis of objects reduces them all to the Brahman (cf. Khândogya, p. 407; Brihadâranyaka, p. 152); and the sage understands this, and makes the analysis accordingly, so he is rightly called an analyser.