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The Vedanta Sutras of Badarayana, Commentary by Sankara (SBE38), tr. by George Thibaut [1896] at

42. There is non-restriction of the assertions concerning them (i.e. the assertions made concerning certain sacrificial acts are not permanently connected with those acts), because this is seen (in scripture); for a separate fruit, viz. non-obstruction (of the success of the sacrifice), (belongs to them).

We meet in the Vedânta-texts with certain vidyâs which are founded on matters subordinate to sacrificial acts. To this class belongs, e.g. the first vidyâ of the Khândogya Upanishad, 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om as udgîtha.'--We now enter on an inquiry whether those

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vidyâs are permanently connected with the acts in the same way as the circumstance of being made of parna-wood is permanently connected with all sacrifices in which the guhû (the sacrificial ladle) is used; or if they are non-permanent like the vessel called godohana 1. The pûrvapakshin maintains that the meditations are permanently connected with the sacrificial acts, because they also are comprised within the scriptural enouncements concerning performances. For they also do not stand under some special heading 2, and as they are connected with the sacrifice through the udgîtha and so on, they combine themselves, like other subordinate members, with the scriptural statements as to the performance of the sacrifice.

If against the doctrine of the meditations forming permanent parts of the sacrificial performances it should be urged, that in the chapters containing them special results are mentioned (which seem to constitute the meditations into independent acts), as e.g. in the passage, 'he indeed becomes a fulfiller of desires' (Kh. Up. I, 1, 7); we reply that those statements of results being given in the text in the present form only (not in an injunctional form), are mere

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arthavâda-passages--like the statement about him whose guhû is made of parna-wood hearing no evil sound--and thus do not aim at enjoining certain results.--Hence, just as the statement about being made of parna-wood--which does not occur under a definite prakarana--connects itself, by means of the sacrificial ladle, with the sacrifice, and thus forms a permanent element of the latter no less than if it were actually made under the heading of the sacrifice; so the meditations on the udgîtha, &c., also form permanent parts of the sacrifices.

To this we make the following reply. 'There is non-restriction of the assertions concerning them.' That means: the assertions which the text makes concerning the nature of certain subordinate members of sacrificial acts such as the udgîtha and so on--as e.g. that the udgîtha is the best of all essences (Kh. Up. I, 1, 3), the fulfiller of desires (I, 1, 7), a gratifier of desires (I, 1, 8),,the chief prâna (I, 2, 7), Âditya (I, 3, 1)--cannot be permanently connected with the sacrificial acts in the same way as other permanent members are, 'because that is seen,' i.e. because scripture shows that they are not so permanently connected. For scripture allows also such as are not acquainted with the details mentioned above to perform the sacrificial actions (cp. the passage I, 1, 10, 'Therefore both he who knows this, and he who does not, perform the sacrifice'), and declares that even those priests, Prastotri and so on, who are devoid of the knowledge of the divinities of the prastâva and the like, do perform the sacrifices 'Prastotri, if you without knowing the deity which belongs to the prastâva are going to sing it,' &c. (I, 10, 9 and ff.).--The sacred text moreover declares that the vidyâs, founded on certain elements of sacrificial acts have results of their own, apart from those acts, viz. 'non-obstruction' in the accomplishment of the fruit of the sacrifice, i.e. a certain additional success of the sacrifice, cp. the passage I, 1, 10, 'Therefore he who knows this and he who does not perform the sacrifice. But knowledge and ignorance are separate. The sacrifice which a man performs with knowledge, faith, and the Upanishad is more powerful.' The declaration made in this passage

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that the performances of him who knows and of him who does not know are separate, and the employment of the comparative form ('more powerful') show that even the sacrifice destitute of the vidyâ is powerful. But how would that be possible if the vidyâ formed a permanent necessary part of the sacrifice? In the latter case a sacrifice devoid of that vidyâ could never be admitted to be powerful; for it is an established principle that only those sacrifices are effective which comprise all subordinate members. Thus the text also teaches definite results for each meditation, in the section treating of the meditation on the Sâman as the worlds and others: 'The worlds in an ascending and in a descending line belong to him,' &c. (Kh. Up. II, 2, 3).--Nor must we understand those declarations of results to be mere arthavâdas; for in that case they would have to be taken as stating a secondary matter only, while if understood to teach certain results they may be taken in their principal (i.e. direct, literal) sense 1. The case of the results which scripture declares to be connected with the prayâgas e.g. is of a different nature. For the prayâgas. are enjoined with reference to a sacrifice (viz. the darsapûrnamâsa) which requires certain definite modes of procedure (such as the offering of the prayâgas and the like), and hence subserve that sacrifice; so that the passage stating a fruit for the prayâgas has to be considered as a mere arthavâda-passage 2. In the case again of the quality of consisting of parna-wood--which quality is stated ex abrupto, not under a definite heading--no special result can be assumed; for as a quality is not an act, it cannot be connected with any result unless it be joined to something to abide in. The use of the godohana indeed may have its own injunction of

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result, for it does possess such an abode--viz. the act of water being carried (in it)--with reference to which it is enjoined. So again a special fruit may be enjoined for the case of the sacrificial post being made of bilva-wood; for this latter quality likewise has an abode, viz. the sacrificial post with reference to which it is enjoined. But in the case of the quality of consisting of parna-wood there is no such established abode under the heading of which that quality is enjoined; and if we assumed that the sentence ('He whose guhû is made of parna-wood hears no evil sound ') after intimating that the quality of consisting of parna-wood resides in the guhû is also meant to enjoin the fruit thereof, we should impute to the text the imperfection called 'split of the sentence.'--The meditations on the other hand are themselves acts, and as such capable of a special injunction; hence there is no reason why a special result should not be enjoined for those meditations which are based on sacrificial acts. The conclusion therefore is that the meditations on the udgîtha, &c., although based on sacrifices, are yet not necessary members of the latter, because they have results of their own like the use of the godohana-vessel. For this reason the authors of the Kalpa-sûtras have not represented such meditations as belonging to the sacrificial performances.


253:1 The question is raised whether the meditations, enjoined in the Upanishads, on certain parts or elements of sacrificial acts, are permanently connected with the latter, i.e. are to be undertaken whenever the sacrificial act is performed, or not.--In the former case they would stand to the sacrifice in the same relation as the parnamayîtva, i.e. the quality of being made of parna-wood, does. Just as the latter is connected with the sacrifice by means of the guhû--the sacrificial ladle,--so the meditation on the syllable Om, e.g. would be connected with the sacrifice by means of that syllable.--In the latter case, i.e. in the case of being connected with the sacrifice on certain occasions only, the upâsana is analogous to the godohana-vessel which is used in the darsapûrnamâsa-sacrifice instead of the usual kamasa, only if the sacrificer specially wishes for cattle.--See Pû. Mî. Sû. III, 6, 1; IV, 1, 2.

253:2 Like the statement about the parnamayîtva of the guhû which the sacred text does not exhibit under some particular prakarana, but ex abrupto as it were; on which account it is to be connected with the sacrifice in general.

255:1 The statement as to the result of an action is a 'statement of a principal matter' if it is really meant to inform us that a certain result will attend a certain action. It is a statement of a 'secondary matter' if it is only meant to glorify the action.

255:2 Not as a passage enjoining a special result for the prayâgas; for the latter merely help to bring about the general result of the darsapûrnamâsa and have no special result of their own.

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