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   a. Salutation to the illustrious sage, Kapila!

   b. Well, the great sage, Kapila, desirous of raising the world [from the Slough of Despond in which he found it sunk], perceiving that the knowledge of the excellence of any fruit, through the desire [which this excites] for the fruit, is a cause of people's betaking themselves to the means [adapted to the attainment of the fruit], declares [as follows] the excellence of the fruit [which he would urge our striving to obtain]:


The subject proposed.

   Aph. 1.* Well, the complete cessation of pain [which is] of three kinds is the complete end of man.

p. 2

   a. The word 'well' serves as a benediction; [the particle atha being regarded as an auspicious one].

   b. By saying that the complete cessation of pain, which is of three kinds,—viz., (1) due to one's self (ádhyátmika), (2) due to products of the elements (ádhibhautika), and (3) due to supernatural causes (ádhidaivika),—is the complete end of man, he means to say that it is the chief end of man, among the four human aims, [viz., merit, wealth, pleasure, and liberation (see Sáhitya-darpaṉa, § 2)]; because the three are transitory, whereas liberation is not transitory: such is the state of the case.

   A question whether the end may not be attained by ordinary means.

   c. But then, let it be that the above-mentionend cessation [of all the three kinds of pain] is the complete end of man; still, what reason is there for betaking one's self to a doctrinal system which is the cause of a knowledge of the truth, in the shape of the knowledge of the difference between Nature and Soul, when there are easy remedies for bodily pains, viz., drugs, &c., and remedies for mental pains, viz., beautiful women and delicate food, &c., and remedies for pains due to products of the elements, viz., the residing in impregnable localities, &c., as is enjoined in the institutes of polity, and remedies for pains due to supernatural causes, viz., gems [such as possess marvellous prophylactic properties], and spells, and herbs of mighty p. 3 power, &c.; and when [on the other hand], since it is hard to get one to grapple with that very difficult knowledge of truth which can be perfected only by the toil of many successive births, it must be still more hard to get one to betake himself to the doctrinal system [which treats of the knowledge in question]? Therefore [i.e., seeing that this may be asked] he declares [as follows]:


   The end is not to be attained by ordinary means.

   Aph. 2.* The effectuation of this [complete cessation of pain] is not [to be expected] by means of the visible [such as wealth, &c.]; for we see [on the loss of wealth, &c.,] the restoration [of the misery and evil,] after [its temporary] cessation.

p. 4

   a. 'The visible,' in the shape of the drugs, &c., above-mentioned [§ 1. c.].

   b. 'The effectuation of this,' i.e., the effectuation of the complete cessation of pain.

   c. Why is it not [to be thus effected]? Because, after the cessation (the cessation of pain is understood), we see its restoration, the springing up again of pain in general, [from whichever of its three sources (§ 1. b.)].

   d. The state of the matter is this: not by the expedients above-mentioned is there such a removal of pain, that no pain arises thereafter; for, when, by this or that expedient, this or that pain has been destroyed, we see other pains springing up. Therefore, though it be not easy [§ 1. c.], the knowledge of truth [as a complete remedy] is to be desired.

   e. But then, grant that future pain is not debarred by drugs, &c., [employed to remove present pain], still, by p. 5 again and again obviating it [as often as it presents itself], there may be the cessation of future pain, also. This doubt he states [as follows]:


   The question whether the end may not be attained by the recurrent use of ordinary means.

   Aph. 3.* [Let us consider the doubt] that the soul's desire [the cessation of pain, may result] from exertions for the obviation [of pain], as is the case with the obviation of daily hunger

   a. When pain shall arise [let us suppose one to argue] then it is to be obviated; and thus there is the soul's desire, the cessation of pain; just as one should eat, when there is hunger; and thus there is the soul's desire of the eater, viz., the cessation of hunger. In regard to this [doubt] he states the recognized decision:

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   This negation negatived.

   Aph. 4.* This [method of palliatives (§ 3)] is to be rejected by those who are versed in evidence; because it is not everywhere possible [to employ it at all], and because, even if this were possible, there would be an impossibility as regards [ensuring] the perfect fitness [of the agents employed].

   a. For there are not physicians, &c., in every place and at all times; and [to rely on physicians, &c., would not be advisable], even if there were the possibility,—i.e., even if these were [always at hand], since physicians are not perfect [in their art];—for pain cannot with certainty be got rid of by means of physicians, &c., with their drugs, &c. Moreover, when corporeal pain has departed, there may still be that which is mental, &c.; so that there is not [under such circumstances], in every respect, liberation from pain. For these reasons, such a soul's aim [as that which contents itself with temporary palliatives] is to be rejected by those who are versed in evidence, [i.e., who are acquainted with authoritative treatises].

   b. He mentions another proof [of his assertion]:

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   Scriptural evidence in favour of this view.

   Aph. 5.* Also [an inferior method ought not to be adopted] because of the preeminence of Liberation [as proved] by the text [of Scripture declaratory] of its preeminence above all else.

   a. One ought not to endeavour after the removal of this or that pain by these and those expedients [§ 1. c.]; since Liberation (moksha), by being eternal, is transcendent as a remover of all pains. Moreover, one ought to endeavour only after the knowledge of truth, which is the means thereof [i.e., of Liberation]; because the Scripture tells its preeminence above all [other objects of endeavour], in the text: 'There is nothing beyond the gaining of Soul, [with the utter exclusion of pain].'

   b. But then [it may be suggested], when you say liberation, we understand you to mean from bondage. And is that bondage essential? Or is it adventitious? In the former case, it is incapable of destruction; if it come under the latter head, it will perish of itself, [like any other adventitious and, therefore, transitory thing]. What have we to do with your 'knowledge of truth,' then? To this he replies [as follows]:

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   An objection met.

   Aph. 6.* And there is no difference between the two.

   a. There is no difference in the applicability of liberation, on either of the suppositions, that the bondage is essential, and that it is adventitious, [supposing it were either (see § 19. b.)]. That is to say, we can tell both how the bondage takes place, and how the liberation takes place.

   b. Now, with the view of demonstrating [the real nature of] Bondage and Liberation, he declares, exclusively, in the first place, the objections to Bondage's being essential [§ 5. b.]:


   Liberation must be possible; else the means would not have been enjoined.

   Aph. 7.* There would be no rule in the enjoining of means for the liberation of one bound essentially.

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   a. Since Liberation has been stated [§ 1] to result from the complete cessation of pain, [it follows that] Bondage is the junction of pain; and this is not essential in man. For, if that were the case, then there would be no rule, i.e., no fitness, in the Scriptural or legal injunction of means for liberation: such is what must be supplied, [to complete the aphorism]. Because, to explain our meaning [by an illustration], fire cannot be liberated from its heat, which is eseential to it; since that which is essential exists as long as the substance exists.

   b. And it has been declared in the Divine Song [the Íśwara-gítá,]: 'If the soul were essentially foul, or impure, or changeable, then its liberation could not take place even through hundreds of successive births.'

   c. [Since some one may be disposed to say] 'Grant that there is no fitness [in the Scriptural and legal injunctions, (§ 7. a.)], what have we to do with that?' Therefore he declares [as follows]:

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   Scripture would be nugatory, if pain were inevitable.

   Aph. 8.* Since an essential nature is imperishable, unauthoritativness, betokened by impracticableness, [would be chargeable against the Scripture, if pain were essential to humanity].

   a. That is to say: since the essential nature of anything is imperishable, i.e., endures as long as the thing itself, it would follow [on the supposition that pain is essential to humanity], that, since Liberation is impossible, the Scripture which enjoins the means for its attainment is a false authority, inasmuch as it is impracticable [in its injunctions. And this is out of the question; Scripture being assumed, here, as in all the others of the six systems, to be an exact measure of truth].

   b. But then [some one may say], let it be an injunction [to use means for the attainment of an unattainable object], on the mere strength of Scripture; [and, since Scripture is an unquestionable authority, we may be excused from asking or answering the question, why the injunction is given]. To this he replies [as follows]:

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   An impracticable injunction is no rule.

   Aph. 9.* There is no rule, where something impossible is enjoined: though it be enjoined, it is no injunction.

   a. There can be no fitness, or propriety, in an injunction with a view to an impossible fruit; seeing that, though something be enjoined, or ordered [to be effected] by means that are impracticable, this is no injunction at all, but only the semblance of an injunction; because it stands to reason, that not even the Veda can make one see sense in an absurdity: such is the meaning.

   b. Here he comes upon a doubt:


   A doubt whether the essential be not removable.

   Aph. 10.* If [some one says] as in the case of white cloth, or of a seed, [something essential may be not irremovable, then he will find his answer in the next aphorism].

   a. But then [the doubter is supposed to argue], the destruction even of what is essential [in spite of what is stated under § 7] is seen; as, for example, the essential whiteness of white cloth is removed by dyeing, and the essential power of germination in a seed is removed by p. 12 fire. Therefore, according to the analogy of the white cloth and the seed, it is possible that there should be the removal of the bondage of the soul, even though it were essential. So, too, there may be [without any impropriety] the enjoinment of the means thereof. Well, if [any one argues thus], such is the meaning [of the aphorism, to which he proceeds to reply].

   b. He declares [the real state of the case, with reference to the doubt just raised]:


   Decision that an essential property may be hidden, but not removed.

   Aph. 11.* Since both perceptibleness and [subsequent] non-perceptibleness may belong to some power [which is indestructible], it is not something impracticable that is enjoined, [when one is directed to render some indestructible* power imperceptible].

   a. In regard even to the two examples above-mentioned [§ 10], people do not give an injunction for [the positive destruction of]** something essential, which is indestructible [§ 8]. Why [do we say this]? Because, in these two p. 13 instances of the perceptibleness and non-perceptibleness of a power [the powers, namely, of appearing white and of germinating (see § 10. a.)], there are merely the manifestation and [afterwards] the hiding of the whiteness, &c., but not the removal of the whiteness, or of the power of germination; because, that is to say, the whiteness of the dyed cloth and the germinating power of the roasted seed can again be brought out by the processes of the bleacher, &c., [in the case of the dyed cloth], and by the will of the Yogí, [the possessor of supernatural powers, in the case of the roasted seed], &c.

   b. Having thus disproved the notion that bondage is essential [to man], wishing to disprove also the notion that it is the result of some [adherent] cause, be rejects the [various supposable] causes, viz., Time, &c.:

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   Time, which applies to all, cannot be the cause of the bondage of a part.

   Aph. 12.* Not from connexion with time [does bondage befall the soul]; because this, all-pervading and eternal, is [eternally] associated with all, [and not with those alone who are in bondage].

   a. The bondage of man is not caused by time; because [if that were the case,] there could be no such separation as that of the liberated and unliberated; because time, which applies to everything, and is eternal, is at all times associated with all men, [and must, therefore, bring all into bondage, if any].


   Place, for the same reason, cannot be the cause.

   Aph. 13.* Nor [does bondage arise] from connexion with place, either, for the same [reason]

   a. That is to say: bondage does not arise from connexion with place. Why? 'For the same reason,' i.e., for that stated in the preceding aphorism, viz., that, since it [viz., place] is connected with all men, whether liberated p. 15 or not liberated, bondage would [in that case] befall the liberated, also.


   The soul is not kept in bondage by its being conditioned.

   Aph. 14.* Nor [does the bondage of the soul arise] from its being conditioned [by its standing among circumstances that clog it by limiting it]; because that is the fact in regard to [not the soul, but] the body.

   a. By 'condition' we mean the being in the shape of a sort of association. The bondage [of the soul] does not arise from that; because that is the property of the body [and not of the soul]; because, that is to say, bondage might befall even the liberated [which is impossible], if that which is the fact in regard to another could occasion the bondage of one quite different.

   b. But then [some one might say], let this conditioned state belong to the soul. On this point [to prevent mistakes], he declares:

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   The soul is absolute.

   Aph. 15.* Because this soul is [unassociated with any conditions or circumstances that could serve as its bonds, it is] absolute.

   a. The word iti here shows that it [i.e., the assertion conveyed in the aphorism] is a reason; the construction with the preceding aphorism being this, that, since the soul is unassociated, it belongs only to the body to be conditioned.


   The fruit of works belongs not to the soul.

   Aph. 16.* Nor [does the bondage of soul arise] from any work; because [works are] the property of another [viz., the mind], and because it [the bondage] would be eternal,3 [if the case were as you imagine].

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   a. That is to say: moreover, the bondage of the soul does not arise from any work, whether enjoined or forbidden; because works are the property of another, i.e., not the property of the soul [but of the mind]. And, if, through a property of another, the bondage of one quite distinct could take place, then bondage might befall even the liberated, [through some acts of some one else].

   b. But then [some one may say], this objection does not apply, if we hold that bondage may arise from the acts of the associate2 [viz., the mental organ]: so, with allusion to this, he states another reason, 'and because it would be eternal,' i.e., because bondage, in the shape of connexion with pain, would occur [where it does not,] even in such cases as the universal dissolutions [of the phenomenal universe, including the mental organ, but not the soul].

   A doubt whether the bondage, also, belongs not to something else than the soul.

   c. But then [some one may say], if that be the case, then let the bondage, too, in the shape of connexion with pain, belong [not to the soul, but] to the mind alone, in accordance with the principle that it have the same locus as the works [to which it is due]; and, since it is an established point that pain is an affection p. 18 of the mind, why is bondage [i.e., connexion with pain] assumed of the soul, also? With reference to this doubt, he declares [as follows]:


   Why it is to the soul that the bondage must belong.

   Aph. 17.* If it were the property of any other, then there could not be diverse experience.

   a. If bondage, in the shape of connexion with pain, were the property of another, i.e., a property of the mind, there could be no such thing as diverse experience; there could be no such different experience as one man's experiencing pain, and another man's not: [for, it must be remembered, it is not in point of mind, but of soul, that men are held, by Kapila, to be numerically different]. Therefore, it must be admitted that pain is connected with the soul, also. And this [pain that belongs to the soul] is in the shape merely of a reflexion of the pain [that attaches to its attendant organism]; and this reflexion is of its own attendant [organism] only; so that there is no undue result [deducible from our theory].

p. 19

   b. He rejects also the notion that Nature (prakṛiti) is directly the cause of bondage:


   Nature is not the immediate cause of the soul's bondage.

   Aph. 18.* If [you say that the soul's bondage arises] from Nature, as its cause, [then I say] 'no;' [because] that, also, is a dependent thing.

   a. But then [some one may say], let bondage result from Nature, as its cause. If you say so, I say 'no;' because that, also, i.e., Nature, also, is dependent on the conjunction which is to be mentioned in the next aphorism; because, if it [Nature] were to occasion bondage, even without that [conjunction which is next to be mentioned], then bondage would occur even in such cases as the universal dissolution, [when soul is altogether disconnected from the phenomenal].

p. 20

   b. If the reading [in the aphorism] be nibandhaná1 [in the 1st case, and not in the 5th], then the construction will be as follows: 'If [you say that] the bondage is caused by Nature,' &c.

   c. Therefore, since Nature can be the cause of bondage, only as depending on something else [i.e., on the conjunction to be mentioned in the next aphorism], through this very sort of conjunction [it follows that] the bondage is reflexional, like the heat of water due to the conjunction of fire; [water being held to be essentially cold, and to seem hot only while the heat continues in conjunction with it].

   d. He establishes his own tenet, while engaged on this point, in the very middle [of his criticisms on erroneous notions in regard to the matter; for there are more to come]:

p. 21


   What really is the relation of its bondage to the soul.

   Aph. 19.* [But] not without the conjunction thereof [i.e., of Nature] is there the connexion of that [i.e., of pain] with that [viz., the soul,] which is ever essentially a pure and free intelligence.

   a. Therefore,1 without the conjunction thereof, i.e., without the conjunction of Nature, there is not, to the soul, any connexion with that, i.e., any connexion with bondage; but, moreover, just through that [connexion with Nature] does bondage take place.

   b. In order to suggest the fact that the bondage [of the soul] is reflexional [and not inherent in it, either essentially or adventitiously], he makes use of the indirect expression with a double negative, ['not without']. For, if bondage were produced by the conjunction [of the soul] with Nature, as colour is produced by heating [in the case of a jar of black clay, which becomes red in the baking], then, just like that, it would continue even after disjunction therefrom; [as the red colour remains in the jar, after the fire of the brick-kiln has been extinguished, whereas the red colour occasioned in a crystal vase by a China-rose, while it occurs not without the China-rose, ceases, on the removal thereof]. Hence, as bondage ceases, on the disjunction [of the soul] from Nature, the bondage is merely reflexional, and neither essential [§ 5. b.] nor adventitious [§ 11. b.].

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   c. In order that there may not be such an error as thot of the Vaiśeshikas, viz., [the opinion that there is] an absolutely real conjunction [of the soul] with pain, he says 'which is ever,' &c. [§ 19]. That is to say: as the connexion of colour with essentially pure crystal does not take place without the conjunction of the China-rose [the hue of which, seen athwart the crystal, seems to belong to the crystal], just so the connexion of pain with the soul, ever essentially pure, &c., could not take place without the conjunction of some accidental associate; that is to say, pain, &c., cannot arise spontaneously, [any more than a red colour can arise spontaneously in the crystal which is essentially pure].

   d. This has been declared, in the Saura, as follows 'As the pure crystal is regarded, by people, as red, in consequence of the proximity of something [as a China-rose] p. 23 that lends its colour, in like manner the supreme soul [is regarded as being affected by pain].'

   e. In that [aphorism, 19], the perpetual purity means the being ever devoid of merit and demerit; the perpetual intelligence means the consisting of uninterrupted thought; and the perpetual liberatedness means the being ever dissociated from real pain: that is to say, the connexion with pain in the shape of a reflexion is not a real bondage, [any more than the reflexion of the China-rose is a real stain in the crystal].*

   f. And so the maker of the aphorism means, that the cause of its bondage is just a particular conjunction [§ 19. c.]. And now enough as to that point.

   g. Now he rejects [§ 18. d.] certain causes of [the soul's] bondage, preferred by others:

p. 24


   The Vedántic tenet on this point disputed.

   Aph. 20.* Not from Ignorance, too, [does the soul's bondage arise]; because that which is not a reality is not adapted to binding.

   a. The word 'too' is used with reference to the previously mentioned 'Time,' &c., [§ 12, which had been rejected, as causes of the bondage, antecedently to the statement, in § 19, of the received cause].

   b. Neither, too, does [the soul's] union with bondage result directly from 'Ignorance,' as is the opinion of those who assert non-duality [or the existence of no reality save one (see Vedánta-sára, § 20. b.)]; because, since their 'Ignorance' is not a real thing, it is not fit to bind; because, that is to say, the binding of any one with a rope merely dreamt of was never witnessed.

   c. But, if 'Ignorance' be a reality [as some assert], then he declares [as follows]:


   The Vedántí cannot evade the objection, without stultifying himself.

   Aph. 21.* If it ['Ignorance'] be [asserted, by you, to be] a reality, then there is an abandonment of the [Vedántíc] tenet, [by you who profess to follow the Vedánta].

p. 25

   a. That is to say: and, if you agree that 'Ignorance' is a reality, then you abandon your own implied dogma* [see Nyáya Aphorisms I., § 31] of the unreality of Ignorance;' [and so you stultify yourself].

   b. He states another objection:


   The Vedántí cannot evade the objection, without conceding a duality.

   Aph. 22.* And [if you assume 'Ignorance' to be a reality, then] there would be a duality, through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul; which you asserters of non-duality cannot contemplate allowing].

   a. That is to say: if 'Ignorance' is real and without a beginning, then it is eternal, and coordinate with Soul: if [therefore] it be not soul, then there is a duality, through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul; and this the Vedántís cannot intend to establish]; because these followers of the Vedánta, asserting non-duality, hold that there is neither a duality through there being something of the same kind [with soul], nor through there being something of a different kind.

p. 26


   The Vedántí must not allege tha 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal.

   Aph. 23.* If [the Vedántí alleges, regarding 'Ignorance,' that] it is in the shape of both these opposites, [then we shall say 'no,' for the reason to be assigned in the next aphorism].

   a. The meaning is: if [the Vedántí says that] 'Ignorance' is not real,—else there would be a duality through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul, which a follower of the Vedánta cannot allow],—and, moreover, it is not unreal, because we experience its effects; but it is in the shape of something at once real and unreal, [like Plato's ὂν καὶ μὴ ὄν: (see Vedánta-sára, § 21)].


   There is no such thing as a thing at once real and unreal.

   Aph. 24.* [To the suggestion that 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal we say] 'no;' because no such thing is known [as is at once real and unreal.]

   a. That is to say: it is not right to say that 'Ignorance' is at once real and unreal. The reason of this he states in the words 'because no such thing,' &c.; because any such thing as is at once real and unreal is not known. p. 27 For, in the case of a dispute, it is neccssary that there should be an example of the thing [i.e. (see Nyáya Aphorisms, I., § 25), a case in which all parties are agreed that the property in dispute is really present]; and, as regards your opinion, such is not to be found; [for, where is there anything in regard to which both parties are agreed that it is at once real and unreal, as they are agreed that fire is to be met with on the culinary hearth?]: such is the import.

   b. Again he ponders a doubt:

p. 28


   A question whether the Vedántí is bound to avoid self-contradiction.

   Aph. 25.* [Possibly the Vedántí may remonstrate] 'We are not asserters of any Six Categories, like the Vaiśeshikas and others.'

   a. 'We are not asserters of a definite set of categories [like the Vaiśeshikas, who arrange all things under six heads, and the Naiyáyikas, who arrange them under sixteen]. Therefore, we hold that there is such a thing, unknown though it be [to people in general], as 'Ignorance' which is at once real and unreal, or [if you prefer it], which differs at once from the real and the unreal [see p. 28 Vedánta-sára, § 21]; because this is established by proofs,' [Scriptural or otherwise, which are satisfactory to us, although they may not comply with all the technical requisitions of Gotama's scheme of argumentative exposition (see Nyáya Aphorisms, I., § 35)].

   b. By the expression [in the aphorism] 'and others' are meant the Naiyáyikas; for the Naiyáyika is an asserter of sixteen categories [see Nyáya Aphorisms, I., § 1].

   c. He confutes [this pretence of evading the objection, by disallowing the categories of the Nyáya]:


   The self-contradictory is altogether inadmissible.

   Aph. 26.* Even although this be not compulsory [that the categories be six, or sixteen], there is no acceptance of the inconsistent; else we come to the level of children, and madmen, and the like.

   a. Let there be [accepted] no system of categories [such as that of the Vaiśeshika, § 25]; still, since being and not-being are contradictory, it is impossible for disciples to p. 29 admit, merely on Your Worship's assertion, a thing at once real and unreal, which is inconsistent, contrary to all fitness: otherwise, we might as well accept also the self-contradictory assertions of children and the like: such is the meaning.

   b. Certain heretics [deniers of the authority of the Vedas] assert that there exist external objects of momentary duration [individuaily; each being, however, replaced by its facsimile the next instant, so that the uninterrupted series of productions becomes something equivalent to continuous duration], and that by the influence2 of these the bondage of the soul [is occasioned]. This he objects to, [as follows]:

p. 30


   The heretical theory of a succession of momentary objects from all eternity, as causing the soul's bondage, rejected.

   Aph. 27.* [The bondage] thereof moreover, is not caused by any influence of objects from all eternity.

   a. 'Thereof,' i.e., of the soul. An eternal influence of objects, an influence of objects the effect of which, in the shape of a continued stream, has had no commencement,—not by this, either, is it possible that the bondage [of the soul] has been occasioned: such is the meaning.

   b. He states the reason of this [impossibility]:

p. 31


   A thing cannot act where it is not.

   Aph. 28.* Also [in my opinion, as well as in yours, apparently], between the external and the internal there is not the relation of influenced and influencer; because there is a local separation; as there is between him that stays at Srughna and him that stays at Páṭaliputra.

   a. In the opinion of these [persons whose theory we are at present objecting to], the soul is circumscibed, residing entirely within the body; and that which is thus within cannot stand in the relation of the influenced and the influencer, as regards an external object. Why? Because they are separated in regard to place; like two persons the one of whom remains in Srughna and the other in Páṭaliputra: such is the meaning. Because the affection which we call 'influence' (vásaná) is seen only when there is conjunction, such as that of madder and the cloth [to which it gives its colour], or that of flowers and the flower-basket [to which they impart their odour.]

   b. By the word 'also' the absence or conjunction [between the soul and objects (see § 10)], &c., which he himself holds, is connected [with the matter of the present aphorism].

p. 32

   c. Srughna and Páṭaliputra [Palibothra, or Patna] are two several places far apart.

   d. But then [these heretics may reply], 'The influence of objects [on the soul] may be asserted, because there is a contact with the object; inasmuch as the soul, according to us, goes to the place of the object, just as the senses, according to Your Worship.' Therefore he declares [as follows]:


   On the heretical view, the free soul would be equally liable to bondage.

   Aph. 29.* [It is impossible that the soul's bondage should arise] from an influence received in the same place [where the object is; because, in that case], there would be no distinction between the two, [the bond and the free].

   a. To complete the sense, we must supply as follows: 'It is impossible that the bondage should arise from an influence received in one and the same place with the object.' Why? Because there would be no distinction between the two, the soul bound and the soul free; because bondage would [in that case] befall the liberated soul, also; [the free soul, according to this hypothesis, being just as likely to come across objects as any other]: such is the meaning.

p. 33

   b. Here he ponders a doubt:


   The heretic's attempted defence.

   Aph. 30.* If [the heretic, wishing to save his theory suggests that a difference between the two cases (see § 29) does exist] in virtue of the unseen, [i.e., of merit and demerit, then he will find his answer in the next aphorism].

   a. That is to say, [the heretic may argue]: 'But then, granting that they [the free soul and the bound] are alike in respect of their coming into contact with objects, when they become conjoined with them in one and the same locality; yet the reception of the influence may result merely from the force of the unseen, [i.e., from the merit and demerit of this or that soul; the soul that is liberated alike from merit and demerit being able to encounter, with impunity, the object that would enchain one differently circumstanced]': if [this be urged, then we look forward].

   b. This he disputes, [as follows]:

p. 34


   Each back must bear its own burden.

   Aph. 31.* They cannot stand in the relation of deserver and bestower, since the two do not belong to one and the same time.

   a. Since, in thy opinion, the agent and the patient are distinct, and do not belong to the same time [believing, as thou heretically dost, not only that objects (see § 26. b.) momentarily perish and are replaced, but that the duration of souls, also, is of a like description], there is positively no such relation [between the soul at one time and its successor at another] as that of deserver and bestower [or transmitter of its merits or demerits]; because it is impossible that there should be an influence of objects [§ 27] taking effect on a patient [say, the soul of to-day], occasioned by the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] belonging to an agent [say, the soul of yesterday, which, on the hypothesis in question, is a numerically different individual]: such is the meaning.

   b. He ponders a doubt:


   Whether merit may, or may not, be imputed.

   Aph. 32.* If [the heretic suggests that] the case is like that of the ceremonies in regard to a son, [then he will find his reply by looking forward].

   a. But then [the heretic, admitting the principle that p. 35 the merit or demerit of an act belongs entirely to the agent, may urge that], as the son is benefited by ceremonies in regard to a son, such as that [ceremony (see Colebrooke's 'Hindu Law,' Vol. III., p. 104) celebrated] in anticipation of conception, which [no doubt] belongs to the father [who performs the ceremonies, to propitiatc the gods], in like manner there may be an influence of objects on the experiencer [say, the soul of to-day], through the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] that belongs even to a different subject [say, the soul of yesterday]: such is the meaning [of the heretic].

   b. He refutes this, by showing that the illustration is not a fact:


   This will not help the heretic's argument.

   Aph. 33.* [Your illustration proves nothing;] for, in that case, there is no one permanent soul which could be consecrated by the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c.

   a. 'In that case,' i.e., on thy theory, too, the benefit of p. 36 the son, by [means of the performance of]1 the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c., could not take place; 'for,' i.e., because, on that theory, there is not one [self-identical] soul, continuing from the [time of] conception to birth, which could be consecrated [by the ceremonies in question], so as to be a fit subject for the duties that pertain to the time subsequent to birth [such as the investiture with the sacred thread, for which the young Bráhman would not be a fit subject, if the ceremonies in anticipation of his conception had been omitted]: and thus your illustration is not a real one, [on your own theory: it is not a thing that you can assert as a fact].

   b. And, according to my theory, also, your illustration is not a fact; seeing that it is possible that the benefit to the son should arise from the 'unseen' [merit] deposited in the son by means of the ceremony regarding the son: for it is an implied tenet [of my school], that it [the soul] is permanent [in its self-identity]; and there is the injunction [of Manu, (Ch. II., v. 26), with regard to the ceremonies in question, which proceeds on the same grounds].

p. 37

   c. Some other heretic may encounter us, on the strength of [the argument here next stated, viz.,] 'But then, since bondage, also, [like everything else] is momentary, let this bondage have nothing determinate for its cause, or nothing at all for its cause,' [which view of matters is propounded in the next aphorism]:


   Whether bondage may not be momentary, and so require no cause.

   Aph. 34.* Since there is no such thing as a permanent result [on the heretical view], the momentariness [of bondage, also, is to be admitted].

   a. 'Of bondage': this must be supplied, [to complete the aphorism].

   b. And thus the point relied on is, that it [i.e., bondage] have no cause at all. And so this is the application [of the argument, viz.]:

(1) Bondage, &c., is momentary;
(2) Because it exists,
(3) [Everything that exists is momentary,] as the apex of the lamp-flame, or the like.

p. 38

   c. And [continues the heretic,] this [reason, viz., 'existence'] does not extend unduly1 [as you may object,] to the case of a jar, or the like; because that, also [in my opinion], is like the subject in dispute; [in being momentary]. This [in fact] is precisely what is asserted in the expression, 'since there is no such thing as a permanent result' [§ 34].

   d. He objects [to this heretical view]:


   The fact of recognition proves that things are not momentary.

   Aph. 35.* No, [things are not momentary in their duration]; for the absurdity of this is proved by recognition.

   a. That is to say: nothing is momentary; because the absurdity of its being momentary follows from the opposite argument [to that under § 34. b.]. taken from such facts of recognition as, 'what I saw, that same do I touch,' [an argument which may be stated as follows], viz.:

(1) Bondage, &c., is permanent;
(2) Because it exists, p. 39
(3) [Everything that exists is permanent,] as a jar, or the like.


   That things are momentary is contradicted by Scripture and reasoning.

   Aph. 36.* And [things are not momentary;] because this is contradicted by Scripture and reasoning.

   a. That is to say: nothing is momentary; because the general principle, that the whole world, consisting of effects and causes, is momentary, is contradicted by such texts as this, viz., '[All] this, O ingenuous one, was antecedently existing,' and by such Scriptural and other arguments as this, viz., 'How should what exists proceed from the non-existent?'


   The heretic's illustration is not a truth.

   Aph. 37.* And [we reject the argument of this heretic;] because his instance is not a fact.

p. 40

   a. That is to say: the general principle of the momentariness [of all things] is denied; because this momentary churacter does not [in fact] belong to the apex of the lamp-flame, &c., the instance [on which thou, heretic, dost ground thy generalization, (§ 34. b.)]. Moreover, thou quite errest in regard to momentariness, in that instance, from not taking account of the minute and numerous instants [really included in a duration which seems to thee momentary]: such is the import.

   If things were momentary, there could be no relation of cause and effect.

   b. Moreover, if the momentary duration, &c., [of things] be asserted, then there can be no such thing as the relation of cause and effect, in the case of the earth and the jar, and the like. And you must not say that there is no such thing as that [relation of cause and effect]; because it is proved to be a reality by the fact that, otherwise, there would be no such thing as the efforts of him who desires an effect; [and who, therefore, sets in operation the causes adapted to its production]. With reference to this, he declares [as follows]:

p. 41


   The causal relation is not between things that arise simultaneously.

   Aph. 38.* It is not between two things coming simultaneously into existence, that the relation of cause and effect exists.

   a. Let us ask, does the relation of product and [material] cause exist between the earth and the jar, as simultaneously coming into [their supposed momentary] existence, or as successive? Not the first; because there is nothing to lead to such an inference, and because we should not [in that case] find the man, who wants a jar, operating with earth, &c., [with a view to the jar's subsequent production]. Nelther is it the last; in regard to which he declares [as follows]:


   A product cannot survive its substantial cause.

   Aph. 39.* Because, when the antecedent departs the consequent is unfit [to arise, and survive it].

   a. The relation of cause and effect is, further, inconsistent with the theory of the momentary duration of things; because, at the time when the antecedent, i.e., the cause, departs, the consequent, i.e., the product, is 'unfit,' i.e., is not competent to arise; because, that is to say, a product is cognized only by its inhering in [and being substantially identical with, however formally different from,] its p. 42 substantial cause, [and is incapable, therefore, of surviving it].

   b. With reference to this same [topic, viz., the] substantial cause, he mentions another [the converse] objection [to the theory of the momentary duration of things]:


   The coexistence of substance and product is impossible, if things be momentary.

   Aph. 40.* Moreover, not [on the theory of the momentary duration of things can there be such a relation as that of cause and effect]; because, while the one [the antecedent] exists, the other [the consequent] is incompatible, because the two keep always asunder.3

   a. To complete [the aphorism], we must say, 'moreover, [on the theory objected to], there can be no such relation as that of cause and effect; because, at the time when the antecedent exists, the consequent cannot coexist with it, the two being mutually exclusive.'4 The two suggesters of the relation of cause and effect, in product and p. 43 substance,1 are (1) concomitancy of affirmatives, that, while the product exists, the substance thereof exists, and (2) this concomitancy of negatives,2 that, when the substance no longer exists, the product no longer exists: and these two [conditions, on your theory] cannot be; because, since things [in your opinion,] are momentary in their duration, the two [viz., the substance and the product], inasmuch as they are antecedent and consequent,3 belong to opposite times, [and cannot, therefore, coexist; for the product, according to you, does not come into existence until its substance has perished, which is contrary to the nature of the causal relation just defined].

   b. But then, [the heretic may say, do not let the coexistence of substance and product be insisted upon, as indispensable to the causal relation between the two, but] 'let the nature of a cause belong to the substantial cause, p. 44 as it belongs to the instrumental cause, in respect merely of its antecedence.' To this he replies:


   Antecedence to the product does not distinguish the Matter from the Instrument.

   Aph. 41.* If there were merely antecedence, then there would be no determination [of a substantial or material cause, as distinguished from an instrumental cause].

   a. And it could not be determined that this was the substance [of this or that product], on the granting of nothing more than its antecedence [to the product]; because antecedence constitutes no distinction between it and the instrumental causes; for, [as we need scarcely remind you], that there is a distinction between instrumental and substantial causes, the whole world is agreed: such is the meaning.

   The question whether anything exists besides Thought.

   b. Other heretics say: 'Since nothing [really] exists, except Thought, neither does Bondage; just as the things of a dream [have no real existence]. p. 45 Therefore it has no cause; nor it is absolutely false.' He rejects the opinion of these [heretics]:


   We have the evidence of Intuition for the External, as well as for the Internal.

   Aph. 42.* Not Thought alone exists; because there is the intuition of the external.

   a. That is to say: the reality is not Thought alone; because external objects, also, are proved to exist, just as Thought is, by intuition.

   b. But then [these heretics may rejoin], 'From the example of intuitive perception in dreams [see Butler's 'Analogy,' Part I., Ch. I.], we find this [your supposed evidence of objective reality] to exist, even in the absence of objects!' To this he replies:


   The denial of the external amounts to Nihilism.

   Aph. 43.* Then, since, if the one does not exist, the other does not exist, there is a void, [i.e., nothing exists at all].

p. 46

   a. That is to say: if external things do not exist, then a mere void offers itself. Why? Because, if the external does not exist, then thought does not exist; for it is intuition that proves the objective: and, if the intuition of the external did not establish the objective, then the intuition of thought, also, would not establish [the existence of] thought.

   b. 'Then let the reality be a mere void; and, therefore, the searching for the cause of Bondage is unfitting, just because a void is all:' with such a proposal [as recorded in the next aphorism] does [some one who may claim the title of] the very crest-gem of the heretics rise up in opposition:


   The heretic goes the length of asserting sheer Nihilism.

   Aph. 44.* The reality is a void: what is perishes; because to perish is the habit of things.

   a. The void alone [says this prince of heretics, or the fact that nothing exists at all] is the reality, [or the only p. 47 truth]. Since everything that exists perishes, and that which is perishable is false, as is a dream, therefore, as of all things the beginnings and endings are merely nonentities, Bondage, &c., in the midst [of any beginning and ending], has merely a momentary existence,—is phenomenal, and not real. Therefore, who can be bound by what? This [question] is what we rest upon. The reason assigned for the perishableness of whatever exists is, 'because to perish is the habit of things;' because to perish is the very nature of things: but nothing continues, after quitting its own nature; [so that nothing could continue, if it ceased to perish]: such is the meaning.

   b. He rejects [this heretical view]


   Nihilism denied; as the indiscerptible is indestructible.

   Aph. 45.* This is a mere counter-assertion of unintelligent persons.

   a. 'Of unintelligent persons,' i.e., of blockheads, this is 'a mere counter-assertion,' i.e., a mere idle counter-assertion that a thing must needs be perishable, because it p. 48 exists; [and such an assertion is idle,] because things that are not made up of parts, since there is no cause of the destruction of such things, cannot perish.

   b. [But] what need of many words? It is not the fact, that even products perish; [for] just as, by the cognition that 'the jar is old' [we mean that it has passed from the condition of new to that of old], so, too, by such a cognition as this, that 'the jar has passed away,' it is settled only that the jar, or the like, is in the condition of having passed away.

   c. He states another objection [to the heretical view]:


   Nihilism is open to the same objections as both the Momentary and the Ideal theories.

   Aph. 46.* Moreover, this [nihilistic theory is not a right one]; because it has the same fortune as both the views [which were confuted just before].

p. 49

   a. This view, moreover [§ 44], is not a good one; because it has the same fortune as, i.e., is open to similar reasons for rejection as, the theory that external things are momentary [§ 26. b.], and as the theory that nothing exists besides Thought [§ 41. b.]. The reason for the rejection of the theory that things are momentary in their duration. viz. [as stated in § 35], the fact of recognition, &c., [which is, at least, as little consistent with Nihilism as it is with the momentary duration of things], and the reason for the rejection of the theory that nothing exists besides Thought. viz. [as stated in § 42], the intuition of the external, &c., apply equally here [in the case of Nihilism]: such is the import.

   b. Moreover, as for the opinion which is accepted by these [heretics], viz., 'Let the mere void [of absolute nonentity] be the soul's aim [and summum bonum], since herein consist at once the cessation of pain [which cannot continue, when there is absolutely nothing], and also the means thereof [since there can be no further means required for the removal of anything, if it be settled that the thing positively does not exist],' this too, can hardly be: so he declares [as follows]:

p. 50


   The soul's aim is not annihilition

   Aph. 47.* In neither way [whether as a means, or as an end,] is this [annihilation] the soul's aim.

   a. 'Let the void [of mere nonentity] be the soul's aim, whether as consisting in the cessation of pain, or as presenting the means for the cessation of pain,' [says the heretic. And this cannot be; because the [whole] world agrees, that the aim of the soul consists in the joys, &c., that shall abide in it; that is to say, because [they hold, while] you do not hold, that there is a permanent soul, [(see § 33) in respect of which the liberation or beatification would be possible, or even predicable].

   b. Now [certain] other things, also, entertained, as causes of [the soul's] bondage, by [imperfectly instructed] believers, remaining over and above those [proposed by unbelievers, and] already rejected, are to be set aside:


   It is by no movement that the soul gets into bondage.

   Aph. 48.* Not from any kind of motion [such as its entrance into a body, does the soul's bondage result].

p. 51

   a. 'Bondage' [required to complete the aphorism] is understood from the topic [of discussion].

   b. The meaning is, that the soul's bondage, moreover, does not result from any sort of motion, in the shape, for instance, of its entrance into a body.

   c. He states a reason for this:


   What is all-pervading does not change place.

   Aph. 49.* Because this is impossible for what is inactive, [or in other words without motion]

   a. That is to say: because this is impossible, i.e., motion is impossible, in the case of the soul, which is inactive, [because] all-pervading, [and, therefore, incapable of changing its place].

   b. But then [the objector may say], 'Since, in the books of Scripture and of law, we hear of its going and coming into this world and the other world, let soul be [not all-pervading, as you allege, but] merely limited [in its extent]: and to this effect, also, is the text, 'Of the size p. 52 of the thumb is the soul, the inner spirit,' and the like:1 [but] this conjecture he repels:


   Were the soul limited, it might be perishable.

   Aph. 50.* [We cannot admit that the soul is other than all-pervading; because] by its being limited, since it would come under the same conditions as jars, &c., there would be a contradiction to our tenet [of its imperishableness].

   a. That is to say: and, if the soul were admitted to be, like a jar, or the like, limited, i.e. circumscribed [in dimension], then, since it would resemble a jar, or the like, in being made up of parts, and [hence] in being perishable, &c., this would be contrary to our settled principle, [that the soul is imperishable].*

   b. He now justifies the text [see § 49. b.] referring to the motion [of the soul, by showing that the motion is not really of the soul, but of an accessory]:

p. 53


   Soul moves not, any more than Space.

   Aph. 51.* The text regarding the motion [of the soul], moreover, is [applicable, only] because of the junction of an attendant;1 as in the case of the Ether [or Space, which moves not, though we talk of the space enclosed in a jar, as moving with the jar].

   a. Since there are such proofs of the soul's unlimitedness, as the declaration that 'It is eternal, omnipresent, permanent,'2 the text3 regarding its motion is to be explained as having reference to a movement pertaining [not to the soul, but] to an attendant; for there is the text, 'As the Ether [or space] included in a jar, when the jar is removed, [in this case] the jar may be removed, but not the space; and in like manner is the soul, which is like the sky, [incapable of being moved]';4 and because we may conclude that the motion [erroneously supposed to belong to the soul (49. b.),] belongs to Nature [see Vedánta Aphorisms, Part I., § 4. l.], from such maxims3 as this, that 'Nature does the works the fruits of which are blissful or baneful; p. 54 and it is wilful Nature that] in the three worlds, reaps these': such is the import.2

   b. It has already been denied [§ 16] that the bondage [of the soul] is occasioned by works] in the shape either of enjoined or of forbidden actions. Now he declares that the bondage, moreover] does not arise from the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] resulting therefrom:


   The bondage of the soul is no result of any merit or demerit.

   Aph. 52.* Nor, moreover, [does the bondage of the soul result from the merit or demerit arising] from works; because these belong not thereto.

   a. That is to say: the bondage of the soul does not arise directly from the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] occasioned p. 55 by works.1 Why? Because this is no property thereof, i.e., because this [merit or demerit (see § 16. a.)] is no property of the soul.

   b. But then [some one may say], 'Let it be that the bondage resulting from the 'unseen,' i.e., the merit [or demerit] even of another, should attach to a different person;' whereupon he declares [as follows]:


   Else, bondage might cling even to the emancipated.

   Aph. 53.*4 If the case were otherwise [than as I say], then it [the bondage of the soul might extend unduly, even to the emancipated].

   a. That is to say: if the case were otherwise, if bondage and its cause were under other conditions [than we have declared them to be], then there might be an undue extension; bondage would befall even the emancipated, [for the same reasons as those stated under § 16. a.].

p. 56

   b. What need of so much [prolixity]? He states a general objection why the bondage of soul cannot result from any one or other [of these causes], beginning with its essence [see § 6. b.], and ending with its [supposed] works [see § 16]; inasmuch as it is contrary to Scripture, [that any one of these should be the cause]:


   A single text of Scripture upsets, equally, all the heretical notions of the soul's relation to bondage.

   Aph. 54.* And this [opinion, that the bondage of the soul arises from any of causes alleged by the heretics,] is contrary to such texts as the one that declares it [the soul] to be without qualities: and so much for that point.

   a. And, if the bondage of the soul arose from any one or other of those [supposed causes already treated of,] among which its essential character [§ 6. b.] is the first, this would be contradictory to such texts as, 'Witness, intelligent, alone, and without the [three] qualities [is the soul]:'2 such is the meaning.

   b. The expression 'and so much for that point' means, p. 57 that the investigation of the cause of the bondage [of the soul] here closes.

   c. The case, then, stands thus: since [all] other [theories] are overthrown by the declaratory aphorisms, 'There would be no fitness in the enjoining' [see § 7], &c., it is ascertained that the immediate cause of the bondage [of the soul] is just the conjunction of Nature and of the soul.

   d. But then, in that case, [some one may say], this conjunction of Nature and of the soul [§ 54. c.], whether it be essential, or adventitiously caused by Time or something else [§ 5. b.], must occasion the bondage even of the emancipated. Having pondered this doubt, he disposes of it [as follows]:


   How the true cause of bondage affects not the emancipated.

   Aph. 55.* Moreover, the conjunction thereof does not, through non-discrimination, take place [in the case of the emancipated]; nor is there a parity, p. 58 [in this respect, between the emancipated and the unemancipated].

   a. 'The conjunction thereof,' i.e., the conjunction of Nature and of the soul; this conjunction, moreover, does not take place again 'through non-discrimination,' i.e., through the want of a discrimination [between Nature and soul] in the emancipated, [who do discriminate, and who thus avoid the conjunction which others, failing to discriminate, incur, and thus fall into bondage]: such is the meaning. And thus the emancipated and the bound are not on a level, [under the circumstances stated at § 54. c.]: such is the import.


   The true cause of bondage, in other words, non-discrimination.

   Aph. 56.* Bondage arises from the error [of not discriminating between Nature and soul].2

   a. Having thus declared the cause of that [bondage] p. 59 which is to be got rid of, he declares the means of getting rid of it:]


   Non-discrimination is removable by discrimination alone.

   Aph. 56.* The removal of it is to be effected by the necessary means, just like darkness.

   a. The necessary means, established throughout the world, in such cases as 'shell-silver' [i.e., a pearl-oyster-shell mistaken for silver], viz., the immediacy of discrimination, by this alone is 'its removal,' i.e., the removal of the non-discrimination [between Nature and soul], to be effected, and not by works, or the like: such is the meaning: just as darkness, the dark, is removed by light alone, [and by no other means].

   b. 'But then [some one may say], if merely the non-discrimination of Nature and soul be, through the conjunction [of the two, consequent on the want of discrimination], the cause of bondage, and if merely the discrimination of the two be the cause of liberation, then there would be liberation, even while there remained the conceit of [one's possessing] a body, &c.; and this is contrary to Scripture, p. 60 to the institutes of law, and to sound reasoning.' To this he replies:


   The discrimination of Nature, as other than soul, involves all discrimination.

   Aph. 57.* Since the non-discrimination of other things [from soul] results from the non-discrimination of Nature [from soul], the cessation of this will take place, on the cessation of that [from which it results].

   a. By reason of the non-discrimination of Nature from the soul, what non-discrimination of other things there is, such as the non-discrimination of the understanding [as something other than the soul], this necessarily ceases, on the cessation of the non-discrimination of Nature; because, when the non-discrimination of the understanding, for example, [as something other than soul,] does occur, it is based on the non-discrimination [from soul] of that cause to which there is none antecedent [viz., Nature]; since the non-discrimination of an effect [and the 'understanding' is an effect or product of Nature,] is, itself, an effect, [and will, of course, cease, with the cessation of its cause].

p. 61

   b. The state of the case is this: as, when the soul has been discriminated from the body, it is impossible but that it should be discriminated from the colour and other [properties], the effects of the body, [which is the substantial cause of its own properties]; so, by parity of reasoning, from the departure of the cause, when soul, in its character of unalterableness, &c., has been discriminated from Nature, it is impossible that there should remain a conceit of [the soul's being any of] the products thereof [i.e., of Nature], such as the 'understanding,' and the like, which have the character of being modifications [of primal Nature, while the soul, on the other hand, is a thing unalterable].*

   c. But then [some one may say], 'What proof is there that there is a conceit [entertained by people in general,] of a Nature [or primal principle] different from the conceit of an 'understanding,' &c., [which, you tell us, are products of this supposed first principle]? For all the various conceits [that the soul falls into], such as, 'I am ignorant,' and so on, can be accounted for on the ground simply of an 'understanding,' &c., [without postulating a primal Nature which is to assume the shape of an 'understanding,' &c.]:' p. 62 well, if any one says this, I reply, 'no;' because, unless there were such a thing as Nature, we could not account for such conceits as the following, viz., 'Having died, having died, again, when there is a creation, let me be a denizen of Paradise, and not of hell;' because no products, such as the 'understanding,' when they have perished, can be created anew, [any more than a gold-bracelet, melted down, can be reproduced, though another like it may be produced from the materials].

   The soul's confounding itself with Nature is logically antecedent to its confounding itself with anything else.

   d. Moreover, it is inadmissible to say that men's conceit of [the identity of themselves with their] 'understanding,' &c., is [the primary cause of the soul's bondage, and is] not preceded by anything; because 'understanding' and the rest [as you will not deny] are effects. Now, while it is to be expected that there should be some predetermining agency to establish a conceit of [ownership in, or of one's identity with,] any effects, it is clear that it is a conceit of [ownership, &c.,] in respect of the cause, and nothing else, that must be the predetermining agency: for we see this in ordinary life; and our theories are bound to conform [deferentially] to experience. For [to explain,] we see, in ordinary life, that the conceit of [the ownership of] the grain, &c., produced p. 63 by a field, results from the conceit of [the ownership of] the field; and, from the conceit of [the ownership of] gold, the conceit of [the ownership of] the bracelets, or other things, formed of that gold; and, by the removal of these [i.e., the removal of the logically antecedent conceits, that the field, or the gold, is one's property], there is the removal of those, [i.e., the removal of the conceits that the grain, &c., and that the bracelets, &c., the corresponding products or effects of the field and of the gold, are one's property: and so the soul will cease to confound itself with the 'understanding,' when it ceases to confound itself with Nature, of which the 'understanding' is held to be a product].

   e. [And, if it be supposed that we thus lay ourselves open to the charge of a regressus ad infinitum, seeing that, whatever we may assign as the first cause, we may, on our own principles, be asked what was the 'predetermining agency' in regard to it; or if it be supposed thut we are chargeable with reasoning in a circle, when we hold that the soul's confounding itself with Nature is the cause of p. 64 its continuing so to confound itself, and its continuing so to confound itself is, reciprocally, the cause why it confounds itself; we reply, that] there is no occasion to look for any other 'predetermining agency,' in the case of the conceit of [the identity of the soul with] Nature, or in the case of the self-continuance1 thereof, [i.e., of that error of confounding one's self with Nature]; because [these two are alike] without antecedent, like seed and sprout, [of which it is needless to ask which is the first; the old puzzle, 'which was first, the acorn, or the oak?' being a frivolous question].

   f. But then [some one may say], if we admit the soul's bondage [at one time], and its freedom [at another], and its discrimination [at one time], and its non-discriminatian [at another], then this is in contradiction to the assertion [in § 19], that it is 'ever essentially a pure and free intelligence;' and it is in contradiction to such texts as this, viz., 'The absolute truth is this, that neither is there destruction [of the soul], nor production [of it]; nor is it bound, nor is it an effecter [of any work], nor is it desirous of liberation, nor is it, indeed, liberated; [seeing that that cannot desire or obtain liberation, which was never bound].'3 This [charge of inconsistency] he repels:

p. 65


   The bondage of the soul is merely verbal.

   Aph. 58.* It is merely verbal, and not a reality1 [this so-called bondage of the soul]; since it [the bondage] resides in the mind, [and not in the soul].

   a. That is to say: since bondage, &c., all reside only in the mind [and not in the soul], all this, as regards the soul, is merely verbal, i.e., it is vox et praeterea nihil; because is is merely a reflexion, like the redness of [pellucid] crystal [when a China-rose is near it], but not a reality, with no false imputation, like the redness of the China-rose itself. Hence there is no contradiction to what had been said before, [as the objector (under § 57. f.) would insinuate]: such is the state of the case.

p. 66

   Whether Testimony, or Inference, without Perception, might not avail to dissipate the soul's bondage.

   b. But then, if bondage, &c., as regards the soul, be merely verbal, let them be set aside by hearing [that they are merely verbal], or by argument [establishing that they are so]. Why, in the Scripture and the Law, is there enjoined, as the cause of liberation, a discriminative knowledge [of Soul, as distinguished from Non-soul], going the length of immediate cognition? To this he replies:


   The truth must be directly discerned, and not merely accepted on the ground of Testimony, or of Inference.

   Aph. 59.* Moreover, it [the non-discrimination of Soul from Nature,] is not to be removed by argument; as that of a person perplexed about the points of the compass [is not to be removed] without immediate cognition.

   a. By 'argument' we mean thinking. The word 'moreover' is intended to aggregate [or take in, along with 'argument'] 'testimony,' [or verbal authority, which, no more than 'argument,' or inference, can remove the evil, which can be removed by nothing short of direct intuitive perception of the real state of the case].

p. 67

   b. That is to say: the bondage, &c., of the soul though [granted to be] merely verbal, are not to be removed by merely hearing, by inferring, without immediate cognition, without directly perceiving; just as the contrariety in regard to the [proper] direction, though merely verbal [as resulting from misdirection], in the case of1 a person who is mistaken as to the points of the compass [and hence as to his own bearings], is not removed by testimony, or by inference, without immediate cognition, i.e., without [his] directly perceiving [how the points of the compass really lie, to which immediate perception 'testimony,' or 'inference,' may conduce, but the necessity of which these media, or instruments of knowledge; cannot supersede].

   c. Or it [Aph. 59] may be explained as follows, viz.: But then, [seeing that] it is declared, by the assertion [in Aph. 56], viz., that 'The removal of it is to be effected by the necessary means,' that knowledge, in the shape of discrimination [between soul and Nature], is the remover of non-discrimination [in regard to the matter in question], tell us, is that knowledge of a like nature with the hearing p. 68 [of Testimony], &c.? Or is it something peculiar? A reply to this being looked for, he enounces the aphorism [§ 59]: 'Moreover, it is not to be removed by argument,' &c. That is to say: non-discrimination is not excluded, is not cut off, by argument, or by testimony, unless there be discrimination as an immediate perception; just as is the case with one who is bewildered in regard to [his] direction; because the only thing to remove an immediate error is an immediate individual perception [of the truth. For example, a man with the jaundice perceives white objects as if they were yellow. He may infer that the piece of chalk which he looks at is really white; or he may believe the testimony of a friend, that it is white; but still nothing will remove his erroneous perception of yellowness in the chalk, except a direct perception of whiteness.

   d. Having thus, then, set forth the fact that Liberation results from the immediate discrimination [of Soul from p. 69 Nature], the next thing to be set forth is the 'discrimination' [here referred to].

   e. This being the topic, in the first place, since only if Soul and Nature exist, liberation can result from the discrimination of the one from the other, therefore that 'instrument of right knowledge' (pramáṉa) which establishes the existence of these [two imperceptible realities] is [first] to be set forth:


   The evidence for things imperceptible.

   Aph. 60.* The knowledge of things imperceptible is by means of Inference; as that of fire [when not directly perceptible,] is by means of smoke, &c.

   a. That is to say: 'of things imperceptible,' i.e., of things not cognizable by the senses, e.g., Nature and the Soul, 'the knowledge,' i.e., the fruit lodged in the soul, is brought about by means of that instrument of right knowledge [which may be called] 'Inference' (anumána), [but which (see Nyáya Aphorisms, I., § 5) is, more correctly, 'the recognition of a Sign']; as [the knowledge that there is] fire [in such and such a locality, where we cannot directly p. 70 perceive it,] is brought about by the 'recognition of a Sign,' occasioned by smoke, &c.

   b. Moreover, it is to be understood that that which is [true, but yet is] not established by 'Inference,' is estalished by Revelation. But, since 'Inference' is the chief [among the instruments of knowledge], in this [the Sánkhya] System, 'Inference' only is laid down [in the aphorism,] as the chief thing; but Revelation is not disregarded [in the Sánkhya system; as will be seen from Aph. 88 of this Book].

   c. He [next] exbibits the order of creation of those things among which Nature is the first, and the relation of cause and effect [among these, severally], preparatorily to the argument that will be [afterwards] stated:

p. 71


   The twenty-five Realities enumerated.

   Aph. 61.* Nature (prakṛiti) is the state of equipoise of Goodness (sattwa) Passion (rajas), and Darkness (tamas): from Nature [proceeds] Mind (mahat); from Mind, Self-consciousness (ahankára); from Self-consciousness, the five Subtile Elements (tan-mátra), and both sets [external and internal,] of Organs (indriya); and, from the Subtile Elements, the Gross Elements (sthúla-bhúta). [Then there is] Soul (purusha). Such is the class of twenty-five.

   a. 'The state of equipoise' of the [three] things called 'Goodness,' &c., is their being neither less nor more [one than another]; that is to say, the state of not being [developed into] an effect [in which one or other of them predominates]. And thus 'Nature' is the triad of 'Qualities' (guṉa), distinct from the products [to which this triad gives rise]: such is the complete meaning.3

   b. These things, viz., 'Goodness,' &c., [though spoken of as the three Qualities], are not 'Qualities' (guṉa) in the Vaiśeshika sense of the word; because [the 'Qualities' of p. 72 the Vaiśeshika system have, themselves, no qualities (see Kaṇáda's 16th Aph.); while] these have the qualities of Conjunction, Disjunction, Lightness, Force,1 Weight, &c.2 In this [Sánkhya] system, and in Scripture, &c., the word 'Quality' (guṉa) is employed [as the name of the three things in question],3 because they are subservient to Soul [and, therefore, hold a secondary rank in the scale of being], and because they form the cords [which the word guṉa also signifies], viz., 'Mind,' &c., which consist of the three [so-called] 'Qualities,' and which bind, as a [cow, or other] brute-beast, the Soul.5

   c. Of this [Nature] the principle called 'the great one' (mahat), viz., the principle of Understanding, (buddhi), is the product. 'Self-consciousness' is a conceit [of separate personality]. Of this there are two products, (1) the p. 73 'Subtile Elements' and (2) the two sets of 'Organs.' The 'Subtile Elements' are [those of] Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste, and Smell. The two sets of 'Organs,' through their division into the external and the internal, are of eleven kinds. The products of the 'Subtile Elements' are the five 'Gross Elements.' But 'Soul' is something distinct from either product or cause. Such is the class of twenty-five, the aggregate of things. That is to say, besides these there is nothing.

   d. He [next], in [several] aphorisms, declares the order of the inferring [of the existence of these principles, the one from the other]:


   The existence of the 'Subtile Elements' is inferred from that of the 'Gross.'

   Aph. 62.* [The knowledge of the existence] of the five 'Subtile Elements' is [by inference,] from the 'Gross Elements.'

p. 74

   a. 'The knowledge, by inference,' so much is supplied, [to complete the aphorism, from Aph. 60].

   b. Earth, &c., the 'Gross Elements,' are proved to exist, by Perception; [and] thereby [i.e., from that Perception; for Perception must precede Inference, as stated in Gotama's 5th Aphorism,] are the 'Subtile Elements' inferred, [the στοιχει̑α στοιχείων of Empedocles]. And so the application [of the process of inference to the case] is as follows:

   (1) The Gross Elements, or those which have not reached the absolute limit [of simplification, or of the atomic], consist of things [Subtile Elements, or Atoms,] which have distinct qualities; [the earthy element having the distinctive quality of Odour; and so of the others]:

   (2) Because they are gross;

   (3) [And everything that is gross is formed of something less gross, or, in other words, more subtile,] as jars, webs, &c.; [the gross web being formed of the less gross threads; and so of the others].


   And thence that of Self-consciousness.

   Aph. 63.* [The knowledge of the existence] of Self-consciousness is [by inference,] from the external and internal p. 75 [organs], and from these ['Subtile Elements,' mentioned in Aph. 62].

   a. By inference from [the existence of] the external and internal organs, and from [that of] these 'Subtile Elements,' there is the knowledge of [the existence of such a principle as] Self-consciousness.

   b. The application [of the process of inference to the case] is in the following [somewhat circular] manner:

   (1) The Subtile Elements and the Organs are made up of things consisting of Self-consciousness:

   (2) Because they are products of Self-consciousness:

   (3) Whatever is not so [i.e., whatever is not made out of Self-consciousness] is not thus [i.e., is not a product of Self-consciousness]; as the Soul, [which, not being made up thereof, is not a product of it].

   c. But then, if it be thus [i.e., if it be, as the Sánkhyas declare, that all objects, such as jars, are made up of Self-consciousness, while Self-consciousness depends on Understanding,' or 'Intellect,' or 'Mind,' the first product of Nature' (see Aph. 61)], then [some may object, that], since it would be the case that the Self-consciousness of the potter is the material of the jar, the jar made by him would disappear, on the beatification of the potter, whose internal organ [or 'Understanding'] then surceases. p. 76 And this [the objector may go on to say,] is not the case; because another man [after the beatification of the potter,] recognizes that 'This is that same jar [which, you may remember, was fabricated by our deceased acquaintance].'

   d. [In reply to this we say,] it is not thus; because, on one's beatification, there is an end of only those modifications of his internal organ [or 'Intellect'] which could be causes [as the jar no longer can be,] of the emancipated soul's experiencing [either good or ill], but not an end of the modifications of intellect in general, nor [an end] of intellect altogether: [so that we might spare ourselves the trouble of further argument, so far as concerns the objection grounded on the assumption that the intellect of the potter surceases, on his beatification: but we may go further, and admit, for the sake of argument, the surcease of the 'intellect' of the beatified potter, without conceding any necessity for the surcease of his pottery. This alternative theory of the case may be stated as follows]:

   e. Or [as Berkeley suggests, in his Principles of Human knowledge, Ch. vi.], let the Self-consciousness of the Deity be the cause why jars and the like [continue to exist], and p. 77 not the Self-consciousness of the potter, &c., [who may lose their Self-consciousness, whereas the Deity, the sum of all life, Hiraṉyagarbha (see Vedánta-śara, § 62), never loses his Self-consciousness, while aught living continues].


   And thence that of Intellect.

   Aph. 64.* [The knowledge of the existence] of Intellect is [by inference,] from that [Self-consciousness, § 63].

   a. That is to say: by inference from [the existence of] 'that,' viz., Self-consciousness, which is a product, there comes the knowledge of 'Intellect' (buddhi), the great 'inner organ' (antaẖkaraṉa), [hence] called 'the great one' (mahat), [the existence of which is recognized] under the character of the cause of this [product, viz., Self-consciousness].

   b. And so the application [again rather circular, of the process of inference to the case,] is as follows:

   (1) The thing called Self-consciousness is made out of the things that consist of the moods of judgment [or mind];

   (2) Because it is a thing which is a product of judgment [proceeding in the Cartesian order of cogito, ergo sum; and]

p. 78

   (3) Whatever is not so [i.e., whatever is not made out of judgment, or mental assurance], is not thus [i.e., is not a product of mental assurance]; as the Soul, [which is not made out of this or of anything antecedent], &c.

   c. Here the following reasoning is to be understood: Every one, having first determined anything under a concept [i.e., under such a form of thought as is expressed by a general term; for example, that this which presents itself is a jar, or a human body, or a possible action of one kind or other], after that makes the judgment, 'This is I,' or 'This ought to be done by me,' and so forth: so much is quite settled; [and there is no dispute that the fact is as here stated]. Now, having, in the present instance, to look for some cause of the thing called 'Self-consciousness' [which manifests itself in the various judgments just referred to], since the relation of cause and effect subsists between the two functions [the occasional conception, and the subsequent occasional judgment, which is a function of Self-consciousness], it is assumed, for simplicity, merely that the relation of cause and effect exists between the two substrata to which the [two sets of] functions belong; [and this is sufficient,] because it follows, as a matter of course, that the occurrence of a function of the effect must result from the occurrence of a function of the cause; [nothing, according to the Sánkhya, being in any p. 79 product, except so far, and in such wise, as it preexisted in the cause of that product].


   And thence that of Nature.

   Aph. 65.* [The knowledge of the existence] of Nature is [by inference,] from that ['Intellect,' § 64].

   a. By inference from [the existence of] 'that,' viz., the principle [of Intellect, termed], 'the Great one,' which is a product, there comes the knowledge of [the existence of] Nature, as [its] cause.

   b. The application [of the process of inference to the case] is as follows:

   (1) Intellect, the affections whereof are Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness, is produced from something which has these affections, [those of] Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness:

   (2) Because, whilst it is a product [and must, therefore, have arisen from something consisting of that which itself now consists of], it consists of Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness; [and]

p. 80

   (3) [Every product that has the affections of, or that occasions, Pleasure, Pain, or Dulness, takes its rise in something which consists of these]; as lovely women, &c.

   c. For an agreeable woman gives pleasure to her husband, and, therefore, [is known to be mainly made up of, or] partakes of the quality of 'Goodness;' the indiscreet one gives pain to him, and, therefore, partakes of the quality of 'Foulness;' and she who is separated [and perhaps forgotten,] occasions indifference, and so partakes of the quality of Darkness.'

   d. And the appropriate refutation [of any objection], in this case, is [the principle], that it is fitting that the qualities of the effect should be [in every case,] in conformity with the qualities of the cause.

   e. Now he states how, in a different way, we have [the evidence of] inference for [the existence of] Soul, which is void of the relation of cause and effect that has been mentioned, p. 81 [in the four preceding aphorisms, as existing between Nature and its various products]:


   The argument for the existence of Soul.

   Aph. 66.* [The existence] of Soul [is inferred] from the fact that the combination [of the principles of Nature into their various effects] is for the sake of another [than unintelligent Nature, or any of its similarly unintelligent products].

   a. 'Combination,' i.e., conjunction, which is the cause [of all products; these resulting from the conjunction of their constituent parts]. Since whatever has this quality, as Nature,2 Mind, and so on [unlike soul, which is not made up of parts], is for the sake of some other; for this reason it is understood that soul exists: such is the remainder, [required to complete the aphorism].

   b. But the application [of the argument, in this particular case, is as follows]:

   (1) The thing in question, viz., Nature the 'Great one,' with the rest [of the aggregate of the unintelligent], has, as its fruit [or end], the [mundane] experiences and the [eventual] Liberation of some other than itself:

p. 82

   (2) Because it is a combination [or compages];

   (3) [And every combination,] as a couch, or a seat, or the like, [is for another's use, not for its own; and its several component parts render no mutual service].

   c. Now, in order to establish that it is the cause of all [products], he establishes the eternity of Nature (prakṛiti):


   Argument for the eternity of Nature.

   Aph. 67.* Since the root has no root, the root [of all] is rootless.3

   a. Since 'the root' (múla), i.e., the cause of the twenty-three principles, [which, with soul and the root itself, make up the twenty-five realities recognized in the Sánkhya,] 'has no root,' i.e., has no cause, the 'root,' viz., Nature (pradhána), is 'rootless,' i.e., void of root. That is to say, there is no other cause of Nature; because there would be p. 83 a regressus in infinitum, [if we were to suppose another cause, which, by parity of reasoning, would require another cause; and so on without end].

   b. He states the argument [just mentioned] in regard to this, [as follows]:

p. 84


   The employment of the term Primal Agency, or Nature, is merely to debate the regressus in infinitum.

   Aph. 68.* Even if there be a succession, there is a halt at some one point; and so it is merely a name [that we give to the point in question, when we speak of the root of things, under the the name of 'Nature'].

   a. Since there would be the fault of regressus in infinitum, if there were a succession of causes,—another cause of Nature, and another [cause] of that one, again,—there must be, at last, a halt, or conclusion, at some one point, somewhere or other, at some one, uncaused, eternal thing. Therefore, that at which we stop is the Primal Agency (pra-kṛiti); for this [word prakṛiti, usually and conveniently rendered by the term Nature,] is nothing more than a sign to denote the cause which is the root: such is the meaning.

   b. But then [some Vedántí may object according to this view of matters], the position that there are just twenty-five realities is not made out; for, in addition to2 the 'Indiscrete' [or primal Nature], which [according to you,] is the cause of Mind,3 another unintelligent principle, named 'Ignorance' [see Vedánta-sára, § 21], presents p. 85 itself. Having pondered this doubt, he declares [as follows]:


   Nature and Soul alike uncreated.

   Aph. 69.* Alike, in respect of Nature, [and of both Soul and Nature, is the argument for the uncreated existence].2

   a. In the discussion of the Primal Agent [Nature], the cause which is the root [of all products], the same side is taken by us both, the asserter [of the Sánkhya doctrine] and the opponent [Vedántí]. This may be thus stated: As there is mention, in Scripture, of the production of Nature, so, too, is there of that of Ignorance, in such texts as this, viz.: 'This Ignorance, which has five divisions, was produced from the great Spirit.'* Hence it must needs be that a figurative production is intended to be asserted, in respect of one of these [and not the literal production of both; else we should have no root at all]; and, of the two, it is with Nature only that a figurative production, in the shape of a manifestation through conjunction with Soul, &c., is congruous. A production [such as that metaphorical one here spoken of,] the characteristic of which is conjunction is mentioned; for there is mention p. 86 of [such] a figurative origination of Soul and Nature, in a passage of the Kaurma [Puráṉa], beginning, 'Of action [or the Primal Agency], and knowledge [or Soul],' and so on. And, as there is no mention, in Scripture, of the origin of Ignorance, as figurative, it is not from eternity. And Ignorance, which consists of false knowledge, has been declared, in an aphorism of the Yoga, to be [not a separate entity, but] 'an affection of the mind.' Hence there is no increase to the [list of the twenty-five] Realities, [in the shape of a twenty-sixth principle, to be styled ignorance].

   b. Or [according to another, and more probable, interpretation p. 87 of the aphorism,] the meaning is this, that the argument is the same in support of both, i.e., of both Soul and Nature: such is the meaning.

   c. But then, there being [as has been shown,] a mode of arriving, by inference, at [a knowledge of the saving truth in regard to] Nature, Soul, &c., whence is it that reflexion, in the shape of discrimination [between Soul and Nature], does not take place in the case of all [men]? In regard to this point, he states [as follows]:


   All do not profit by the saving truth; because it is only the best kind of people that are fully amenable to reason.

   Aph. 70.* There is no rule [or necessity, that all should arrive at the truth]; because those who are privileged [to engage in the inquiry] are of three descriptions.

   a. For those privileged [to enguge in the inquiry] are of three descriptions, through their distinction into those who, in reflecting, are dull, mediocre, and best. Of these, by the dull the [Sánkhya] arguments are frustrated [and altogether set aside], by means of the sophisms that have been uttered by the Bauddhas, &c. By the mediocre they [are brought into doubt, or, in other words,] are made to appear as if there were equally strong arguments on the other side, by means of arguments which really prove the reverse [of what these people employ them to prove], or by p. 88 arguments which are not true: [see the section on Fallacies in the Tarka-sangraha]. But it is only the best of those privileged, that reflect in the manner that has been set forth [in our exposition of the process of reflexion which leads to the discriminating of Soul from Nature]: such is the import. But there is no rule that all must needs reflect in the manner so set forth: such is the literal meaning.

   b. He now, through two aphorisms, defines 'the Great one' and 'Self-consciousness'; [the reader being presumed to remember that Nature consists of the three 'Qualities' in equipoise, and to be familiar with the other principles, such as the 'Subtile elements' (see § 61)]:


   By 'the Great one' is meant Mind.

   Aph. 71.* The first product [of the Primal Agent, Nature], which is called 'the Great one,' is Mind.

   a. 'Mind' (manas). 'Mind' [is so called], because its function is 'thinking' (manana). By 'thinking' is here meant 'judging' (niśchaya). That of which this is the function p. 89 is 'intellect' (buddhi); and that is the first product, that called 'the Great one' (mahat): such is the meaning.


   The relation of Self-consciousness to Mind.

   Aph. 72.* 'Self-consciousness' is that which is subsequent [to Mind.]

   a. 'Self-consciousness,' the function of which is a conceit [that 'I exist,' 'I do this, that, and the other thing'], is that which is subsequent: that is to say, 'Self-consciousness' is the next after 'the Great one' [§ 71].

   b. Since 'Self-consciousness' is that whose function is a conceit [which brings out the Ego, in every case of cognition, the matter of which cognition would, else, have lain dormant in the bosom of Nature, the formless Objective], it therefore follows that the others [among the phenomena of mundane existence,] are effects of this [Self-consciousness]; and so he declares [as follows]:

p. 90


   All products, save Mind, result from Self-consciousness.

   Aph. 73.* To the others it belongs to be products thereof, [i.e., of Self-consciousness].

   a. 'To be products thereof,' i.e., to be products of Self-consciousness: that is to say, the fact of being products thereof belongs to the others,2 the eleven 'Organs' (indriya), the five 'Subtile elements,' and, mediately, to the [gross] Elements, also, the products of the Subtile elements.

   b. But then, if it be thus [some one may say], you relinquish your dogma, that Nature is the cause of the whole world. Therefore he declares [as follows]:

p. 91


   Nature, immediately the cause of Mind, is, mediately, the cause of all other products.

   Aph. 74.* Moreover, mediately, through that [i.e., the 'Great one' (§ 71)] the first [cause, viz., Nature,] is the cause [of all products]; as is the case with the Atoms, [the causes, though not the immediate causes, of jars, &c.].

   a. 'Moreover, mediately,' i.e., moreover, not in the character of the immediate cause, 'the first,' i.e., Nature, is the Cause of 'Self-consciousness' and the rest, [mediately,] through 'the Great one' and the rest; as, in the theory of the Vaiśeshikas, the Atoms are the cause of a jar, or the like, only [mediately,] through combinatians of two atoms, and so on: such is the meaning.

   b. But then, since, also, both Nature and Soul are eternal, which of them is [really] the cause of the creation's commencing? In regard to this, he declares [as follows]:

p. 92


   Why Nature is the sole cause.

   Aph. 75.* While both [Soul and Nature] are antecedent [to all products], since the one [viz., Soul,] is devoid [of this character of being a cause], it is applicable [only] to the other of the two, [viz., Nature].

   a. That is to say: 'while both,' viz., Soul and Nature, are preexistent to every product, still, 'since the one,' viz., Soul, from the fact of its not being modified [into anything else, as clay is modified into a jar], must be 'devoid,' or lack the nature of a cause, 'it is applicable,' i.e., the nature of a cause must belong, to the other of the two.

   b. But then [some one may say], let Atoms alone be causes; since there is no dispute [that these are causal]. In reply to this, he says:

p. 93


   Why the theory of a plastic Nature is preferable to that of Atoms.

   Aph. 76.* What is limited cannot be the substance of all [things].

   a. That which is limited cannot be the substance of all [things]; as yarn cannot be the [material] cause of a jar. Therefore it would [on the theory suggested,] be necessary to mention separate causes of [all] things severally; and it is simpler to assume a single cause. Therefore Nature alone is the cause. Such is the meaning.

   b. He alleges Scripture in support of this:


   Scripture declares in favour of the theory.

   Aph. 77.* And [the proposition that Nature is the cause of all is proved] from the text of Scripture, that the origin [of the world] is therefrom, [i.e., from Nature].

   a. An argument, in the first instance, has been set forth [in § 76; for, till argument fails him, no one falls back upon authority]. Scripture, moreover, declares that Nature is the cause of the world, in such terms as, 'From Nature the world arises,' &c.

p. 94

   b. But then [some one may say], a jar which antecedently did not exist is seen to come into existence. Let, then, antecedent non-existence be the cause [of each product]; since this is an invariable antecedent, [and, hence, a cause; 'the invariable antecedent being denominated a cause,' if Dr. Brown, in his 6th lecture, is to be trusted]. To this he replies:


   Ex nihilo nihil fit.

   Aph. 78.* A thing is not made out of nothing.

   a. That is to say: it is not possible that out of nothing, i.e., out of a nonentity, a thing should be made, i.e., an entity should arise. If an entity were to arise out of a nonentity, then, since the character of a cause is visible in its product, the world, also, would be unreal: such is the meaning.

   b. Let the world, too, be unreal: what harm is that to us? [If any ask this,] he, therefore, declares [as follows]:

p. 95


   Reasons why the world is not to be supposed unreal.

   Aph. 79.* It [the world] is not unreal; because there is no fact contradictory [to its reality], and because it is not the [false] result of depraved causes, [leading to a belief in what ought not to be believed].

   a. When there is the notion, in regard to a shell [of a pearl-oyster, which sometimes glitters like silver], that it is silver, its being silver is contradicted by the [subsequent and more correct] cognition, that this is not silver. But, in the case in question [that of the world regarded as a reality], no one ever has the cognition, 'This world is not in the shape of an entity,' by which [cognition, if any one ever really had such,] it being an entity might be opposed.

   b. And it is held that that is false which is the result of a depraved cause; e.g., some one's cognition of a [white] conch-shell as yellow, through such a fault as the jaundice, [which depraves his eye-sight]. But, in the case in question, [that of the world regarded as a reality], there is not such [temporary or occasional] depravation [of the senses]; because all, at all times, cognize the world as a reality. Therefore the world is not an unreality.

p. 96

   c. But then [some one may suggest], let a nonentity be the [substantial] cause of the world; still the world will not [necessarily, therefore,] be unreal. In regard to this, he declares [as follows]:


   The product of something is something; and that of nothing, nothing.

   Aph. 80.* If it [the substantial cause,] be an entity, then this would be the case, [that the product would be an entity], from its union [or identity] therewith; [but] if [the cause be] a nonentity, then how could it possibly be the case [that the product would be real], since it is a nonentity, [like the cause with which it is united, in the relation of identity]?

   a. If an entity were the substantial cause [of the world], then, since [it is a maxim that] the qualities of the cause present themselves in the product, 'this would be the case,' i.e., it would be the case that the product was real, 'because of union therewith,' i.e., because of the union [of the product] with the reality [which is its subatratum]. [But,] since, [by parity of reasoning], if a nonentity [were the substantial cause], the world would be a nonentity, then, by reason of its being a nonentity, i.e., by reason of the world's being [on that supposition,] necessarily a non-entity, [like its supposed cause], how could this be the case, [that it would be real]?

p. 97

   b. But then [a follower of the Mímáṅsá may say], since [it would appear that] nonentity can take no shape but that of nonentity, let works alone be the cause of the world. What need have we of the hypothesis of 'Nature'? To this he replies:


   Action cannot serve as a substratum.

   Aph. 81.* No; for works are not adapted to be the substantial cause [of any product].

   a. Granting that 'the uneeen' [merit or demerit arising from actions] may be an instrumental cause, [in bringing about the mundane condition of the agent], yet we never see merit or demerit in the character of the substantial cause [of any product]: and our theories ought to show deference to our experience. 'Nature' is to be accepted; because Liberation arises [see § 56,3 and § 83,] from discerning the distinction between Nature and the Soul.

p. 98

   b. But then [some one may say], since Liberation can be attained by undertaking the things directed by the Veda, what occasion is there for [our troubling ourselves about] Nature? To this he replies:


   Salvation is not to be obtained by ritual observances

   Aph. 82.* The accomplishment thereof [i.e., of Liberation] is not moreover, through Scriptural rites: the chief end of man does not consist in this [which is gained through such means]; because, since this consists of what is accomplished through acts, [and is therefore, a product, and not eternal], there is [still left impending over the ritualist,] the liability to repetition of births.

   a. 'Scriptural means,' such as sacrifices, [are so called], because they are heard from [the mouth of the instructor in] Scripture. Not thereby, moreover, is 'the accomplishment thereof,' i.e., the accomplishment of Liberation; 'because one is liable to repetition of births, by reason of the fact that it [the supposed Liberation,] was accomplished by means,' i.e., because the [thus far] liberated p. 99 [soul] is still liable to repetition of births,1 inasmuch as this [its supposed Liberation,] is not eternal, [just] because it is [the result of] acts. For this reason, the chief end of man does not consist in this, [which is gained through ritual observances].

   b. He shows what does constitute the chief end of man:


   In regard to the attainment of the chief end of man, the Scripture concurs with the Sánkhya.

   Aph. 83.* There is Scripture for it, that he who has attained to discrimination, in regard to these [i.e. Nature and Soul], has no repetition of births.

   a. 'In regard to these,' i.e., in regard to Nature and Soul, of him who has attained to discrimination, there is a text declaring, that, in consequence of his knowledge of the distinction, there will be no repetition of births; the text, viz., 'He does not return again,'4 &c.

p. 100

   b. He states an objection to the opposite view:


   Pain can lead only to pain, not to liberation from it.

   Aph. 84.* From pain [occasioned, e.g., to victims in sacrifice] must come pain [to the sacrificer, and not liberation from pain]; as there is not relief from chilliness, by affusion of water.

   a. If Liberation were to be effected by acts, [such as sacrifices], then, since the acts involve a variety of pains, Liberation itself [on the principle that every effect includes the qualities of its cause,] would include a variety of pains; and it would be a grief, from the fact that it must eventually end: for, to one who is distressed by chilliness the affusion or water does not bring liberation from his chilliness, but, rather, [additional] chilliness.

   b. But then [some one may say], the fact that the act is productive of pain is not the motive [to the performance of sacrifice]; but the [real] reason is this, that the act is productive of things desirable. And, in accordance with this, there is the text, 'By means of acts [of sacrifice] they may partake of immortality,' &c. To this he replies:

p. 101


   The character of the end contemplated makes no difference in regard to the transitoriness of what is effected by works.

   Aph. 85.* [Liberation cannot arise from acts]; because whether the end be something desirable, or undesirable, [and we admit that the motive of the sacrifice is not the giving pain to the victim], this makes no difference in regard to its being the result of acts, [and, therefore, not eternal, but transitory].

   a. Grant that pain is not what is [intended] to be accomplished by works done without desire, [on the part of the virtuous sacrificer], still, though there is a difference [as you contend,] between [an act done to secure] something enjoyable and an act done without reference to enjoyment, this makes no difference with repect to the fact of the Liberation's being produced by acts, [which, I repeat, permanent Liberation cannot be]: there must still again be pain; for it [the Liberation supposed to have been attained through works,] must be perishable, because it is a production. The text which declares that works done without desire are instruments of Liberation has reference to knowledge, [which, I grant, may be gained by such means]; and Liberation comes through knowledge; so that these [works] are instruments of Liberation p. 102 mediately: [but you will recollect that the present inquiry regards the immediate cause].

   b. [But then, some one may say], supposing that Liberation may take place [as you Sánkhyas contend,] through the knowledge of the distinction between Nature and Soul, still, since, from the perishableness [of the Liberation effected by this means, as well as any other means], mundane life may return, were both on an equality, [we, whose Liberation you Sánkhyas look upon as transitory, and you Sánkhyas, whose Liberation we, again, look upon as being, by parity of reasoning, in much the same predicament]. To this he replies:

p. 103


   The right means effect Liberation once for all.

   Aph. 86.* Of him who is essentially liberated, his bonds having absolutely perished, it [i.e., the fruit of his saving knowledge,] is absolute:3 there is no parity [between his case and that of him who relies on works, and who may thereby secure a temporary sojourn in Paradise, only to return again to earth].

   a. Of him 'who is essentially liberated,' who, in his very essence, is free, there is the destruction of bondage. The bond [see § 56,1] is Non-discrimination [between Nature and Soul]. By the removal thereof there is the destruction, the annihilation, of Non-discrimination: and how is it possible that there should again be a return of the mundane state, when the destruction of Non-discrimination is absolute? Thus there is no [such] similarity, [between the two cases, as is imagined, by the objector, under § 85. b.].

   b. It has been asserted [in § 61,] that there is a class of twenty-five [things which are realities], and, since these cannot be ascertained [or made out to be true], except by p. 104 proof, therefore he displays this; [i.e., he shows what he means by proof]:


   What is meant by evidence.

   Aph. 87.* The determination of something not [previously] lodged in both [the Soul and the Intellect], nor in one or other of them, is 'right notion' (pramá). What is, in the highest degree, productive thereof [i.e., of any given 'right notion'], is that; [i.e., is what we mean by proof, or evidence, (pramáṉa)].

   a. 'Not lodged,' i.e., not deposited in 'one rightly cognizing' (pramátṛi); in short, not previously known. The 'determination,' i.e., the ascertainment [or right comprehension] of such a thing, or reality, is 'right notion'; and, whether this be an affection 'of both,' i.e., of Intellect, and also of Soul [as some hold that it is], or of only one or other of the two, [as others hold,] either way, 'what is, in the highest degree, productive' of this 'right notion' is [what we term proof, or] evidence, (pramáṉa): such is the definition of evidence in general; [the definition of its several species falling to beconsidered hereafter]: such is the meaning.

p. 105

   b. It is with a view to the exclusion of Memory, Error, and Doubt, in their order, that we employ [when speaking of the result of evidence,] the expressions 'not previously known' [which excludes things remembered], and 'reality' [which excludes mistakes and fancies], and 'discrimination,' [which excludes doubt].

   c. In regard to this [topic of knowledge and the sources of knowledge], if 'right notion,' is spoken of as located in the Soul [see § 87. a.], then the [proof, or] evidence is an affection of the Intellect. If [on the other hand, the 'right notion' is spoken of as] located in the Intellect, in the shape of an affection [of that the affections of which are mirrored by the Soul], then it [the proof, or evidence, or whatever we may choose to call that from which 'right notion' results,] is just the conjunction of an organ [with its appropriate object; such conjunction giving rise to sense-perception], &c. But, if both the Soul's cognition and the affections of the Intellect are spoken of as [cases of] 'right notion,' then both of these aforesaid [the affection of the Intellect, in the first case, and the conjunction of an organ with its appropriate object, &c., in the other p. 106 case,] are [to receive the name of] proof (pramáṉa). You are to understand, that, when the organ of vision, &c., are spoken of as 'evidence,' it is only as being mediately [the sources of right knowledge].

   d. How many [kinds of] proofs [then,] are there? To this he replies:


   There are three kinds of evidence.

   Aph. 88.* Proof is of three kinds:1 there is no establishment of more; because, if these be established, then all [that is true] can be established [by one or other of these three proofs].

   a. 'Proof is of three kinds;' that is to say, 'perception' p. 107 (pratyaksha), 'the recognition of signs' (anumána), and 'testimony' (śabda), are the [three kinds of] proofs.

   b. But then [some one may incline to say], let 'comparison' [which is reckoned, in the Nyáya, a specifically distinct source of knowledge], and the others [such as 'Conjecture,' &c., which are reckoned, in like manner, in the Mímáṅsá], also be instruments of right knowledge, [as well as these three], in [the matter of] the discriminating of Nature and Soul: he therefore says, 'because, if those [three] be established,' &c. And, since, if there be the three kinds of proof established, 'everything [that is really true] can be established [by means of them], there is no establishment of more;' no addition to the proofs can be fairly made out; because of the cumbrousness [that sins against the philosophical maxim, that we are not to assume more than is necessary to account for the case]: such is the meaning.

   c. For the same reason, Manu, also, has laid down only a triad of proofs, where he says [see the Institutes, Ch. xii., v. 105]: 'By that man who seeks a distinct knowledge of his duty, [these] three [sources of right knowledge] must be well understood, viz., Perception, Inference, and Scriptural authority in its various shapes [of legal institute, p. 108 &c.].' And 'Comparison,' and 'Tradition' (aitihya), and the like, are included under Inference and Testimony; and 'Non-perception' (anupalabdhi) and the like are included under Perception; [for the non-perception of an absent jar on a particular spot of ground is nothing else than the perception of that spot of ground without a jar on it].

   d. He [next] states the definitions of the varieties [of proof, having already (§ 87) given the general definition]:


   Perception defined.

   Aph. 89.* Perception (pratyakska) is that discernment which, being in3 conjunction [with the thing perceived], portrays the form thereof.

   a. 'Being in conjunction,' [literally,] 'existing in conjunction;' p. 109 'portrays the form thereof,' i.e., assumes the form of the thing with which it is in conjunction [as water assumes the form of the vessel into which it is poured]; what 'discernment,' or affection of the Intellect, [does this], that [affection of the Intellect (see Yoga Aphorisms, I., § 5 and § 8. b.)] is the evidence [called] Perception: such is the meaning.

   b. But then, [some one may say,] this [definition of Perception (§ 89)] does not extend [as we conceive it ought, and presume it is intended, to do,] to the perception, by adepts in the Yoga, of things past, future, or concealed [by stone walls, or such intervening things as interrupt ordinary perception]; because there is, here, 'no form of the thing, in conjunction' [with the mind of him who perceives it, while absent]: having pondered this doubt, he corrects it by [stating, as follows,] the fact, that this [supernatural sort of perception] is not what he intends to define:

p. 110


   The definition not to be blamed, though it should not apply to the perceptions of the mystic.

   Aph. 90.* It is not a fault [in the definition, that it does not apply to the perceptions of adepts in the Yoga]; because that of the adepts in the Yoga is not an external perception.

   a. That is to say: it is only sense-perception that is to be here defined; and the adepts of the Yoga do not perceive through the external [organs of sense]. Therefore there is no fault [in our definition]; i.e., there is no failure to include the perceptions of these; [because there is no intention to include them].

   b. [But, although this reply is as much as the objector has any right to expect,] he states the real justification [of the definition in question]:


   But the definition does apply to the perceptions of the mystic.

   Aph. 91.* Or, there is no fault [in the definition], because of the conjunction, with causal things, of that [mystical mind] which has attained exaltation.4

p. 111

   a. Or, be it so that the perception of the Yogí, also, shall be the thing to be defined; still there is no fault [in our definition, § 89]; it does not fail to extend [to this, also]; since the mind of the Yogí, in the exaltation gained from the habitude produced by concentration, does come into conjunction with things [as existent] in their causes, [whether or not with the things as developed into products perceptible by the external senses].

   b. Here the word rendered 'causal' (lína) denotes the things, not in conjunction [with the senses], alluded to by the objector [in § 89. b.]; for we, who assert that effects exist [from eternity, in their causes, before taking the shape of effects, and, likewise, in these same causes, when again resolved into their causes], hold that even what is past, &c., still essentially exists, and that, hence, its conjunction [with the mind of the mystic, or the clairvoyant,] is possible.

   Objection, that the definition does not apply to the perceptions of the 'Lord.'

   c. But then, [some one may say,] still this [definition] does not extend to the Lord's perceptions; because, since these are from everlasting, they cannot p. 112 result from [emergent] conjunction. To this he replies:


   That any 'Lord' exists is not proved.

   Aph. 92.* [This objection to the definition of Perception has no force]; because it is not proved that there is a Lord (íśwara).

   a. That there is no fault [in the definition of Perception], because there is no proof that there is a Lord, is supplied [from § 90].

   b. And this demurring to there being any 'Lord' is merely in accordance with3 the arrogant dictum of [certain] partisans [who hold an opinion not recognized by the majority]. Therefore, it is to be understood, the expression employed is, 'because it is not proved that there is a Lord,' but not the expression, 'because there is no Lord,'

p. 113

   c. But, on the implication1 that there is a 'Lord,' what we mean to speak of [in our definition of Perception, (§ 89),] is merely the being of the [same] kind with what is produced by conjunction [of a sense-organ with its object; and the perceptions of the 'Lord' may be of the same kind with such perceptions, though they were not to come from the same source].

   d. Having pondered the doubt, 'How should the Lord not be proved [to exist] by the Scripture and the Law, [which declare his existence]?' he states a dilemma which excludes [this]:


   A dilemma, to exclude proof that there is any 'Lord.'

   Aph. 93.* [And, further,] it is not proved that he [the 'Lord,'] exists; because [whoever exists must be either free or bound; and], of free and bound, he can be neither the one nor the other.

   a. The 'Lord' whom you imagine, tell us, is he free from troubles, &c.? Or is he in bondage through these? p. 114 Since he is not, cannot be, either the one or the other, it is not proved that there is a 'Lord:' such is the meaning.

   b. He explains this very point:


   The force of the dilemma.

   Aph. 94.* [Because,] either way, he would be inefficient.

   a. Since, if he were free, he would have no desires, &c., which [as compulsory motives,] would instigate him to create; and, if he were bound, he would be under delusion; he must be [on either alternative,] unequal to the creation, &c. [of this world].

   b. But then, [it may be asked,] if such be the case, what becomes of the Scripture-texts which declare the 'Lord?' To this he replies:

p. 115


   The import of the texts which speak of the 'Lord.'

   Aph. 95.* [The Scriptural texts which make mention of the 'Lord' are either glorifications of the liberated Soul, or homages to the recognized3 [deities of the Hindu pantheon].4

   a. That is to say: accordingly as the case may be, some text [among those in which the term 'Lord' occurs,] is intended, in the shape of a glorification [of Soul], as the 'Lord,' [as Soul is held to be], merely in virtue of junction [with Nature], to incite [to still deeper contemplation], to exhibit, as what is to be known, the liberated Soul, i.e., absolute Soul in general; and some other text, declaratory, for example, of creatorship, &c., preceded by resolution [to create, is intended] to extol [and to purify the mind of the contemplator, by enabling him to take a part in extolling] the eternity, &c., of the familiarly known3 Brahmá, p. 116 Vishṉu, Śiva, or other non-eternal 'Lord;' since these, though possessed of the conceit [of individuality], &c., [and, in so far, liable to perish], have immortality, &c., in a secondary sense; [seeing that the Soul, in every combination, is immortal, though the combination itself is not so].

   b. But then, [some one may say], even if it were thus [as alleged under § 95], what is heard in Scripture, [viz.], the fact that it [viz., Soul] is the governor of Nature, &c., would not be the case; for, in the world, we speak of government in reference only to modifications [preceded and determined] by resolutions [that so and so shall take place], &c. To this he replies:

p. 117


   Soul, like the lode stone, acts not by resolve, but through proximity.

   Aph. 96.* The governorship [thereof, i.e., of Soul over Nature] is from [its] proximity thereto, [not from its resolving to act thereon]; as is the case with the gem, [the lodestone, in regard to iron].

   a. If it were alleged that [its, Soul's] creativeness, or [its] governorship, was through a resolve [to create, or to govern], then this objection [brought forward under § 95. b.] would apply. But [it is not so; for,] by us [Sánkhyas,] it is held that the Soul's governorship, in the shape of creatorship, or the like, is merely from [its] proximity [to Nature]; 'as is the case with the [lodestone] gem.'

   b. As the gem, the lodestone, is attracted by iron merely by proximity, without resolving [either to act or to be acted on], &c., so, by the mere conjunction of the primal Soul, Nature is changed into the principle [called] the 'Great one,' [or Mind, (see § 61. c.)]. And in this alone consists [what we speak of as] its acting as creator towards that which is superadded to it: such is the meaning

p. 118

   c. And thus it is declared, [in some one of the Puráṉas1]: 'As the iron acts, whilst the gem [the lodestone,] stands void of volition, just so this world is created by a deity who is mere Existence. Thus it is, that there are, in the Soul, both agency [seemingly,] and non-agency, [really]. It is not an agent, inasmuch as it is void of volition; [and it is] an agent, merely through approximation [to Nature].'

   d. In respect of worldly products, also, animal souls overrule, merely through their approximation [to Nature]: so he declares [as follows]:

p. 119


   In like manner, embodied souls do not energize.

   Aph. 97.* In the case of individual products, also, [the apparent agency] of animal souls [is solely through proximity].

   a. 'The agency is solely through proximity:' so much is supplied [from § 96].

   b. The meaning is this, that, in the case, also, of particular productions,—the creation, &c., of things individual [as contradistinguished from that of all things in the lump, (see Vedánta-sára, § 67)],—animal souls, i.e., souls in which the intellects [of individuals] reflect themselves [see § 99. a.], overrule, merely through proximity, but not through any effort; seeing that these [animal souls] are none other than the motionless Thought.

   c. But then, [some one may say], if there were no eternal and omniscient 'Lord,' through the doubt of a blind tradition, [in the absence of an intelligently effective guardianship], the Vedas would cease to be an authority; [a possibility which, of course, cannot be entertained for an instant]. To this he replies:

p. 120


   How the Vedas need not the 'Lord' to authenticate them.

   Aph. 98.* The declaration of the texts or sense [of the Veda, by Brahmá, for example], since he knows the truth, [is authorative evidence].

   a. To complete [the aphorism, we must say], 'since Hiraṉyagarbha [i.e., Brahmá,] and others [viz., Vishṉu and Śiva], are knowers of what is certain, i.e., of what is true, the declaration of the texts or sense of the Vedas, where these are the speakers, is evidence [altogether indisputable].'

   b. But then, if Soul, by its simple proximity [to Nature (§ 96)], is an overruler in a secondary sense [only of the term,—as the magnet may be said, is a secondary sense, to draw the iron, while the conviction is entertained, that, actually and literally, the iron draws the magnet],—who is the primary [or actual,] overruler? In reference to this, he says:

p. 121


   It is in the shape of the internal organ, that Nature affects Soul.

   Aph. 99.* The internal organ,1 through its being enlightened thereby [i.e., by Soul], is the overruler; as is the iron, [in respect of the magnet].

   a. The internal organ, i.e., the understanding, is the overruler, through its fancying itself to be Soul, [as it does fancy,] by reason of its being enlightened by the Soul, through its happening to reflect itself in [and contemplate itself in,] Soul; 'just as the iron,' that is to say, as the attracting iron, though inactive, draws [the magnet], in consequence of [its] mere proximity, [and so acquires magnetism by magnetic induction].

   b. He [now, having discussed the evidence that consists in direct perception,] states the definition of inference (anumána):

p. 122


   Inference defined.

   Aph. 100.* The knowledge of the connected [e.g., fire], through perception of the connexion [e.g., of fire with smoke], is inference.

   a. That is to say: inference [or conviction of a general truth,] is [a kind of] evidence consisting in a [mental] modification, [which is none other than] the knowledge of the connected, i.e., of the constant accompanier, through the knowledge of the constant accompaniment: by 'connexion' (pratibandha) here being meant 'constant attendedness' (vyápti); and through the perception thereof [it being that the mind has possession of any general principle].

   b. But a conclusion (anumiti) is knowledge of the soul; [whilst an Inference, so far forth as it is an instrument in the establishment of knowledge deducible from it, is an affection of the internal organ, or understanding (see § 87. c.)]

   c. He [next] defines testimony (śabda):

p. 123


   Valid testimony defined.

   Aph. 101.* Testimony [such as is entitled to the name of evidence, is a declaration by one worthy [to be believed].

   a. Here 'fitness' means 'suitableness;' and so the evidence which is called 'Testimony' is the knowledge arising from a suitable declaration: such is the meaning. And [while this belongs to the understanding, or internal organ (see § 100. b.)] the result is that [knowledge] in the Soul, [which is called,] 'knowledge by hearing' (śabda-bodha).

   b. He [next] volunteers to tell us what is the use of his setting forth [the various divisions of] evidence:


   Why the kinds of Evidence have been here set forth.

   Aph. 102.* Since the establishment of [the existence of] both [soul and non-soul] is by means of evidence, the decaration thereof [i.e., of the kinds of evidence, has been here made].

   a. It is only by means of evidence that both Soul and non-soul are established as being distinct, [the one from the p. 124 other]: therefore has this, viz., evidence, been here declared: such is the meaning.

   b. Among these [several kinds of proof], he [now] describes that one by which, especially, viz., by a proof which is one kind of inference, Nature and Soul are here to be established discriminatively:


   The existence of Soul and Nature argued from analogy.

   Aph. 103.* The establishment of both [Nature and Soul] is by analogy.

   a. [Analogy (sámányato dṛishṭa) is that kind of evidence which is employed in the case] where, by the force [as an argument,] which the residence of any property in the subject derives from a knowledge of its being constantly accompanied [by something which it may therefore betoken], when we have had recourse to [as the means of determining this constant accompaniment,] what is, for instance, generically of a perceptible kind, [where, under such circumstances, we repeat,] anything of a different kind, i.e., not cognizable by the senses, is established; as when, p. 125 for example, having apprehended a constant accompaniment, [e.g., that an act implies an instrument], by taking into consideration such instruments as axes, &c., which are of earthy and other kinds, a quite heterogeneous, imperceptible, instrument of knowledge, viz., [the instrument named] Sense, is established [or inferred to exist]; such is what we mean by Analogy; and it is by this [species of inference], that both, [viz.,] Nature and Soul are proved [to exist]: such is the meaning.

   b. Of these [viz., Nature and Soul,] the argument from analogy for [the existence of] Nature is as follows: the Great Principle [viz., Understanding (see § 61. c.)] is formed out of the things [called] Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion, [to the aggregate of which three in equipoise (see § 61) the name of Nature is given]; because, whilst it is [undeniably,] a production, it has the characters of Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion; just as a bracelet, or the like, formed of gold, or the like; [has the characteristic properties p. 126 of the gold, or the like, and is thereby known to have been formed out of gold, or the like].

   c. But, [as regards tht argument from analogy, in proof of the existence] of Soul, [it is, as stated before, under § 66, to the following effect]: Nature is for the sake of another; because it is something that acts as a combination; as a house, for instance, [which is a combination of various parts combined for the benefit of the tenant]. In this instance, having gathered, in regard to houses, &c., the fact established on sense-perception, that they exist for the sake of [organized] bodies, for example, something of a different kind therefrom, [i.e., from Nature, viz.], Soul, is inferred [by analogy,] as something other than Nature, &c., [which, as being a compound thing, is not designed for itself]: such is the meaning.

   d. But then [some one may say], since Nature is eternal, and exertion is habitual to her, [and the result of her action is the bondage of the Soul], there should constantly be experience [whether of pleasure or of pain], and, hence, no such thing as thorough emancipation. To this he replies:

p. 127


   When it is that experience ceases.

   Aph. 104.* Experience [whether of pain or pleasure, ends with the discernment of] Thought, [or Soul, as contradistinguished from Nature].

   a. By 'Thought' [we mean] soul. Experience [whether of pain or pleasure,] ceases, on the discerning thereof. As 'antecedent non-existence,' though devoid of a beginning, [see Tarka-sangraha, § 92], surceases [when the thing antecedently non-existent begins to be], so, eternal Nature [eternal, as regards the absence of any beginning,] continues [no further than] till the discernment of the difference [between Nature and Soul]; so that experience [whether of pain or pleasure,] does not at all times occur: such is the state of the case.

   b. [But some one say], if Nature be agent, and Soul experiencer, then it must follow [which seems unreasonable,] that another is the experiencer of [the results of] the acts done by one different. To this he replies:


   The fruit of the action is not always the agent's.

   Aph. 105.* The experience of the fruit may belong even to another than the agent; as in the case of food, &c.

p. 128

   a. As it belongs to the cook to prepare the food, &c., and to one who was not the agent, viz., the master, to enjoy the fruit [thereof, i.e., the fruit of the cook's actions], so is the case here, also.

   b. Having stated an exoteric principle [which may serve, in practice, to silence, by the argumentum ad hominem, him on whose principles it may be valid], he [next] declares his own doctrine, [in regard to the doubt started under § 104. b.]:


   To suppose that Soul acts and experiences is an error.

   Aph. 106.* Or, [to give a better account of the matter than that given in § 105], since it is from non-discrimination that it is derived, the notion that the agent [soul being mistaken for an agent,] has the fruit [of the act is a wrong notion].

   a. The soul is neither an agent nor a patient; but, from the fact that the Great Principle [the actual agent (see § 97. b.)] is reflected in it, there arises the conceit of its being an agent. 'Or, since it is from non-discrimination;' that is to say, because it is from the failure to discriminate between Nature and Soul, that this takes place, i.e., that conceit takes place, that it is the agent that experiences the fruit; [whereas the actual agent is Nature, which, being unintelligent, can experience neither pain nor pleasure].

p. 129

   b. The opposite of this [wrong view, referred to in § 106,] he states [as follows]:


   Soul is really neither agent nor experiencer.

   Aph. 107.* And, when the truth is told, there is [seen to be] neither [agency, in Soul, nor experience].

   a. 'When the truth is told' [and discerned], i.e., when, by means of evidence, Nature and Soul are perceived [in their entire distinctness, one from the other], 'there is neither,' i.e., neither the condition [as regards soul,] of an agent nor that of a patient.

   b. Having discussed [the topic of] evidence, he [now] states the distribution of the subject-matter of evidence:

p. 130


   What is perceptible, under certain circumstances, may be imperceptible, under others.

   Aph. 108.* [A thing may be] an object [perceptible], and also [at another time,] not an object, through there being, in consequence of great distance, &c., a want of [conjunction of the sense with the thing], or [on the other hand,] an appliance of the sense [to the thing].

   a. An object [is a perceived object], through the proximity, or conjunction, of the sense [with the object]. [A thing may be] not an object [perceived], through the want of the sense, i.e., through the want of conjunction [between the sense and what would otherwise be its object]. And [this] want of conjunction [may result] from the junction's being prevented by great distance, &c.

   What may prevent perception.

   b. [To explain the '&c.,' and to exemplify the causes that may prevent the conjunction, required in order to perception, between the thing and the sense, we may remark, that] it is in consequence of great distance, that a bird [flying very high up] in the sky is not perceived; [then again,] in consequence of extreme proximity, the collyrium located in the eye [is not perceived by the eye itself]; a thing placed in [the inside of, or on the opposite side of,] a wall [is not perceived], in consequence of the obstruction; from distraction of mind, the unhappy, or other [agitated person], does not perceive the thing that is at his side [or under his very nose]; through its subtilty, p. 131 an atom [is not perceived]; nor is a very small sound, when overpowered by the sound of a drum; and so on.

   c. How [or, for which of the possible reasons just enumerated,] comes the imperceptibleness of Nature? In regard to this, he declares:


   The subtility of Nature.

   Aph. 109.* Her imperceptibleness arises from [her] subtility.

   a. 'Her,' i.e., Nature's, imperceptibleness is from subtilty. By subtilty is meant the fact of being difficult to investigate; not [as a Naiyáyika might, perhaps, here prefer understanding the term,] the consisting of atoms; for Nature is [not atomic, in the opinion of the Sánkhyas, but] all-pervasive.

p. 132

   b. How, then, [it may be asked,] is [the existence of] Nature determined? To this he replies:


   Nature inferred from the existence of productions.

   Aph. 110.* [Nature exists;] because her existence is gathered from the beholding of productions.

   a. As the knowledge of [there being such things as] atoms comes from the beholding of jars, &c., [which are agglomerations], so the knowledge of Nature comes from the beholding of products which have the three Qualities; [(see § 62. a.) and the existence of which implies a cause, to which the name of Nature is given, in which these constituents exist from eternity].

   b. Some [the Vedántís,] say that the world has Brahma as its cause; others [the Naiyáyikas], that it has atoms as its cause; but our seniors [the transmitters of the Sánkhya doctrine], that it has Nature as its cause. So he sets forth a doubt [which might naturally found itself] thereon:

p. 133


   A doubt thrown on the existence of Nature, by the contradiction of dissentients.

   Aph. 111.* If [you throw out the doubt that] it [viz., the existence of Nature,] is not established, because of the contradiction of asserters [of other views, then you will find an answer in the next aphorism].

   a. 'Because of the the contradiction of asserters [of the Vedánta or Nyáya], it is not established,' i.e., Nature [as asserted by the Sánkhyas,] is not established.

   b. But then, [to set forth the objection of these counter-asserters], if a product existed antecedently to its production [as that product], then an eternal Nature [such as you Sánkhyas contend for,] would be proved to exist as the [necessary] substratum thereof; since you will declare that a cause is inferred only as the [invariable] accompanier of an effect; but it is denied, by us asserters [of the Vedánta, &c.], that the effect does exist [antecedently to its production; well,] if [this doubt be thrown out]: such is the meaning [of the aphorism].

   c. He states [his] doctrine [on this point]:

p. 134


   Mutual denials settle nothing.

   Aph. 112.* Still, since1 each [doctrine] is established in the opinion of each, a [mere unsupported] denial is not [decisive].

   a. If one side were disproved merely by the dissent of the opponent, then [look you,] there is dissent against the other side, too: so how could it be established? If the one side is established by there being inevitably attendant the recognition of the constant accompanier, on the recognition of that which is constantly accompanied [by it], it is the same with my [side], also: therefore [my] inference from effect [to cause] is not to be denied [in this peremptory fashion].

   b. Well, then, [the opponent may say], let [the inference of] cause from effect be granted; how is it that this [cause] is Nature, and nothing else, [such as Atoms, for instance]? To this he replies:

p. 135


   Nature the only hypothesis consistent with what appears.

   Aph. 113.* Because [if we were to infer any other cause than Nature,] we should have a contradiction to the threefold [aspect which things really exhibit].

   a. Quality is threefold [see § 61. a.], viz., Goodness, Passion, and Darkness: there would be a contradiction to these: such is the meaning.

   b. The drift here is as follows: If the character of cause [of all things around us] belonged to Atoms, or the like, then there would be a contradiction to the fact of being an aggregate of pleasure, pain, and delusion, which is recognizable in the world; [because nothing, we hold, can exist in the effect, which did not exist in the cause, and pleasure, pain, &c., are no properties of Atoms].

   c. He now repels the doubt as to whether the production of an effect is that of what existed [antecedently], or of what did not exist:

p. 136


   What never existed will never exist.

   Aph. 114.* The production of what is no entity, as a man's horn, does not take place.

   a. Of that which, like the horn of a man, is not an entity, even the production is impossible: such is the meaning. And so the import is, that that effect alone which [antecedently] exists is [at any time] produced.

   b. He states an argument why an effect must be some [previously existent] entity:


   A product cannot be of nothing.

   Aph. 115.* Because of the rule, that there must be some material [of which the product may consist].

   a. And only when both are extant is there, from the presence of the cause, the presence of the effect. Otherwise, everywhere and always, every [effect] might be produced; [the presence of the cause being, on the supposition, superfluous]. This he insists upon [as follows]:

p. 137


   Else, anything might occur at any time, anywhere.

   Aph. 116.* Because everything is not possible everywhere and always [which might be the case] if materials could be dispensed with].

   a. That is to say: because, in the world, we see that everything is not possible, i.e., that everything is not produced; 'everywhere,' i.e., in every place; 'always,' i.e., at all times.

   b. For the following reason, also, he declares, there is no production of what existed not [antecedently]:


   Effects preexist, potentially, in their causes.

   Aph. 117.* Because it is that which is competent [to the making of anything] that makes what is possible, [as a product of it].

   a. Because the being the material [of any future product] is nothing else than the fact of [being it, potentially, i.e., of] having the competency to be the product; and [this] competency is nothing else than the product's condition as that of what has not yet come to pass: therefore, since 'that which is competent,' viz., the cause, makes the product which is 'possible' [to be made out of it], it is not of any nonentity that the production takes p. 138 place, [but of an entity, whose esse, antecedently, was possibility]: such is the meaning.

   b. He states another argument:


   The product is nothing else than the cause.

   Aph. 118.* And because it [the product,] is [nothing else than] the cause, [in the shape of the product].

   a. It is declared, in Scripture, that, previously to production, moreover, there is no difference between the cause and its effect; and, since it is thereby settled that a product is an entity, production is not of what [previously] existed not: such is the meaning.

   b. He ponders a doubt:.


   A doubt whether that which is can be said to become.

   Aph. 119.* If [it be alleged that] there is no possibility of that's becoming which already is [then the answer will be found in the next aphorism].

p. 139

   a. That is to say: but then, if it be thus [that every effect exists antecedently to its production], since the effect [every effect,] must be eternal [without beginning], there is no possibility of [or room for] the adjunction of becoming, the adjunction of arising, in the case of a product which is [already, by hypothesis,] in the shape of an entity; because the employment of [the term] 'arising' [or the fact of being produced] has reference solely to what did not exist [previously]; if this be urged: such is the meaning.

   b. He declares the doctrine [in regard to this point]:


   Production is only manifestation; and so of the opposite.

   Aph. 120.* No; [do not argue that what is cannot become; for] the employment and the non-employment [of the term 'production'] are occasioned by the manifestation [and the non-manifestation of what is spoken of as produced, or not].

   a. 'No;' the view stated [in § 119] is not the right one: such is the meaning.

   b. As the whiteness of white cloth [which has become] dirty is brought manifestly out by means of washing, &c., p. 140 so, by the operation of the potter, is the pot brought into manifestness; [whereas], on the blow of a mallet, it becomes hidden, [and no longer appears as a pot].

   c. And manifestation [is no fiction of ours; for it] is seen; for example, that of oil, from sesamum-seeds, by pressure; of milk, from the cow, by milking; of the statue, which resided in the midst of the stone, by the operation of the sculptor; of husked rice, from rice in the husk, by threshing; &c.

   d. Therefore, the employment and the non-employment of the [term] 'the production of an effect' are dependent on manifestation, dependent on the manifestation of the effect: that is to say, the employment of [the term] 'production' is in consequence of the manifestation [of what is spoken of as produced]; and the non-employment of [the term] 'production' is in consequence of there being no manifestation [of that which is, therefore, not spoken of as produced]; but [the employment of the term 'production' is] not in consequence of that's becoming an entity which was not an entity.

p. 141

   e. But if [the employment of the term] 'production' is occasioned by [the fact of] manifestation, by what is occasioned [the employment of the term] destruction?1 To this he replies:


   What is meant by destruction.

   Aph. 121.* Destruction [of anything] is the resolution [of the thing spoken of as destroyed,] into the cause [from which it was produced].

   a. The resolution, by the blow of a mallet, of a jar into its cause [i.e., into the particles of clay which constituted the jar], to this are due both [the employment of] the term 'destruction,' and the kind of action [or behaviour] belonging to anything [which is termed its destruction].4

p. 142

   b. [But some one may say], if there were [only] a resolution [of a product into that from which it arose], a resurrection [or παλιγγενεσία] of it might be seen; and this is not seen: well [we reply], it is not seen by blockheads; but it is seen by those who can discriminate. For example, when thread is destroyed, it is changed into the shape of earth [as when burned to ashes]; and the earth is changed into the shape of a cotton-tree; and this [successively] changes into the shape of flower, fruit, and thread [spun again from the fruit of the cotton-plant]. So is it with all entities.

   c. Pray [some one may ask], is [this] manifestation [that you speak of under § 120] something real, or something not real? If it be something real [and which, therefore, never anywhere ceases to be], then [all] effects [during this constant manifestation] ought constantly to be perceived; and, if it be not real, then there would be the absence of [all] products, [in the absence of all manifestation. Manifestation, therefore, must be something real; and] there must be [in order to give rise to it,] another manifestation of it, and of this another; [seeing that a manifestation can be the result of nothing else than a manifestation, p. 143 on the principle that an effect consists of neither more nor less than its cause]; and thus we have a regressus in infinitum. To this he replies:


   How manifestation may occur without being an entity.

   Aph. 122.* Because they seek each other reciprocally,3 as is the case with seed and plant, [manifestation may generate manifestation, from eternity to eternity].

   a. Be it so, that there are thousands of manifestations; still there is no fault; for there is no starting-point; as is the case with seed and plant, [which people may suppose to have served, from eternity, as sources, one to another, reciprocally].

p. 144

   b. He states another argument:


   The objections to the theory of manifestation retorted.

   Aph. 123.* Or, [at all events, our theory of 'manifestation' is as] blameless as [your theory of] 'production.'

   a. Pray [let us ask], is production produced, or is it not? If it is produced, then of this [production of production] there must be production; so that there is a regressus in infinitum, [such as you allege against our theory, under § 121. c.] If it be not produced, then, pray, is this because it is unreal, or because it is eternal? If because it is unreal, then production never is at all; so that it would never be perceived, [as you allege that it is]. Again, if [production is not something produced,] because it is eternal, then there would be at, all times, the production of [all possible] effects, [which you will scarcely pretend is the case]. Again, if you say, since 'production' itself consists of production, what need of supposing an ulterior production [of production]? then, in like manner, [I ask,] since 'manifestation' itself consists of manifestation, what need of supposing an ulterior manifestation [of manifestation]? The view which you hold on this point is ours, also; [and p. 145 thus every objection stated or hinted under § 121. c., is capable of being retorted].

   b. He [now] states the community of properties [that exists] among the products of Nature, mutually:


   The characters common to all products.

   Aph. 124.* [A product of Nature is] caused, uneternal, not all-pervading, mutable, multitudinous, dependent, mergent.

   a. 'Caused,' i.e. having a cause. 'Uneternal,' i.e., destructible. 'Not all-pervading,' i.e., not present everywhere. 'Mutable,' i.e., distinguished by the acts of leaving [one form], and assuming [another form], &c. It [the soul,] leaves the body it has assumed, [and, probably, takes another]; and bodies, &c., move [and are mutable, as is notorious]. 'Multitudinous,' i.e., in consequence of the distinction of souls; [every man, e.g., having a separate body]. 'Dependent,' [i.e.,] on its cause. 'Mergent,' that is to say, it [i.e., every product, in due time,] is resolved into that from which it originated.

p. 146

   b. [But, some one may say], if realities be the twenty-five [which the Sánkhyas enumerate (see § 61), and no more], pray, are such common operations as knowing, enjoying, &c., absolutely nothing; you accordingly giving up what you see, [in order to save an hypothesis with which what you see is irreconcilable]? To this he replies:


   The qualities of the Nyáya are implied in the term Nature.

   Aph. 125.* There is the establishment of these [twenty-four 'Qualities' of the Nyáya, which you fancy that we do not recognize, because we do not explicitly enumerate them], either by reason that these ordinary qualities [as contradistinguished from the three Qualities of the Sánkhya], &c., are, in reality, nothing different; or [to put it in another point of view,] because they are hinted by [the term] Nature, [in which, like our own three Qualities, they are implied].

p. 147

   a. Either from their being nothing different from the twenty-four principles, 'in reality,' truly, quite evidently,—since the character of these [twenty-four] fits the ordinary qualities, &c., [which you fancy are neglected in our enumeration of things,]—' there is the establishment of these,' i.e., there is their establishment [as realities,] through their being implied just in those [twenty-four principles which are explicitly specified in the Sánkhya].

   b. The word 'or' shows that there is another alternative [reply, in the aphorism, to the objection in question]. 'Or because they are hinted by [the term] Nature;' that is to say, the qualities, &c. [such as Knowledge], are established [as realities], just because they are hinted by [the term] Nature, by reason that [these] qualities are, mediately, products of Nature; for there is no difference between product and cause. But the omission to mention them [explicitly] is not by reason of their not being at all.

   c. He [next] mentions the points in which Nature and [her] products agree:

p. 148


   The characters common to Nature and her products.

   Aph. 126.* Of both [Nature and her products] the fact that they consist of the three Qualities [§ 61. a.], and that they are irrational, &c., [is the common property].

   a. Consisting of the three qualities, and being irrational, [such in the meaning of the compound term with which the aphorism commences]. By the expression '&c.' is meant [their] being intended for another, [see § 66]. 'Of both,' i.e., of the cause [viz., Nature], and of the effects [viz., all natural products]. Such is the meaning:

   b. He [next] states the mutual differences of character among the three Qualities which [see § 61] are the [constituent] parts of Nature:


   In what the three Qualities differ.

   Aph. 127.* The Qualities [§ 62] differ in character mutually by pleasantness, unpleasantness, lassitude, &c., [in which forms, severally, the Qualities present themselves].

   a. 'Pleasantness,' i.e., Pleasure. By the expression p. 149 '&c.' is meant Goodness (sattwa), which is light [i.e., not heavy,] and illuminating. 'Unpleasantness,' i.e., Pain. By the expression '&c.' [in reference to this,] is meant Passion (rajas), which is urgent and restless. 'Lassitude,' i.e., stupefaction. By the expression '&c.' is meant Darkness (tamas), which is heavy and enveloping. It is by these habits that the Qualities, viz., Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, differ: such is the remainder, [required to complete the aphorism].

   b. At the time of telling their differences, he tells in what respects they agree:


   In what respects the Qualities agree, as well as differ.

   Aph. 128.* Through Lightness and other habits the Qualities mutually agree and differ.

   a. The meaning is as follows: the enunciation [in the p. 150 shape of the term laghu, 'light,' is not one intended to call attention to the concrete, viz., what things are light, but] is one where the abstract [the nature of light things, viz., 'lightness' (laghutwa)] is the prominent thing. 'Through Lightness and other habits,' i.e., through the characters of Lightness, Restlessness, and Heaviness, the Qualities differ. Their agreement is through what is hinted by the expression 'and other.' And this consists in their mutually predominating [one over another, from time to time], producing one another, consorting together, and being reciprocally present, [one in another], for the sake of Soul.

   b. By [the expressions, in § 124,] 'caused,' &c., it is declared that the 'Great one' [or Mind], &c., are products. He states the proof of this:


   Proof that Mind &c. are products.

   Aph. 129.* Since they are other than both [Soul and Nature, the only two uncaused entities], Mind and the rest are products; as is the case with a jar, or the like.

   a. That is to say: like a jar, or the like, Mind and the p. 151 rest are products; because they are something other than the two which [alone] are eternal, viz., Nature and Soul.

   b. He states another reason:


   A second proof.

   Aph. 130.* Because of [their] measure, [which is a limited one].

   a. That is to say: [Mind and the rest are products]; because they are limited in measure; [whereas the only two that are uncaused, viz., Nature and Soul, are unlimited].

   b. He states another argument:


   A third proof.

   Aph. 131.* Because they conform [to Nature].

   a. [Mind and the rest are products]; because they well [follow and] correspond with Nature; i.e., because the Qualities of Nature [§ 61] are seen in all things: [and it p. 152 is a maxim, that what is in the effect was derived from the cause and implies the cause].

   b. He states the same thing, [in the next aphorism]:


   A fourth proof.

   Aph. 132.* And, finally, because it is through the power [of the cause alone, that the product can do aught].

   a. It is by the power of its cause, that a product energizes, [as a chain restrains an elephant, only by the force of the iron which it is made of]; so that Mind and the rest, being [except through the strength of Nature,] powerless, produce their products in subservience to Nature. Otherwise, since it is their habit to energize, they would at all times produce their products, [which it will not be alleged that they do].

   b. And the word iti, in this place, is intended to notify the completion of the set of [positive] reasons [why Mind and the others should be regarded as products].

   c. He [next] states [in support of the same assertion,] the argument from negatives, [i.e., the argument drawn p. 153 from the consideration as to what becomes of Mind and the others, when they are not products]:


   Converse proof of the same.

   Aph. 133.* On the quitting thereof [quitting the condition of product], there is Nature, or Soul, [into one or other of which the product must needs have resolved itself].

   a. Product and non-product; such is the pair or alternatives. 'On the quitting thereof;' i.e., when Mind and the rest quit the condition of product, Mind and the rest [of necessity] enter into Nature, or Soul; [these two alone being non-products].

   b. [But perhaps some one may say, that] Mind and the rest may exist quite independently of the pair of alternatives [just mentioned]. In regard to this, he declares [as follows]:

p. 154


   Mind and the rest would not be at all, if neither product nor non-product.

   Aph. 134.* If they were other than these two they would be void; [seeing that there is nothing self-existent, besides soul and Nature].

   a. If Mind and the rest were 'other than these two,' i.e., than product or non-product [§ 133], they would be in the shape of what is 'void,' i.e., in the shape of nonentity.

   b. Well now, [some one may say,] why should it be under the character of a product, that Mind and the rest are a sign of [there being such a principle as] Nature? They may be [more properly said to be] a sign, merely in virtue of their not occurring apart from it. To this he replies:


   What kind of causes can be inferred from their effects.

   Aph. 135.* The cause is inferred from the effect, [in the case of Nature and her products]; because it accompanies it.

   a. That [other relation, other than that of material and product, which you would make out to exist between Nature and Mind,] exists, indeed, where the nature [or p. 155 essence] of the cause is not seen in the effect; as [is the case with] the inference, from the rising of the moon, that the sea is swollen [into full tide; rising, with maternal affection, towards her son who was produced from her bosom on the occasion of the celebrated Churning of the Ocean. Though the swelling of the tide does not occur apart from the rising of the moon, yet here the cause, moon-rise, is not seen in the effect, tide; and, consequently, though we infer the effect from the cause, the cause could not have been inferred from the effect]. But, in the present case, since we see, in Mind and the rest, the characters of Nature, the cause is inferred from the effect. 'Because it accompanies it,' i.e., because, in Mind and the rest, we see the properties of Nature, [i.e., Nature herself actually present; as we see the clay which is the cause of a jar, actually present in the jar].

   b. [But it may still be objected,] if it be thus, then let that principle itself, the 'Great one' [or Mind], be the cause of the world: what need of Nature? To this he replies:

p. 156


   How Mind must have an antecedent.

   Aph. 136.* The indiscrete, [Nature, must be inferred] from its [discrete and resolvable] effect. [Mind], in which are the three Qualities, [which constitute Nature].

   a. 'It is resolved;' such is the import of [the term] linga, [here rendered] 'effect.' From that [resolvable effect], viz., the 'Great principle' [or Mind], in which are the three Qualities, Nature must be inferred. And that the 'Great principle,' in the shape of ascertainment [or distinct intellection], is discrete [or limited] and perishable, is established by direct observation. Therefore [i.e., since Mind, being perishable, must be resolvable into something else,] we infer that into which it is resolvable, [in other words, its 'cause,' here analogously termed lingin, since 'effect' has been termed linga].

   b. But then, [some one may say], still something quite different may be the cause [of all things]: what need of [this] Nature [of yours]? In regard to this, he remarks [as follows]:

p. 157


   Why Nature, and nothing else, must be the root of all.

   Aph. 137.* There is no denying that it [Nature,] is; because of its effects, [which will be in vain attributed to any other source].

   a. Is the cause of this [world] a product, or not a product? If it were a product, then, the same being [with equal propriety to be assumed to be] the case with its cause, there would be a regressus in infinitum. If effects be from any root [to which there is nothing antecedent], then this is that [to which we give the name of Nature]. 'Because of its effects,' that is to say, because of the effects of Nature. There is no denying 'that it is,' i.e., that Nature is.

   b. Be it so, [let us grant,] that Nature is; yet [the opponent may contend,] Soul positively cannot be; for [if the existence of causes is to be inferred from their products, Soul cannot be thus demonstrated to exist, seeing that] it has no products. In regard to this, he remarks [as follows]:

p. 158


   It is not from any effect that Soul is inferred.

   Aph. 138.* [The relation of cause and effect is] not [alleged as] the means of establishing [the existence of Soul]; because, as is the case with [the disputed term] 'merit,' there is no dispute about there being such a kind of thing; [though what kind of thing is matter of dispute].

   a. There is no dispute about 'there being such a kind of thing,' i.e., as to there being Soul, simply; [since everybody who does not talk stark nonsense must admit a Soul, or self, of some kind]; for the dispute is [not as to its being, but] as to its peculiarity [of being], as [whether it be] multitudinous, or sole, all-pervading, or not all-pervading, and so forth; just as, in every [philosophical system, or] theory, there is no dispute as to [there being something to which may be applied the term] 'merit' (dharma); for the difference of opinion has regard to the particular kind of [thing,—such as sacrifices, according to the Mímáṅsá creed, or good works, according to the Nyáya,—which shall be held to involve] 'merit.'

   b. 'Not the means of establishing' that [viz., the existence of soul]; i.e., the relation of cause and effect is not the means of establishing it. This intends, 'I will mention another means of establishing it.'

p. 159

   c. [But some one may say,] Souls are nothing else than the body, and its organs, &c.: what need of imagining anything else? To this he replies:


   Materialism scouted.

   Aph. 139.* Soul is something else than the body, &c.

   a. [The meaning of the aphorism is] plain.

   b. He propounds an argument in support of this:


   The discerptible is subservient to the indiscerptible.

   Aph. 140.* Because that which is combined [and is, therefore, discerptible,] is for the sake of some other, [not discerptible].

   a. That which is discerptible is intended for something else that is indiscerptible. If it were intended for something else that is discerptible, there would be a regressus ad infinitum.

   b. And combinedness [involving (see § 67) discerptibleness,] p. 160 consists in the Qualities' making some product by their state of mutual commixture; or [to express it otherwise,] combinedness is the state of the soft and the hard, [which distinguishes matter from spirit]. And this exists occultly in Nature, as well as the rest; because, otherwise, discerptibleness would not prove discoverable in the products thereof, viz., the 'Great one,' &c.

   c. He elucidates this same point:


   Soul presents no indication of being material.

   Aph. 141.* [And Soul is something else than the body, &c.]; because there is [in Soul,] the reverse of the three Qualities, &c.

   a. Because there is, in Soul, 'the reverse of the three Qualities,' &c., i.e., because they are not seen [in it]. By the expression '&c.' is meant, because the other characters of Nature, also, are not seen [in soul].

   b. He states another argument:

p. 161


   Another proof that Soul is not material.

   Aph. 142.* And [Soul is not material;] because of [its] superintedence [over Nature].

   a. For a superintendent is an intelligent being; and Nature is unintelligent: such is the meaning.

   b. He states another argument:


   Another proof.

   Aph. 143.* [And Soul is not material;] because of [its] being the experiencer.

   a. It is Nature that is experienced; the experiencer is Soul. Although Soul, from its being unchangeably the same, is not [really] an experiencer, still the assertion [in the aphorism,] is made, because of the fact that the reflexion of the Intellect befalls it, [and thus makes it seem as if it experienced (see § 58. a.)].

   b. Efforts are engaged in for the sake of Liberation. Pray, is this [for the benefit] of the Soul, or of Nature; p. 162 [since Nature, in the shape of Mind, is, it seems, the experiencer]? To this be replies:


   For Soul, not Nature, is Liberation wanted.

   Aph. 144.* [It is for Soul, and not for Nature;] because2 the exertions are with a view to isolation [from all qualities; a condition to which Soul is competent, but Nature is not].

   a. The very essence of Nature cannot depart from it [so as to leave it in the state of absolute, solitary isolation contemplated]; because the three Qualities are its very essence, [the departure of which from it would leave nothing behind], and because it would thus prove to be not eternal, [whereas, in reality, it is eternal]. The isolation (kaivalya) of that alone is possible of which the qualities are reflexional, [and not constitutive (see § 58. a.)]; and that is Soul.

   b. Of what nature is this [Soul]? To this he replies:

p. 163


   The nature of the Soul.

   Aph. 145.* Since light does not pertain to the unintelligent, light, [which must pertain to something or other, is the essence of the Soul, which, self-manifesting, manifests whatever else is manifest].

   a. It is a settled point, that the unintelligent is not light; [it is not self-manifesting]. If Soul, also, were unintelligent [as the Naiyáyikas hold it to be, in substance; knowledge being, by them, regarded not as its essence or substratum, but as one of its qualities], then there would need to be another light for it; and, as the simple theory, let Soul itself consist, essentially, of light.

   b. And there is Scripture [in support of this view; for example, the two following texts from the Bṛihadáraṉyaka Upanishad2]: 'Wherewith shall one distinguish that wherewith one distinguishes all this [world]?' 'Wherewith shall one take cognizance of the cognizer?'

   c. [But the Naiyáyika may urge,] let Soul be unintelligent [in its substance], but have Intelligence as its p. 164 attribute. Thereby it manifests all things; but it is not, essentially, Intelligence. To this he replies:


   Soul has no quality

   Aph. 146.* It [Soul,] has not Intelligence as its attribute; because it is without quality.

   a. If soul were associated with attributes, it would be [as we hold everything to be, that is associated with attributes,] liable to alteration; and, therefore, there would be no Liberation; [its attributes, or susceptibilities, always keeping it liable to be affected by something or other; or, the absolutely simple being the only unalterable].

   b. He declares that there is a contradiction to Scripture in this, [i.e., in the view which he is contending against]:


   Scripture is higher evidence than supposed intuition.

   Aph. 147.* There is no denial [to be allowed] of what is established by Scripture; because the [supposed] evidence of intuition for this [i.e., for the existence or qualities in the Soul,] is confuted [by the Scriptural declaration of the contrary].

p. 165

   a. The text, 'For this Soul is uncompanioned,'1 &c., would be confuted, if there were any annexation of qualities [to Soul: and the notion of confuting Scripture is not to be entertained for a moment].

   b. But the literal meaning [of the aphorism] is this, that the fact, established by Scripture, of its [i.e., soul's,] being devoid of qualities, &c., cannot be denied; because the Scripture itself confutes the [supposed] intuitive perception thereof, i.e., the [supposed] intuitive perception of qualities, &c., [in the soul].


   Argument against the soul's being unintelligent.

   Aph. 148.* [If soul were unintelligent,] it would not be witness [of its own comfort,] in profound [and dreamless] sleep, &c.

   a. If soul were unintelligent, then, in deep sleep, &c., it would not be a witness, a knower. But that this is not p. 166 the case [may be inferred] from the phenomenon, that 'I slept pleasanty.' By the expression '&c.' [in the aphorism,] dreaming is included.

   b. The Vedántís say that 'soul is one only'; and so, again, 'For Soul is eternal, omnipresent, changeless, void of blemish:' 'Being one [only], it is divided [into a seeming multitude] by Nature (śakti), i.e., Illusion (máyá), but not through its own essence, [to which there does not belong multiplicity].' In regard to this, he says [as follows]:


   There is a multiplicity of souls.

   Aph. 149.* From the several allotment of birth, &c., a multiplicity of souls [is to be inferred].

   a. 'Birth, &c.' By the '&c.,' growth, death, &c., are included. 'From the several allotment' of these, i.e., from their being appointed; [birth to one, death to another, and so on]. 'A multiplicity of souls;' that is to say, souls p. 167 are many. If soul were one only, then, when one is born, all must be born, &c.

   b. He ponders, as a doubt, the opinion of the others, [viz., of the Vedántís]:


   The view of the Vedánta on this point.

   Aph. 150.* [The Vedántís say, that,] there being a difference in its investments, moreover, multiplicity attaches [seemingly,] to the one [Soul]; as is the case with Space, by reason of jars, &c., [which mark out the spaces that they occupy].

   a. As Space is one,—[and yet], in consequence of the difference of adjuncts, [as] jars, &c., when a jar is destroyed, it is [familiarly] said, 'the jar's space is destroyed' [for then there no longer exists a space marked out by the jar];3—so, also, on the hypothesis of there being but one Soul, since there is a difference of corporeal limitation, on the destruction thereof, [i.e., of the limitation occasioned by any particular human body], it is merely a way of talking [to say], 'The soul has perished.' [This, indeed, is so far true, that there is really no perishing of Soul; but p. 168 then it is true,] also on the hypothesis that there are many souls. [And it must be true:] otherwise, since Soul is eternal, [without beginning or end, as both parties agree], how could there be the appointment of birth and death?

   b. He states [what may serve for] the removal of doubt [as to the point in question]:


   Refutation of the Vedánta on this point.

   Aph. 151.* The investment is different, [according to the Vedántís], but not that to which this belongs; [and the absurd consequences of such an opinion will be seen].

   a. 'The investment is different,' [there are diverse bodies of John, Thomas, &c.]; 'that to which this belongs,' i.e. that [Soul] to which this investment [of body, in all its multiplicity,] belongs, is not different, [but is one only]: such is the meaning. And, [now consider], in consequence of the destruction of one thing, we are not to speak as if there were the destruction of something else; because this [if it were evidence of a thing's being destroyed,] would present itself where it ought not;3 [the destruction of Devadatta, p. 169 e.g., presenting itself, as a fact, when we are considering the case of Yajnadatta, who is not, for that reason, to be assumed to be dead]: and, on the hypothesis that Soul is one, the [fact that the Vedánta makes an] imputation of in consistent conditions is quite evident; since Bondage and Liberation do not [and cannot,] belong [simultaneously] to one. But the conjunction and [simultaneous] non-conjunction of the sky [or space] with smoke, &c., [of which the Vedántí may seek to avail himself, as an illustration,] are not contradictory; for Conjunction is not pervasion; [whereas, on the other hand, it would be nonsense to speak of Bondage as affecting one portion of a monad, and Liberation as affecting another portion; as a monkey may be in conjunction with a branch of a tree, without being in conjunction with the stem].

   b. What may be [proved] by this? To this he replies:


   The Sánkhya is free from the charge of absurdity to which the Vedánta is open.

   Aph. 152.* Thus, [i.e., by taking the Sánkhya view,] there is no imputation of contradictory conditions to [a Soul p. 170 supposed to be] everywhere present as one [infinitely extended monad].

   a. 'Thus,' i.e., [if you regard the matter rightly,] according to the manner here set forth, there is no 'imputation,' or attribution, 'of incompatible conditions,' Bondage, Liberation, &c., to a soul 'existing everywhere,' throughout all, as one, [i.e., as a monad].

   b. [But, the Vedántí may contend,] we see the condition of another attributed even to one quite different; as, e.g., Nature's character as an agent [is attributed] to Soul, which is another [than Nature]. To this he replies:


   Imputation is not proof.

   Aph. 153.* Even though there be [imputed to Soul] the possession of the condition of another, this [i.e., that it really possesses such,] is not established by the imputation; because it [Soul,] is one [absolutely simple, unqualified entity].

   a. [The notion] that Soul is an agent is a mistake; because, that Soul is not an agent is true, and the imputation [of agency to Soul] is not true, and the combination of the true and the untrue is not real. Neither birth nor p. 171 death or the like is compatible with Soul; because it is uncompanioned, [i.e., unattended either by qualities or by actions].

   b. [But the Vedántí may say:] and thus there will be an opposition to the Scripture. For, according to that, 'Brahma is one without a second:'2 'There is nothing here diverse; death after death does he [deluded man,] obtain, who here sees, as it were, a multiplicity.'3 To this he replies:


   Scripture, speaking of Soul as one, is speaking of it generically.

   Aph. 154.* There is no opposition to the Scriptures [declaratory] of the non-duality [of Soul]; because the reference [in such texts,] is to the genus, [or to Soul in general].

   a. But there is no opposition [in our Sánkhya view of the matter,] to the Scriptures [which speak] of the Oneness of Soul; because those [Scriptural texts] refer to the genus. p. 172 By genus we mean sameness, the fact of being of the same nature: and it is to this alone that the texts about the non-duality [of Soul] have reference. It is not the indivisibleness [of Soul,—meaning, by its indivisibleness, the impossibility that there should be more souls than one,—that is meant in such texts]; because there is no motive [for viewing Soul as thus indivisible]: such is the meaning.

   b. But then, [the Vedántí may rejoin,] Bondage and Liberation are just as incompatible in any single soul, on the theory of him who asserts that souls are many, [and that each is at once bound and free]. To this he replies:

p. 173


   The compatibility of Bondage and Freedom.

   Aph. 155.* Of him [i.e., of that soul,] by whom the cause of Bondage is known, there is that condition [of isolation, or entire liberation], by the perception [of the fact, that Nature and soul are distinct, and that he, really, was not bound, even when he seemed to be so].3

   a. By whom is known 'the cause of bondage,' viz., the non-perception that Nature and soul are distinct, of him, 'by the perception' [of it], i.e., by cognizing the distinction, there is 'that condition,' viz., the condition of isolation, [the condition (see § 144) after which the soul aspires. The soul in Bondage which is no real bondage may be typified by Don Quixote, hanging, in the dark, from the ledge of a supposed enormous precipice, and holding on for life, as he thought, from not knowing that his toes were within six inches of the ground].

p. 174

   b. [Well, rejoins the Vedántí,] Bondage [as you justly observe,] is dependent on non-perception [of the truth], and is not real. It is a maxim, that non-perception is removed by perception; and, on this showing, we recognize as correct the theory that soul is one, but not that of soul's being multitudinous. To this he replies:


   He jeers at the Vedántí

   Aph. 156.* No: because the blind do not see, can those who have their eyesight not perceive?

   a. What! because a blind man does not see, does also one who has his eyesight not perceive? There are many arguments [in support of the view] of those who assert that souls are many, [though you do not see them]: such is the meaning.'

   b. He declares, for the following reason, also, that souls are many:

p. 175


   Scripture proof that Souls are many.

   Aph. 157.* Vámadeva, as well as others, has been liberated, [if we are to believe the Scriptures; therefore] non-duality is not [asserted, in the same Scriptures, in the Vedántic sense].

   a. In the Puráṉas, &c., we hear, Vámadeva has been liberated,' 'Śuka has been liberated,' and so on. If Soul were one, since the liberation of all would take place, on the liberation of one, the Scriptural mention of a diversity [of separate and successive liberations] would be self-contradictory.

   b. [But the Vedántí may rejoin:] on the theory that Souls are many, since the world has been from eternity, and from time to time some one or other is liberated, so, by degrees, all having been liberated, there would be a universal void. But, on the theory that Soul is one, Liberation is merely the departure of an adjunct, [which, the Vedántí flatters himself, does not involve the inconsistency which he objects to the Sánkhya], To this he replies:

p. 176


   As it has been, so will it be.

   Aph. 158.* Though it [the world,] has been from eternity, since, up to this day, there has not been [an entire emptying of the world], the future, also, [may be inferentially expected to be] thus [as it has been heretofore].

   a. Though the world has been from eternity, since, up to this day, we have not seen it become a void, there is no proof [in support] of the view that there will be Liberation [of all Souls, so as to leave a void].

   b. He states another solution [of the difficulty]:


   The stream of mundane things will flow on for ever.

   Aph. 159.* As now [things are, so], everywhere [will they continue to go on: hence there will be] no absolute cutting short [of the course of mundane things].

   a. Since souls are [in number,] without end, though Liberation successively take place, there will not be [as a necessary consequence,] a cutting short of the world. As now, so everywhere,—i.e., in time to come, also,—there p. 177 will be Liberation, but not, therefore, an absolute cutting short [of the world]; since of this the on-flowing is eternal.

   b. On the theory, also, that Liberation is the departure of an adjunct [§ 157. b.], we should find a universal void; so that the doubt2 is alike, [in its application to either view]. Just as there might be an end of all things, on the successive liberation of many souls, so, since all adjuncts would cease, when [the fruit of] works [this fruit being in the shape of Soul's association with body, as its adjunct,] came to an end, the world would become void, [on the Vedánta theory, as well as on the Sánkhya].

   c. Now, [if the Vedántí says,] there will not be a void, because adjuncts are [in number,] endless, then it is the same, on the theory that Souls are many. And thus [it has been declared]:4 'For this very reason, indeed, though those who are knowing [in regard to the fact that Nature p. 178 and Soul are different], are continually being liberated, there will not be a void, inasmuch as there is no end of multitudes of souls in the universe.'

   d. Pray, [some one may ask,] is Soul [essentially] bound? Or free? If [essentially] bound, then, since its essence cannot depart, there is no Liberation; for, if it [the essence,] departed, then it [Soul,] would [cease, with the cessation of its essence, and] not be eternal. If [on the other hand, you reply that it is essentially] free, then meditation and the like [which you prescribe for the attainment of liberation,] are unmeaning. To this he replies:

p. 179


   Soul is ever free, though it may seem bound in all sorts of ways.

   Aph. 160.* It [Soul,] is altogether free [but seemingly] multiform [or different, in appearance, from a free thing, through a delusive semblance of being bound].3

   a. It is not bound; nor is it liberated; but it is ever free, [see § 19]. But the destruction of ignorance [as to its actual freedom,] is effected by meditation, &c., [which are, therefore, not unmeaning, as alleged in § 159. d.].

   b. It has been declared that Soul is a witness.2 Since it is a witness [some one may object], even when it has attained to discriminating [between Nature and Soul], there p. 180 is no Liberation; [Soul, on this showing, being not an absolutely simple entity, but something combined with the character of a spectator or witness]. To this he replies:


   How Soul is a spectator.

   Aph. 161.* It [Soul,] is a witness, through its connexion with sense-organs, [which quit it, on liberation].

   a. A sense-organ is an organ of sense. Through its connexion therewith, it [Soul,] is a witness. And where is [its] connexion with sense-organs, [these products of Nature (see § 61)], when discrimination [between Nature and Soul] has taken place?

   b. [Well, some one may ask], at all times of what nature is Soul? To this he replies:

p. 181


   The real condition of Soul.

   Aph. 162.* [The nature of Soul is] constant freedom.5

   a. 'Constant freedom:' that is to say; Soul is, positively, always devoid of the Bondage called Pain [see §§ 1 and 19]; because Pain and the rest are modifcations of Understanding, [which (see § 61) is a modification of Nature, from which Soul is really distinct].


   Soul's indifference.

   Aph. 163.* And, finally, [the nature of Soul is] indifference [to Pain and Pleasure, alike].

   a. By 'indifference' is meant non-agency. The word iti [rendered 'finally,'] implies that the exposition of the Nature of Soul is completed.]

   b. [Some one may say, the fact of] Soul's being an agent is declared in Scripture. How is this, [if, as you say, it be not an agent]? To this he replies:

p. 182


   How Soul, which is not an agent, is yet spoken of as such.

   Aph. 164.* [Soul's fancy of] being an agent is, through the influence [of Nature],1 from the proximity of Intellect, from the proximity of Intellect.

   a. [Its] 'being an agent,' i.e., Soul's fancy of being an agent, is 'from the proximity of Intellect,' 'through the influence' of Nature, [(see § 19,) of which Intellect (see § 61) is a modification].

   b. The repetition of the expression 'from the proximity of Intellect' is meant to show that we have reached the conclusion: for thus do we see [practised] in the Scriptures, [e.g., where it is said, in the Veda: 'Soul is to be known; it is to be discriminated from Nature: thus it does not come again, it does not come again'4].

p. 183

   c. So much, in this Commentary1 on the illustrious Kapila's Aphorisms declaratory of the Sánkhya, for the First Book, that on the [topics or] subject-matter [of the Sánkhya system].





p. 12

* Instead of 'indestructible' read 'impracticable.'

** Remove the brackets enclosing the words 'the positive destruction of.' Dr. Ballantyne's maimed expression I find nowhere but in the Serampore edition of Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya.

p. 16

3 Professor Wilson's Dictionary erroneously gives 'uninterrupted continuance' as one of the definitions of atiprasanga; and that definition, in all probability, suggested 'eternal' to the translator, who here had to do with atiprasakti. Near the end of a, in the next page but one, atiprasanga is rendered 'undue result.' For the synonymous atiprasakti and atiprasanga, respectively, see Aph. 53. with the comment on it, and the comment on Aph. 151. of this Book.

Colebrooke, on various occasions, represents one or other of these terms by 'wrest,' 'straining a rule,' 'room for misconstruction,' &c. As technicalities, they generally signify 'illegitimately extended application' of a canon, notion, or the like. Ed.

p. 17

2 Upádhi, for which see p. 53, 1, infra. Ed.

p. 20

1 This is the lection preferred by Aniruddha and his followers. Ed.

p. 21

1 The Sanskrit word thus rendered was inadvertently omitted in the first edition. Vijnána here supplies the comment. Ed.

p. 23

* 'That is to say,' &c., See, for a more correct rendering, the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 63.

p. 25

* Read, instead of 'your own implied dogma,' 'the dogma which you accept.'

p. 29

2 Vásaná, a term which Dr. Ballantyne has rendered variously, in divers passages of the present work, and also elsewhere. It is well defined, in Prof. Benfey's Sanskrit-English Dictionary: 'An impression remaining unconsciously in the mind, from past actions, etc., and, by the resulting merit or demerit, producing pleasure or pain.' Ed.

p. 36

1 The brackets are of my inserting. Ed.

p. 38

1 Vyabhichára is the expression here paraphrased. In this work and others, the translator has given it many meanings; and so has Colebrooke, who renders it, in various contexts, by 'contradiction,' 'derogation,' 'failure,' 'impossibility,' 'unoperativeness,' &c. As a logical technicality, it denotes the presentation of the reason, or middle term, unaccompanied by the major term. Ed.

p. 42

3 For vyabhichára, the word used in the original, see 1, at p. 38, supra. Ed.

4 Here again occurs, in the Sanskrit, the term vyabhichára. Ed.

p. 43

1 I have inserted the words 'in product and substance.' Ed.

2 The original dual of 'concomitancy of affirmatives' and 'concomitancy of negatives' is anwayavyatirekau. For other English equivalents of this term, occurring in the singlar number; see Book VI., Aph. 15 and 63. Ed.

3 'Antecedent and consequent' renders kramika, translated 'successive' in Aph. 38. a, at p. 41, supra. Ed.

p. 52

1 Śwetáśwatara Upanishad, iii., 13. Ed.

* 'That is to say,' &c. For another version, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 119.

p. 53

1 Upádhi; often, below, 'investment' and 'adjunct.' Ed.

2 Bhagavad-gítá, ii., 24. Ed.

3 'Text' and 'maxim' are here meant to represent śruti and smṛiti, taken in their more limited senses. Elsewhere the translator has, for the same terms; in wider acceptations, 'books of Scripture and of law,' &c. The first is 'revealed law,' the Vedas; the second, 'memorial law,' or a code of such law, as the Mánava, and also any composition of a man reputed to be inspired. Both are held to have originated from a superhuman source; but only the former is regarded as preserving the very words of revelation. Ed.

4 The anacoluthism observable in the translation follows that of the original, with reference to which see the Indische Studien, vol. ii., p. 61.

p. 54

2 For another rendering, see my translation of the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 57. Ed.

p. 55

1 Dr. Ballantyne should have taken 'unseen' and 'works' as in apposition, and should have made the former explanatory of the latter. Ed.

4 Aniruddha transposes Aphorisms 53 and 54. Ed.

p. 56

2 Śwetáśwatara Upanishad, vi., 11. Ed.

p. 58

2 These words, a bad reading of the 24th Aphorism of Book III., were pointed out, by me, as having, with the sentence of comment attached to them, no place here; and Dr. Ballantyne, when he republished the Sánkhya Aphorisms in the Bibliotheca Indica, omitted them. Hence the brackets now inserted, and my alteration of the numbering of the Aphorisms throughout the remainder of Book I. Ed.

[* Almost certainly, this interpolation was taken from the Serampore edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya. My copy of that work was lent, in 1851, to Pandit Híránanda Chaube, who prepared, for Dr. Ballantyne, the Sanskrit portion of what corrpesonds to pp. 1-183, supra, in which additions, compressions, interpolations, and other alterations lawlessly made by him, and scholia of his own devising, were introduced with regrettable frequency.]

p. 61

* For another rendering {of the text from § 56 b through § 57 b}, from a text here and there somewhat different, see the Rational Refutation, & c., pp. 12, 13.

p. 64

1 To render vásaná, on which see 2, at p. 29, supra. Ed.

3 Amṛitabindu Upanishad, v. 10. See Dr. Albrecht Weber's Indische Studien, vol. ii., p. 61, note 2. Ed.

[* The verses in question also occur as ii., 32, of Gauḍapáda's Máṇḍúkyopanishat-káriká. They are quoted and translated in the Rational Refutation, &c., pp. 189, 190, where they are professedly taken, I cannot now say how tenably, from the Vivekachúḍámaṇi, which is credulously affiliated on Śankara Áchárya.]

p. 65

1 Aniruddha has: 'But it is merely verbal, not a reality,' &c. Ed.

p. 67

1 Here I have had to make several insertions and other alterations. Dr. Ballantyne had: 'That is to say, the bondage, &c., [of the soul] is not to be removed by merely hearing, or inferring, without perceiving; just as the contrariety in regard to the proper direction, in the case,' &c. Ed.

p. 71

3 For a translation of a slightly different text, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 43. Ed.

p. 72

1 Balavattwa; for which I find the variant chalatwa, 'mobility.' Ed.

2 Read: 'Goodness and the rest are substances, not specific qualities; for they [themselves] possess [qualities, viz., those of] contact and separation, and also have the properties of levity, mobility, gravity, &c.' Vaiśeshiká guṇah́ is equivalent to the viśesha-guṇáh́ in the original of Book V., 25. a. For the 'specific qualities,' see the Bháshá-parichchheda, st. 90. Ed.

3 For 'is employed,' &c., read, 'is applied to these (teshu), [namely, goodness, passion, and darkness].' Ed.

5 For a different translation, see the Rational Refutation, &c., pp. 43, 44. Ed.

p. 81

2 Here indicated by the adjective avyakta, 'the indiscrete.' See Aph. 136 of this Book. Ed.

p. 82

3 This seems to mean: 'There being no root to a root, the root [or radical principle, in the Sánkhya,] is rootless.'

In several MSS. which I consulted in India I found the strange reading: 'The root of roots, since it has no root, is rootless.' This is very like saying that A = A. Ed.

p. 84

2 Read 'in connexion with.' Ed.

3 Literally, instead of 'Mind,' the principle [termed] the Great one.' Ed.

p. 85

2 This is Dr. Ballantyne's revised translation, suggested by a remark of Vijnána, quoted and translated below, in b. The rendering now replaced runs: 'Alike [is the opinion] of both [of us], in respect of Nature.' The side-note was formerly correspondent to a., viz.: 'He meets a Vedántic objection.' Ed.

* 'This Ignorance,' &c. The original of this is i., v., 4, of the Vishṉu-puráṉa.

p. 90

2 Paragraph a is taken, with slight alterations at the beginning and at the end, from Aniruddha. Ed.

p. 97

3 It is the bracketed Aph. 56. at p. 58 supra, that is here referred to Ed.

p. 99

1 Literally, 'liable to return to mundane existence.' Ed.

4 Compare the Chhándogya Upanishad, viii., xv. Ed.

p. 102

3 Dr. Ballantyne, on republishing the Sánkhya Aphorisms in the Bibliotheca Indica, adopted the genuine reading, instead of that given above, which I find, indeed, in the Serampore edition of the Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya, but in no MS. He ought, however, at the same time, to have altered his translation, p. 103 which, in conformity with the unadulterated text, might have run somewhat as follows: 'Of him who is, in himself, liberated all extinction of bondage is final,' &c. Such is the interpretation which, on comparison of the various commentaries, seems to be the most elegible. Ed.

1 This is the Aphorism bracketed at p. 58, supra. Ed.

p. 106

1 So reads Aniruddha; but Vijnána, Nágeśa, and Vedánti Mahádeva end the eighty-seventh Aphorism with these two words. Hence: 'That which is in the highest degree, productive thereof is proof, of three kinds.' Ed.

p. 108

3 Aniruddha has 'determined by,' &c., instead of 'being in,' &c. Ed.

p. 110

4 For the term atiśaya, again rendered, in the next page, by 'exaltation,' vide infra, p. 115, note 4. Ed.

p. 112

3 Rather, 'And this [mere] taking exception to a Lord is expressly owing to,' &c. The aphorist would not be confounded with those who denied what he waited to see evidenced. The attitude which he assumed is that of suspense of judgment on the point of theism, as against the positiveness of the professed atheist. Vijnána, here followed, then goes on to say: 'For, otherwise [i.e., if the aphorist had been atheistic], it would have been explicitly declared, Because of the non-existence of a Lord.' Ed.

p. 113

1 Rather, 'the view being accepted' (abhyupagame):

p. 115

3 In both places, siddha, 'possessor of supernatural powers.' Ed.

4 Aniruddha's exposition of this Aphorism is as follows: p. 116 According to this, the term íśwara, 'mighty one,' 'lord,' is applied, by way of eulogy, either to a soul as it were liberated, or to a person who, through devotion, has acquired transcendent faculties, that is to say, the Yogí. Resolution, agentship, and the like, are impredicable of one absolutely liberated; and such a one, being inert and impassive, cannot be intended by íśwara, 'a power.' Hence the expression, 'as it were liberated.' Also see, for atiśaya,—translated, above, 'transcendent faculties,'—Book IV., Aph. 24. Ed.

p. 118

1 The translator's authority for this attribution has not been discovered. Ed.

[* The quotation in question is xvi., 3, 4,of the Yoga-vásisṭha. For a more correct translation of it, see the Rational Refutation, &c., p. 214.]

p. 121

1 Aniruddha prefixes to 'the internal organ' the synonymous 'the Great One.' Ed.

p. 134

1 I have corrected the translator's 'But, since thus,' which rendered an unwarranted reading, now replaced by one correlative to the end of the preceding Aphorism. Ed.

p. 141

1 'If production is occasioned by manifestation, by what is destruction occasioned?' Aniruddha, here quoted. Ed.

4 'From the blow of a mallet [results] the resolution of a jar into its material cause: by this the destruction [of it] is occasioned. Such is the meaning of the word [náśa], and [such is] the particular action [which] p. 142 it expresses.' This is from Aniruddha. Ed.

p. 143

3 Translating the Sánkhya Aphorisms in the Bibliotheca Indica, Dr. Ballantyne, adopting the lection anveshaṇá, inconsiderately rendered: 'You are to understand, that, successively,' instead of 'There is a continual following of one after the other.' Vijnána explains anveshaṇá by anudhávana; and Vedánti Mahádeva has, in definition of it, the synonymons anusaraṇa. Ed.

p. 162

2 This lection is that of Aniruddha alone. Vijnána, Nágeśa, and Vedánti Mahádeva necessitate 'and because,' &c. Ed.

p. 163

2 II., 4, 14,; or Śatapatha-bráhmaṇa, xiv., 5, 4, 16. The two sentences quoted are continuous. Ed.

p. 165

1 Bṛihadáraṇyaka Upanishad, iv., 3, 16; or Śatapatha-bráhmaṇa, xiv., 7, 1, 17. Ed.

p. 167

3 Vide supra, p. 53, Aph. 51, &c. Ed.

p. 168

3 Vide supra, p. 16, note 3.

p. 172

2 Chhándogya Upanishad, vi., 1. But the word ### does not occur there. Ed.

3 Kaṭha Upanishad, iv., 11. Instead of ###, however, the correct reading is ###. Ed.

p. 172

3 All the commentators but Aniruddha read ###; and they differ widely from him, as they often do, in their elucidations of the Aphorism. Nágeśa's explanation of it is as follows: ### p. 173 The substance of this is, that, only in the eyes of the mistaken man who is influenced by the notorious cause of bondage, or in other words, who is unable to discriminate, is the essential condition of souls multeity, a condition the reverse of the one before referred to, unity; and that is inconclusive. The Aphorism, thus undertood, must be assumed to proceed from a Vedántic disputant against the Sánkhya. Whether as read by Aniruddha, or as read by others, it is susceptible, with reference to the previous context, of a variety of renderings. Ed.

p. 177

2 Anuyoga, here rendered 'doubt,' rather signifies 'difficulty raised,' 'question.' Ed.

4 The source of the stanza here translated I have not ascertained. Ed.

p. 178

3 This reading I find nowhere, but, instead of it, 'Clear of both conditions [i.e., that of being bound and that of being freed, is Soul, which is eternally free].'

According to most interpreters, however, the preceding Aphorism has reference to the question whether it be only after Soul is p. 179 liberated, or, on the other hand, at all times, that simplicity, or unchanging fixedness, of essential condition (ekarúpatwa) is predicable of it.

Also see the commentaries on the Sánkhya-káriká, st. 19; and § 144. a., at p. 162, supra. Ed.

2 Vide supra, p. 56, § 54. a., and p. 165, § 148. Ed.

p. 180

5 Vijnána says that this Aphorism and that next following specify notes of Soul which establish that its essential condition is neither p. 181 of those alluded to in Aph. 160.

p. 182

1 The translator inadvertently omitted the words 'through,' &c. Ed.

4 These words are taken from Colebrooke: see his Miscellaneous Essays (Prof. Cowell's edition), vol. i., p. 249. The original is found, as a quotation, &c., in Váchaspati Miśra's Tattwa-kaumudí, near the beginning of the comment on st. 2 of the Sánkhya-káriká . . . . p. 183 The words ### {?} are obviously a gloss; and I have punctuated accordingly. They are preceded, I take it, by one text, and are followed by another. The source of the first has not been discovered. For what is very similar to the second, see the conclusion of the Chhándogya Upanishad. Colebrooke's 'thus' is unrepresented in the Sankrit as I find it. Ed.

[* For emendations of sundry matters, see p. 429, note 4.

1 Aniruddha's is intended, though many passages in the preceding pages are from other commentaries. Ed.