I. e. the piety, Arguna Misra,; the self, Nîlakantha.

I. e. such as piety, &c., Arguna Misra.

follow Arguna Misra, who says 'permanent' means soul, &c. The correct expression would seem to be 'that which is called permanent by others is impermanent.'

This is the view of those who hold the theory of Parinâma, or development, says Arguna Misra.

'To be one' = knowledge to be all of one description, 'distinct' = knowledge having various entities for its distinct objects (this is the view of the holders of the Vigñânavâda, says Arguna Misra); manifold = that the selfs are numberless. The words here are nearly identical with those at Gîtâ, p. 83, see note 4 there.

I. e. help in action, Arguna Misra.

See Âpastamba I, 1, 1, 2 (comment).

I. e. for the acquisition of anything desirable, Arguna Misra, who adds, 'by those who wish for piety.' Nîlakantha says means = 'meditation and so forth;' as to 'that is not so' he cites what he calls a Sruti, which is however one of the Kârikâs of Gaudapâda on the Mândukya; see p. 432.

This, too, is not quite clear, but Nîlakantha says, 'meditation should be practised for release from pain, and for acquisition of pleasure;' land others say not so, it should be done without desire.'

That is to say, they hold that meditation should be practised.

Arguna Misra seems to take this to mean 'renunciation of knowledge,' i.e. a blank, and says this was the view of the Mâdhyamikas,--I suppose the Mâdhyamika Bauddhas.

I. e. the Kârvâkas, Arguna Misra.

Svetâsvatara, p. 276, and Sankara's commentary there.

Were there optimists. and pessimists at the time of the Anugîtâ in India? This verse, however, does not occur in some MSS. Nîlakantha's note on this passage may be of some interest. He says, 'Some hold that the self exists after the body is lost; others, that is the Lokâyatas or Kârvâkas, hold the contrary. Everything doubtful is the view of the Syâdvâdins; nothing doubtful that of the Tairthikas, the great teachers (I presume, about their own respective doctrines). Everything impermanent, Târkikas; permanent, Mîmâmsakas; nothing exists, the Sûnyavâdins; something exists, but only momentarily, p. 377 Saugatas; knowledge is one, but the ego and non-ego are two different principles, the Yogâkâras; mixed, Udulomas; one, is the view of the worshippers of the Brahman as possessed of qualities; distinct, other Mîmâmsakas, who hold that the special actions are the cause (of everything, is meant, I presume); manifold = the atomists; time and space = astrologers. Those who "say that is not so," that is to say, that what we see has no real existence at all, are the Vriddhas, ancient philosophers; omission to bathe = the condition of Naishthika Brahmakârins; bathing = householder's condition; "means should be resorted to, that is not so," those who are against all meditation, &c., according to the Sruti text, which Nîlakantha quotes; "merit and glory, that is not so," some say there is no merit as the Lokâyatas or Kârvâkas; "knowledge, renunciation," the former is to be gained only by means of the latter; "ponder on elements" = who are intent on the investigation of the true nature of things; nature = abundance of resources, by which alone knowledge is produced, not by mere renunciation.' It will be understood, that this commentary assumes a different syntactical construction of the original in some places from that adopted in our translation.