Pahlavi Texts, Part IV (SBE37), E.W. West, tr. , at sacred-texts.com
1. The second section is miscellaneous (hamdâdakŏ): about the authority for the enquiry (khvâst-radakîh) of a father into the sin of a grown-up son, when unaware of the sin of his son at the time it is committed; that of a son into that of a father, and of others grown-up, as to one another, when they are not abettors of the sin; and that of a husband into the sin of a wife, when not and when 2 co-operating and unrestraining. 2. About arrival at the period for the teaching of children by a guardian or father, and the mode of his teaching; the period at which the sin of a child has reached a beginning, the extent of the sin of childhood, the retribution in childhood, and that also at maturity; the sin due to not teaching a child who is to be taught, and whatever is on the same subject.
3. About the freedom from slaughter which is to
keep away the destruction of the world; and what is the mode of distributing the property of a man of the valiant after his slaughter. 4. About the sin of having given implements of slaughter to a woman, a child, or a foreigner. 5. About a woman who, as regards two men worthy of death, demands the head of the one, and is seeking a son in the other one.
6. About a warrior, without provisions (atûsakŏ), who, on the march, has come upon pasture, corn, and sheep whose shepherd 1 is a stranger to him, and whatever is on the same subject. 7. About considering property inexpedient, and the decision thereon.
8. About the amount of delay of a judge on becoming aware that the plaintiff is falsely petitioning and the defendant is falsely confessing. 9. About the amount of delay of the judge, and in the court of justice (dâd gas); and whatever is on the same
subject. 10. About a decision regarding a judge who explained a doubtful opinion as a certainty, and that which is certain as a doubtful decision, and would make an undecided matter decided. 11. About the opinion as to certainty and that as to doubtfulness, making a decision, and whatever is on the same subject.
12. About the business of commissioned judges, from him who is lowest to him who is highest, one above the other one. 13. Decisions about adjudication; that which is legal when two judges are together, that which is legal with either one judge or two judges together, and whatever is on the same subject. 14. About the statements of a decision regarding interpretations (pâdŏ-khânânŏ) 1, and whatever is on the same subject. 15. About the proportion of the time of judges for decision, that for summoning witnesses to the judges, and that for the proceedings (sakisnŏ). 16. About the judge who is doubly satisfied 2, and him who is not doubly satisfied; also the time from a judge's not being doubly satisfied till his being doubly satisfied. 17. About a judge of four customs, and his decision thereon; one who knows the decree and would act to effect it, and one who knows it and would not act. 18. About the supremacy of a judge as to adjudication so far as there is a false decision therein; how it is when he is at a distance (pavan hâsar), and how it is when he is on the spot; he who is at a
distance becomes a superior therein, when he comes back to the place of justice before the end of a Hâsar 1. 19. About other false teaching of a judge which is manifest therefrom, and the retribution for the false teaching; the false summoning, false investigation, and false evidence of the complainant (mûst-hômŏnd) having been his own, and a separate atonement unto the afflicted one has to atone for the affair; it having been mitigated by no good work. 20. About the trouble of adjudication to the priestly authorities (radân). 21. About the proficiency of a woman or child who is acquainted with the law 2, for a judgeship, being above that of a full-grown man unacquainted with the law.
22. About assisting the want of one's own disciple for a master for the recited law, and the sin due to not assisting, such as that when, wanting assistance, it is allowable for the afflicted one to beg an assistant from foreigners, and according to his petition is the bringing of a foreigner for assistance; and whatever is on the same subject. 23. About the supremacy of Rashnû 3 the righteous.
24. About several persons who are engaged in legal proceedings about the keeping and non-division of property not their own, and the decision as regards for whom one has in keeping that property which is not his own. 25. About actions which are not inconsistent and those which are inconsistent. 26. About the decision of a judge of congregational actions.
27. About the offence which accusers would commit, as regards the law, by means of the law, it being
not allowable to commit it with their own hands; also as regards any one's property, about which there is a dispute, even though with a certainty as to its ownership.
77:2 Perhaps the repetition of the word amat, 'and when' is a blunder of the copyist.
78:1 The Pahlavi word is written twenty-four times, and once, in this Book, but its reading is not quite certain. It means 'shepherd' throughout Chaps. XXIII, XXXIX, and in XXXI, 17, 31, XL, 3; but is used for 'herdsman' in XXXIX, 3, and for 'follower' in XXXI, 2. This last meaning is strongly in favour of the reading pasîg, for pasîk, 'following,' an adjectival form derived from pas, 'after,' which, when used as a noun, would imply 'one who follows,' as drovers and shepherds are accustomed to do, with a few local exceptions. The Pahlavi spelling of the word is uniformly inconsistent with the reading pâs, 'guard, protector;' and it seems hazardous to trace it to a possible Avesta adjective pasvya, from pasu, 'a sheep,' because the latter word becomes pâh in Pahlavi. The word also occurs in Pahl. Vend. XV, 116; it is a transcript of Av. fshenghî and fshenghyô in Yas. XXXI, 10 b, XLIX, 9 a, and of fshê in Vend. XIII, 10, 11; so that it may perhaps be read fsheg, or fshê, as a mere transcript from the Avesta.
79:1 Pahl. pâdŏ-khân = Pers. pâîhvân.
79:2 Pâz. vayôzust, Av. vayôzustô = dvayôzustô. Farh. Oîm, p. 43, ll. 10-12, has 'the Vayôzustô, who is a judge, explains this, so that the petitioner who is doubtful is a hearer of certainty; it is, as one says, deliberately weighed.'
80:1 See Chap. XX, 68.
80:2 See Chap. XX, 74.
80:3 See Chap. XX, 153.