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HAVING explained, in four Books, all the matter of the Institute, and having, in the Fifth Book, thoroughly established it, by refuting the opinions of opponents, now, in a Sixth Book, he recapitulates the same matter, which is the essence of the Institute, while condensing it. For, in addition [to what has preceded], an enumeration of the matters before mentioned, namely, a summary, having been composed, learners acquire an undoubting, accurate, and more solid knowledge; so that, therefore, reiteration is not here to be imputed as a fault; because the method is that of fixing a stake, [viz., by repeated blows], and because arguments, &c., not previously stated, are adduced.
|The existence of Soul.|
Aph. 1.* Soul is; for there is no proof that it is not.
a. Soul really is existent, generically; since we are aware of this, that 'I think;' because there is no evidence to defeat this. Therefore, all that is to be done is to discriminate it [from things in general]. Such is the meaning.
b. The discrimination of it he establishes by means of two proofs:
|Soul is not Body, &c.|
Aph. 2.* This [Soul,] is different from the Body, &c.; because of heterogeneousness, [or complete difference between the two].
|The usage of language is evidence for this.|
Aph. 3.* Also because it [Soul,] is expressed by means of the sixth [or possessive,] case.
a. That is to say: Soul is different from Body, &c., also because the learned express it by the possessive case, in p. 421 such examples as, 'This [is] my body,' 'This [is] my understanding;' for the possessive case would be unaccountable, if there were absolute non-difference [between the Body, or the like, and the Soul, to which it is thus attributed as a possession].
b. But then, suppose that this, also, is like the expressions, 'The Soul's Thought' [Soul and Thought being identical], 'Ráhu's head' [the trunkless Ráhu being all head], 'The statue's body,' &c. To this he replies:
|An objection disposed of.|
Aph. 4.* It is not as in the case of the statue; because there is [there] a contradiction to the evidence which acquaints us with the thing.
a. This expression by means of the possessive case, p. 422 [viz., 'My body' (§ 3)] is not like 'The statue's body,' &c. In such a case as 'The statue's body,' there is a mere fiction; 'for it is contradicted by the evidence which acquaints is with the thing;' [sense being the evidence that there is here no body other than the statue]. But, in such an expression as 'My body,' there is no contradiction by evidence; for the contradiction, by Scripture and other evidences, is only in supposing the Body to be the Soul. Such is the meaning.
b. Having settled that Soul is different from Body, &c., he settles its emancipation:
|Soul's aim how accomplished.|
Aph. 5.* Through the entire cessation of pain there is done what was to be done.
a. But then, since there is an equality of gain and loss, inasmuch as, through the cessation of Pain there is the p. 423 ceasing of Pleasure, also, that cannot be Soul's aim. To this he replies:
|Pleasure no compensation for Pain.|
Aph. 6.* Not such desire for pleasure is there to Soul, as there is annoyance from Pain.
a. And so the aversion to Pain, having excluded also the desire for Pleasure, gives rise to a wish for he cessation of Pain simply; so that there is not an equality of gain and loss: [but a clear gain, in the desired release].
b. He declares that Soul's aim is simply the cessation of Pain; because Pain is, indeed, abundant, in comparison of Pleasure:
|Pleasure sparingly dispensed.|
Aph. 7.* For [only] some one, somewhere, is happy.
a. Among innumerable grasses, trees, brutes, birds, men, &c., very few,—a man, a god, or the like,—are happy: such is the meaning.
|Pleasure undeserving of the name.|
Aph. 8.* It [Pleasure,] is also mixed with Pain, therefore the discriminating throw it to the side of [and reckon it as so much,] Pain.
a. He rejects the opinion that Soul's aim is not the simple cessation of Pain, but this [cessation] tinctured with Pleasure:
|Cessation of suffering is a joy.|
Aph. 9.* If you say that this [cessation of Pain] is not Soul's aim, inasmuch as there is no acquisition of Pleasure, then it is not as you say; for there are two kinds [of things desired].
a. For we see, amongst men, quite a distinct aspiration: [the first,] 'May I be happy;' [the second,] 'May I not be miserable;' [and the latter is our conception of beatitude].
b. He ponders a doubt:
Aph. 10.* The Soul [some one may suggest,] has no quality; for there is Scripture for its being unaccompanied, &c.
a. Therefore the cessation of Pain, indeed, [a property which does not belong to it,] cannot be Soul's aim: such is the meaning.
b. He clears up this [doubt]:
|This cleared up.|
Aph. 11.* Though it [the Pain,] be the property of something else, yet it exists in it [the Soul,] through non-discrimination.
a. Though qualities, viz., pleasure, pain, &c., belong [only] to the Mind, they exist, i.e., they abide, in the shape of a reflexion, in it, viz., in Soul, 'through non-discrimination,' as the cause, owing to the conjunction of Nature with Soul: such is the meaning. And this has been set forth in the First Book.
b. The binding of Soul by the qualities [or fetters,] arises from non-discrimination: but from what does non-discrimination arise? With reference to this, he says:
|Two reasons why non-discrimination must have been from eternity.|
Aph. 12.* Non-discrimination [of Soul from Nature] is beginningless; because, otherwise, two objections would present themselves.
a. For, had it a beginning, then, if [first,] it arose quite spontaneously, bondage might befall even the liberated; p. 427 and, if [secondly,] it were produced by Desert, &c., there would be a regressus in infinitum, inasmuch as we should have to search for another [previous instance of] non-discrimination, to stand as the cause of [that] Desert, &c., also: such is the meaning.
b. And then, if it be without beginning, it must be everlasting. To this he replies:
|Non-discrimination, though from eternity, may be cut short.|
Aph. 13.* It [non-discrimination, cannot be everlasting [in the same manner] as the soul is; else, it could not be cut short, [as we affirm that it can be].
a. It is not everlasting, indivisible, and beginningless, in the same way as the soul is; but it is beginningless, in the shape of an on-flow [which may be stopped]. For, otherwise, the cutting short of a beginningless entity would, as is established by Scripture, be unfeasible, [though the beginningless antecedent non-entity of a given jar may be readily understood to terminate, on the production of the jar]. Such is the meaning.
b. Having stated the cause of [Soul's] Bondage, he states the cause of Liberation:
|Bondage how destructible.|
Aph. 14.* It [Bondage,] is annihilable by the alloted cause, [viz., discrimination of Soul from Nature]; as darkness is [annihilable by the allotted cause, viz., Light].
Aph. 15.* Here, also, [viz., in the case of Bondage and Discrimination, as in the case of Darkness and Light,] there is allotment, [as is proved] both by positive and negative consociation;2 [Liberation taking place where Discrimination is, and not where it is not].
a. He reminds [us] of what was mentioned in the first Book,3 viz., that Bondage cannot be innate, &c:
|Bondage not innate.|
Aph. 16.* Since it cannot be [accounted for] in any other way, it is non-discrimination alone that is [the cause of] Bondage, [which cannot be innate].
a. 'Bondage' here means the cause of Bondage, named the conjunction of pain. The rest is plain.
b. But then, since liberation, also, from its being a product, is liable to destruction, Bondage should take place over again. To this he replies:
|Bondage does not recur.|
Aph. 17.* Further, Bondage does not again attach to the liberated; because there is Scripture4 for its non-recurrence.
|Evidence of this.|
Aph. 18.* Else, it [liberation,] would not be the Soul's aim, [which it is].
a. He states the reason why this is not Soul's aim:
|Force of the evidence.|
Aph. 19.* What happened to both would be alike, [if liberation were perishable].
a. That is to say: there would be no difference between the two, the liberated and the bound; because of their being alike liable to future bondage; and, therefore, such [perishable emancipation] is not Soul's aim, [but emancipation final and complete].
b. But then, in that case, if you acknowledge that there is a distinction between the bond and the free, how is it p. 431 that you have asserted [Book I., § 19,] the eternal freedom [of all souls alike]? To this he replies:
|The nature of liberation.|
Aph. 20.* Liberation is nothing other than the removal3 of the obstacle [to the Soul's recognition of itself as free].
a. But then, in that case, since Bondage and Liberation are unreal, Liberation must be contradictory to the texts, &c., which set forth what is Soul's aim, [as some positive and real acquisition, not merely the removal of a screen]; to which he replies:
|An objection repelled.|
Aph. 21.* Even in that case, there is no contradiction.
a. That is to say: 'even in that case,' i.e., even if Liberation consists [only] in the removal of an obstacle, there is no contradiction in its being Soul's aim.
b. But then, if Liberation be merely the removal of an obstacle, then it should be accomplished through mere hearing [of the error which stands in the way]; just as a piece of gold on one's neck, [which one has sought for in vain, while it was] withheld from one by ignorance [of the fact that it has been tied round one's neck with a string], is attained, [on one's hearing where it is]. To this he replies:
|Another objection repelled.|
Aph. 22.* This [attainment of Liberation, on the mere hearing of the truth,] is no necessity; for there are three sorts of those competent [to apprehend the truth; but not all are qualified to appropriate it, on merely hearing it].3
a. He mentions that not mere hearing alone is seen to be the cause of knowledge, but that there are others, also:
|Utility of other means besides hearing.|
Aph. 23.* Of others [viz., other means besides hearing] for the sake of confirmation, [there is need].
a. He speaks of these same other means:
|Formality in postures not imperative.|
Aph. 24.* There is no [absolute] necessity that what is steady and promoting ease should be a [particular] posture, [such as any of those referred to in Book III., § 34].
a. That is to say: there is no necessity that a 'posture' should be the 'lotus-posture,' or the like; because whatever is steady and promotes ease is a [suitable] 'posture.'
b. He states the principal means [of Concentration]:
|The efficient means of Concentration.|
Aph. 25.* Mind without an object is Meditation.
a. That is to say: what Internal Organ is void of any modification, that is 'Meditation,' i.e., Concentration, in the shape of exclusion of the modifications of Intellect: by reason of the identity [here,] of effect and cause, the word 'cause' is employed for 'effect.' For it will be p. 434 declared how Meditation effects this [exclusion of the modifications of Intellect].
b. But then, since Soul is alike, whether there be Concentration or Non-concentration, what have we to do with concentration? Having pondered this doubt, he clears it up:
|A distinction not without a difference.|
Aph. 26.* If you say that even both ways there is no difference, it is not so: there is a difference, through the excluion [in the one case,] of the tinge [of reflected pain which exists in the other case].
a. But how can there exist a tinge in that which is unassociated [with anything whatever, as Soul is alleged to be]? To this he replies:
|Soul tinged by what does not belong to it.|
Aph. 27.* Though it [Soul,] be unassociated, still there is a tingeing [reflexionally,] through Non-discrimination.
a. That is to say: though there is not a real tinge in that which is unassociated [with tincture, or anything else], still there is, as it were, a tinge; hence the tinge is treated as simply a reflexion, by those who discriminate the tinge [from the Soul, which it delusively seems to belong to].
b. He explains this same:
|Its seeming presence explained.|
Aph. 28.* As is the case with the Hibiscus and the crystal [Book I., § 19, c.], there is not a tinge, but a fancy [that there is such].
a. He states the means of excluding the aforesaid tinge:
|How to be got rid of.|
Aph. 29.* It [viz.,the aforesaid tinge,] is debarred by Meditation, Restraint, Practice, Apathy, &c.
a. He shows the means settled by the ancient teachers, in regard to the exclusion—through Meditation, &c., lodged in the Mind,—of the tingeing of Soul:
|The ancient dogma on this point.|
Aph. 30.* It is by the exclusion of dissolution2 and distraction, say the teachers.
a. That is to say: through the removal, by means of meditation, &c., of the Mind's condition of [being dissolved in] Sleep, and condition of [waking] Certainty, &c., there takes place also the exclusion of the tingeing of Soul by the condition; because, on the exclusion of any [real] object, there is the exclusion also of its reflexion: so say the ancient teachers.
b. He states that there is no compulsion that Meditation, &c., should take place in caves and such places:
|Meditation may take place anywhere.|
Aph. 31.* There is no rule about localities; for it is from tranquillity of Mind.
a. That is to say: Meditation, or the like, results simply 'from tranquillity of Mind.' Therefore, such a place as a cave is not indispensable for it.
b. The discussion of Liberation is completed. Now, with an eye to the unchangeableness of Soul, he handles compendiously the cause of the world:
|Nature the material of the world.|
Aph. 32.* Nature is the primal material; for there is Scripture [to the effect] that the others are products.
a. That is to say: since we learn, from Scripture, that Mind, &c., are products, Nature is established under the character of the radical cause of these.
b. But then, let Soul be the material. To this he replies:
|Soul not the material of the world.|
Aph. 33.* Not to Soul does this [viz., the material of the world,] belong, though it be eternal; because of its want of suitableness.
a. That is to say: suitableness to act as material implies possession of qualities, and the being associable: [and,] by reason of the absence of both of these, Soul, though eternal, [and, therefore, no product,] cannot serve as material.
b. But then, since, from such Scriptural texts as, 'Many creatures have been produced from Soul,'2 we may gather the fact that Soul is a cause, the assertions of an illusory creation, &c., ought to be accepted. Having pondered this adverse suggestion, he replies:
|The opposite view unscriptural.|
Aph. 34.* The despicable sophist4 does not gain [a correct apprehension of] Soul; because of the contradictoriness [of his notions] to Scripture.
a. That is to say: the various views, in regard to Soul's being a cause, which are conceivable are, all, opposed to Scripture; therefore, the lowest of the bad reasoners, and others, who are accepters thereof,1 have no knowledge of the nature of Soul. Hence it is to be understood that those, also, [e.g., the Naiyáyikas,] who assert that Soul is the substance of the qualities Pleasure, Pain, &c., are quite illogical; these, also, have no correct knowledge of Soul. And, if it be asserted that Soul is a cause [of the world], just as the sky is the recipient cause of the clouds, &c., [and stands, towards it, in the relation of a cause, in so far as, without the room afforded by it, these could not exist], then we do not object to that; for, what we deny is only that there is transformation [of soul, as material, into the world, as product].
b. Since we see, that, in the case of things motionless, locomotive, &c., the material cause is nothing else than p. 440 earth, &c., how can Nature be the material of all? To this he replies:
|Nature the ultimate material cause.|
Aph. 35.* Though but mediately [the cause of products], Nature is inferred [as the ultimate cause of the intermediate causes,]; just as are Atoms, [by the Vaiśeshikas].
Aph. 36.* It [Nature,] is all-pervading; because [its] products are seen everywhere.
a. But then, only if it be limited, can it be said that, 'Wherever a product arises, there does it [Nature,] go [or act];' [for what is unlimited] and fills all space, can find no other space to move into]. To this he replies:
|An objection parried.|
Aph. 37.* Though motion may attach to it, this does not destroy its character as ultimate cause; just as is the case with Atoms.
a. 'Motion' means action. Though it be present, this does not prevent its [Nature's,] being the radical cause; just as is the case with the earthy and other p. 441 Atoms, according to the opinion of the Vaiśeshikas: such is the meaning.
|Nature the proper substitute for eight of the substances in the Nyáya list.|
Aph. 38.* Nature is something in addition to the notorious [nine Substances of the Naiyáyikas]: it is no matter of necessity [that there should be precisely nine].
a. And the argument, here, is the Scriptural declaration, that eight [of the pretended primitive substances] are products: such is the import.
|Nature consists of the three Qualities.|
Aph. 39.* Purity and the others are not properties of it [viz., Nature]; because they are its essence.
a. That is to say: Purity and the other Qualities are not properties of Nature; because they are what constitutes Nature.
b. He determines the motive of Nature's energizing; p. 442 since, if we held the energizing to be without a motive, Emancipation would be inexplicable:
Aph. 40.* Nature, though it does not enjoy [the results of its own energizing], creates for the sake of Soul; like a cart's carrying saffron, [for the use of its master. See Book III., § 58].
a. He states the concomitant3 cause of diversified creation:
|Nature treats every one according to his deserts.|
Aph. 41.* The diversity of creation is in consequence of the diversity of Desert.
a. But then, granting that creation is due to Nature, yet whence is destruction? For a couple of opposite results cannot belong to one and the same cause. To this he replies:
|Contrary results from Nature how.|
Aph. 42.* The two results are through equipoise and the reverse of equipoise.
a. Nature is the triad of Qualities, viz., Purity, &c.; and their 'reverse of equipoise' is their aggregation in excess or defect; the absence of this [reverse of equipoise] is 'equipoise:'2 through these two causes two opposite results, in the shape of creation and destruction, arise from one and the same: such is the meaning.
b. But then, since it is Nature's attribute to create, there should be the mundane state, even after [the discriminative] knowledge, [which, it is alleged, puts an end to it]. To this he replies:
|Nature's energy does not debar emancipation.|
Aph. 43.* Since [or when,] the emancipated has understood [that he never was really otherwise], Nature does not create; just as, in the world, [a minister does not toil,when the king's purpose has been accomplished].1
a. But then, Nature does not rest from creating; for we see the mundane condition of the ignorant: and so, since Nature goes on creating, to the emancipated, also, Bondage may come again. To this he replies:
|No reason why Nature should invade the emancipated.|
Aph. 44.* Even though it [Nature,] may invade others [with its creative influences], the emancipated does not experience, in consequence of the absence of a concurrent cause,4 [e.g., Non-discrimination, in the absence of which there is no reason why the emancipated should be subjected to Nature's invasion].
a. But then, this arrangement could be possible then, [only] if there were a multiplicity of souls: but that is quite excluded by the text of the non-duality of Soul. Having pondered this doubt, he says:
|Multeity of Soul proved from the Veda.|
Aph. 45.* The multeity of Soul [is proved] by the distribution [announced by the Veda itself].
a. That is to say: the multeity of Soul is proved, absolutely, by the distribution of Bondage and Emancipation mentioned in such Scriptural texts as, 'Whoso understand this, these are immortal, while others experience only sorrow.'3
b. But then, the distribution of Bondage and Liberation may be through the difference of adjunct. To this he replies:
|Unity excluded by the supposion of Souls.|
Aph. 46.* If [you acknowledge] an adjunct [of Soul], then, on its being established, there is duality, [upsetting the dogma founded on in § 44].
a. But then, the adjuncts, moreover, consist of 'Ignorance,' [which, according to the Vedánta, is no reality]; so that by these there is no detriment to [the Vedántíc dogma of] non-duality. With reference to this doubt, he says:
|The Vedánta cannot evade non-duality.|
Aph. 47.* Even by the two the authority is contradicted.
a. Thst is to say: even by acknowledging the two, viz., Soul and Ignorance, a contradiction is constituted to the text, [which is alleged as] the authority for non-duality.
b. He states another couple of objections, also:
|The establishment of the Vedánta tenet implies a contradiction.|
Aph. 48.* The primâ facie view [of the Vedánta] is not [to be allowed any force, as an objection]; because, by [admitting] two, [viz., Soul and Ignorance], there is no opposition [to our own dualistic theory of Soul and Nature]: and the subsequent [dogma, viz., that one single Soul is the only reality, is not to be allowed]; because of the non-existence of a proof, [which, if it did exist, would, along with Soul, constitute a duality].
a. But then, Soul will be demonstrated by its self-manifestation. To this he replies:
Aph. 49.* [And,] in its [Soul's,] being demonstrated by the light [of itself as you Vedántís say it is], there is the [unreconciled] opposition of patient and agent [in one, which is a contradiction].
a. That is to say: if Soul be demonstrated by the light which Soul consists of, there is the 'opposition of patient and agent' [in one].
b. But then, there is no contradiction [here,] between patient and agent; because it [the Soul], through the property of light which is lodged in it, can, itself, furnish p. 448 the relation to itself; just as the Vaiśeshikas declare, that, through the intelligence lodged in it, it is, itself, object to itself. To this he replies:
|Illuminating function of Soul.|
Aph. 50.* This [Soul], in the shape of Thought, discrepant from the non-intelligent, reveals the non-intelligent.
a. But then, in that case, if duality be established in accordance with proofs, &c., what becomes of the Scriptural text declaring non-duality? To this he replies:
|A salvo for the Vaidic view.|
Aph. 51.* There is no contradiction to Scripture [in our view]; because that [text of Scripture which seems to p. 449 assert absolute non-duality] is [intended] to produce apathy in those who have desires, [and who would be better for believing in 'the nothingness of the things of time'].
a. He tells us that the assertors of non-duality are to be shunned, not only for the reason above mentioned, but, also, because of the non-existence of evidence to convince us that the world is unreal:
|The world's reality irrefragable.|
Aph. 52.* The world is real; because it results from an unobjectionable cause, and because there is [in Scripture,] no debarrer [of this view of the matter].
a. We see, in the world, that no reality belongs to dream-objects, or to the [fancied] yellowness of [invariably white] conch-shells, and the like; inasmuch as these are results of the internal organ, &c., when [not normal, but] injured by [i.e., under the injurious influence of] Sleep,2 &c.: and this is not [the state of things] in the [waking] Universe, in which Mind is the first,3 [according to Book I., § 71].
b. He declares that the Universe is real, not merely in its existent state [at any given instant], but, also, always:
Aph. 53.* Since it cannot be [accounted for] in any other way, manifestation [of whatever is manifested] is of what is real, [i.e., of what previously existed].
a. That is to say: since, through the aforesaid reasons, it is impossible that the unreal should come into existence, what does come into existence, or is manifested, is what really existed [previously,] in a subtile form.
b. Though [it is declared that] the being the agent and the being the experiencer belong to diverse subjects, be asserts the distribution [of agency to Self-consciousness, and of experience to Soul,] by two aphorisms:
|The real agent who.|
Aph. 54.* Self-consciousness, not Soul, is the agent.
|Experience is got rid of when.|
Aph. 55.* Experience ceases at [discrimination of] Soul, [as being quite distinct from Nature]; since it arises from its [Soul's,] Desert, [which is not, really, Soul's, but which, while Non-discrimination lasts, is made over to Soul; just as the fruits of the acts of a king's ministers are made over to the king].
a. He shows the reason for what was stated before, viz., that cessation of action does not result from enterings into the world of Brahmá:
|Paradise no security against transmigration.|
Aph. 56.* Even in the world of the moon, &c., there is return [to munane existence]; because of there really being a cause [of such return].
a. 'A cause,' viz., Non-discrimination, Desert, &c.
b. But then, through the counsels of the persons dwelling in these various [supermundane] worlds, there ought to be no return [to mundane existence]. To this he replies:
|This point enforced.|
Aph. 57.* Not by the counsel of [supermundane] people is there effectuation [of Emancipation]; just as in the former case, [the case, viz., of counsel given by mundane instructors].
a. But, in that case, what becomes of the text that there no return from the world of Brahmá? To this he replies:
|A salvo for Scriptural text.|
Aph. 58.* There is Scripture [declaratory] of Emancipation, [on going to the world of Brahmá]; this [Emancipation] being effected [more readily in that world than in this, but only] by intermediacy [of the appropriate means].
a. He alleges the Scriptural text of Soul's going [to the locality where it is to experience], even though it be all-filling, [and can, therefore, have no place into which to move]:
Aph. 59.* And, in accordance with the text of its 'going,' though it [Soul,] p. 453 is all-pervading, yet, in time, it reaches its place of experience [or body], through conjunction with an adjunct; as in the case of Space.
a. For, as Space, though it is all-pervading, is spoken of as moving to some particular place, in consequence of its conjunction with an adjunct, such as a jar, [when we say 'the space occupied by the jar is moved to the place to which the jar is carried'], just so is it [here].
b. He expounds the statement, that the site of experience [the body,] is formed through the superintendence of the experiencer, [Soul]:
|The Body's existence dependent on Soul.|
Aph. 60.* This [constitution of a body] is not accomplished in the case of what is [organic matter] not superintended [by Soul]; because we find putrefaction [in organic matter where Soul is absent].
a. But then, let the construction of a site of experience [or a body,] for Experiencers [i.e., Souls,] take place p. 454 without any superintendence at all, through Desert. To this he replies:
|Desert not the author of the Body.|
Aph. 61.* If you say that [independently of any superintendence,] it is through Desert [that a Body is formed, it is not so]; since what is unconnected [with the matter to be operated upon] is incompetent thereto; as is the case with [unapplied] water, &c., in respect of a plant.
a. That is to say: because it is impossible that Desert, which is not directly conjoined with the semen and other [elements of the Body] , should operate through Soul, in the construction of the Body, &c.; just as it is for water, &c., unconnected with the seed, to operate through tillage, &c., in the production of a plant.
b. According to the system of the Vaiśeshikas and others, it is settled that Soul is the superintendent, [in the construction of the Body], in virtue of its being conjoined with Desert. But he tells us, that, in his own doctrine, p. 455 since Desert, &c., are not properties of Soul, the Soul cannot, through these, be the cause [of the Body]:
|Reason for this.|
Aph. 62.* For this is impossible [viz., that the Soul should, through its Desert, &c., be the cause of Body]; because it has no qualities for these [viz., Desert, &c.,] are properties of Self-consciousness, [not of Soul].
a. And so, in our opinion, it is settled that Soul superintends [in the causing of the Body,] quite directly, by conjunction simply, without reference to anything intermediate: such is the import.
b. But, if Soul be all-pervading, then the limitedness of the living soul, which is set forth in Scripture, is unfounded. To repel this doubt, he says:
|Soul how limited and unlimited.|
Aph. 63.* The nature of a living soul belongs to that which is qualified, [not to soul devoid of qualities, as is proved] by direct and indirect argument.1
a. To be a living soul is the being possessed of the vital airs; and this is the character of the soul distinguished by peraonality, not of pure Soul, [which is unlimited].
b. Desiring, now, to set forth the difference between the products of Mind [or the Great Principle,] and of Self-consciousness, he first states the products of Self-consciousness:
|The real agent what.|
Aph. 64.* The effectuation of works is dependent on the agent Self-consciousness, not dependent on a Lord, [such as is feigned by the Vaiśeshikas]; because there is no proof [of the reality of such].4
a. By this aphorism are set forth, as are also established p. 457 by Scripture and the Legal Institutes, the creative and the destructive agencies of Brahmá and Rudra1 [respectively], owing to their adjunct, Self-consciousness, [or peronality].
b. But then, grant that Self-consciousness is the maker of the others, still who is the maker of Self-consciousness? to this he replies:
|The real agent whence.|
Aph. 65.* It is the same as in the arising of Desert.
a. Just as, at the creations, &c., the manifestation of Desert, which sets Nature energizing, results solely from the particular time,—since, if we were to suppose other Desert as the instigator of this, we should have an infinite regress,—just so Self-consciousness arises from time alone. as the cause; but there is not another maker thereof, also: thus, the two [cases] are alike: such is the meaning.
|Orthodox recognition of Brahmá, Śiva, and Vishṇu, put forward.|
Aph. 66.* The rest is from Mind, [the Great Principle].
a. What is other than the products of Self-consciousness [or personality], viz., Creation, &c., that, viz., Preservation, &c., results from the Great Principle alone; because, inasmuch as it consists of pure Goodness, having no Conceit, Passion, &c., it is moved solely by benevolence towards others: such is the meaning. And by this aphorism is established the character, as Preserver, of Vishṇu, owing to the Great Principle, as adjunct2 [of the soul, which, without adjunct, would neither create, preserve, nor destroy (see § 64)].
b. It has been stated, before, that the relation of Nature and Soul, as experienced and experiencer, is caused by Non-discrimination [of the one from the other]. Here, what is Non-discrimination, itself, caused by? p. 459 With reference to this doubt, he states that all philosophers reject, in common, the doubt whether we should have an infinite regress, on the supposition of a stream of Non-discrimination; because this [regress] is valid; [since an infinite regress which is in conformity with the truth is no sound cause of objection]:
|A theory which may be acquiesced in without detriment to the argument.|
Aph. 67.* The relation of possession and possessor, also, if attributed [as it is by some,] to Desert, in the case of Nature [and Soul], like [the relation of] seed and plant, [which takes the shape of an infinite regress of alternants], is beginningless.
Aph. 68.* Or [the case is, likewise, one of infinite regress,] if it [the relation between Nature and Soul,] be attributed to Non-discrimination [of Soul from Nature], as Panchaśikha [holds].
Aph. 69.* [The case is the same,] if, as the teacher Sanandana does, we attribute it [the relation between Nature and Soul,] to the Subtile Body, [which, in the shape of its elemental causes, attends Soul, even during the periodical annihilations of the world].
a. He sums up the import of the declarations of the Institute:
|The summing up.|
Aph. 70.* Be that the one way, or the other, the cutting short thereof [viz., of the relation between Nature and Soul,] is Soul's aim; the cutting short thereof is Soul's aim.
Sacred-Texts Hindu Index
2 Vide supra, p. 43, note 2, and p. 194, note 3. Prof. Cowell defines anwaya-vyatireka as 'affirmative and negative induction,' in his edition of Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i., p. 315, note 3. See also his translation of the Kusumánjali, pp. 7 and 23. Ed.
3 Vide supra, p. 8. Ed.
4 Vijnána and Nágeśa quote the text: ###1. Aniruddha and Vedánti Mahádeva cite the longer passage: ###2, 3, 1. See note 4, at p. 182, supra. Since that note was written, I have observed the words ###2 in the Bṛihadáraṇyaka p. 430 Upanishad, ii., 4, 5, and Śatapatha-bráhmaṇa, xiv., 5, 4, 5. Aniruddha, in his comment on an Aphorism which soon follows, the twenty-third, quotes them correctly, with their ensuing context; a fact which suggests that my criticism on Váchaspati Miśra's quotation, ventured in the note above referred to, may be hasty. Ed.
3 The rare word dhwasti, thus rendered, Vijnána and Vedánti Mahádeva explain by dhwansa. Ed.
3 This Aphorism, as given, is a literal repetition of Book I., 70, at p. 87, supra. Ed.
2 'Inertness [of mind]' is a better rendering of laya. Ed.
2 Muṇḍaka Upanishad, ii., i., 5. Ed.
4 Here I have offered a substitute for 'illogical outcaste.' Ed.
1 'Lowest . . . . thereof' I have put instead of 'base illogical holders of these.' Ed.
3 Nimitta, on which vide supra, p. 400, note 4. Ed.
2 Compare Book I., Aph. 61, a, at p. 71, supra. Ed.
1 Compare Aph. 66 of Book III., at p. 267, supra. Ed.
4 Nimitta, on which vide supra, p. 400, note 4. Ed.
3 Śatapatha-bráhmaṇa, xiv., 7, 2, 15. Ed.
2 For 'injured,' &c,' read, 'impeded by the obstruction [offered] by Sleep.' Ed.
3 Instead of 'in which,' &c., read, '[consisting of] the Great One, &c.' Ed.
1 On anawaya-vyatireka, vide supra, p. 428, note 2. Ed.
4 See Book I., Aph. 92, at p. 112, supra. Ed.
1 This is an appellation of Śiva. Ed.
2 The text here followed is very inferior. Ed.