Herein Lies the Very Brief Exposition of the Views of the Four
Indian Schools
Written by Todd Fenner, Ph.D.
This paper came from a series of posts made in the Buddhist area of
America On-Line between 11/28/95 and 12/4/95. I made these posts
under the name of Jamyang. It was initiated by a request to teach
the view of dependent arising in the nine yanas. It has since been
edited slightly.
Subj: The View
Date: 95-11-28 01:49:30 EST
From: Jamyang
With regard to the view in the nine yanas, the explanation of the
Nyingma is a unique one in that it connects the views of the yanas
with the philosophical schools so that sravakayana is connected with
the view of the Vaibhasika and so on. A good summary is in the
appendix to the book 'The Life of Shabkar'. An extensive explanation
is in Dudjom Rinpoche's magnum opus on the Nyingma Lineage.
Unfortunately it costs over $200.
So I think it would be best to work through the classical tenet
systems of Vaibhasika, Sautrantika, Yogacara and Madhyamika along
with some of the subdivisions. I will also address the issue of
Prasangika and Svatantrika that Namdrol rightly raised and try and
explain both sides of the issue. Before doing that however, I want
to make some comments. There are differences in Madhyamika,
Mahamudra, Dzogchen etc. however the differences lay in method not
view. In usage, that distinction is not usually made explicit, so it
can sometimes be confusing. Thus each refers to certain meditation
methods to attain the view as well as the view itself. Sometimes
certain scholars, favoring certain techniques have thus rated one
superior to the other but this is questionable as all of them are
functional, that is they produce realization. Likewise with regard
to tantra, the actual view in all tantra sets is identical between
the sets and to that of sutrayana. The difference is in the
consciousness cognizing the view. So I will try and go into the view
irregardless of the consciousness cognizing it. This greatly
simplifies the explanations. In samadhi, the distinction between
consciousness and the object is like water poured into water.
Subj: The View II
Date: 95-11-28 10:48:55 EST
From: Jamyang
Tibetans generally classify tenet systems into four broad categories
Vaibhasika, Sautrantika, Yogacara, and Madhyamika. In reality the
systems are much more diverse. The source of the views of the
Vaibhasika and Sautrantika come primarily from the Abhidharmakosa by
Vasubandhu and commentaries. The Yogacara from Maitreya, Asanga and
Vasubandhu (he changed his mind) and the Madhyamika from Nagarjuna
and Aryadeva. There is a classification of Madhyamika into Svatantra
and Prasanga. The former stems from Bhavaviveka, Santiraksita and
Kamalashila and the latter from Buddhapalita and Chandrakirti. The
Gelug and perhaps others, place Dignaga and Dharmakirti between
Sautrantika and Yogacara. They call their writings which seem to
affirm the true existence of external objects Sautrantika following
reason and those writings which seem to deny the true existence of
external objects Yogacara following reason.
The classifications are largely(not entirely by any means) Tibetan
ways of organizing the varied teachings. For instance, Tibetans use
the term Vaibhasika to refer to the original 18 schools which
include Theravada. In reality the 18 schools often had very
distinctive ideas and did not consider themselves as one. It should
be pointed out that the Abhidharma teachings in Theravada are quite
a bit different than those in the Abhidharmakosa. The term
Vaibhasika as used by Vasubandhu is restricted to one of the 18
schools which existed in Kasmir and produced a work called the
Mahavibhasa (Great Commentary). This work exists now in Chinese but
was never translated into Tibetan. For more information of this
nature see Jeffrey Hopkin's chapter on Tibetan Doxography in
'Tibetan Literature, Studies in Genre' newly published by Snow Lion.
By the way I wrote chapter 27 (little plug).
The Tibetans consider the study of the four systems to be like a
progressive meditation because the definition of 'selflessness'
becomes subtler and subtler and so the schools serve as a bridge or
a ladder. The notion of doing it this way is reinforced by the
Hevajra Tantra which explicitly advises one to progress in this
fashion.
It should also be pointed out that there are a number of differences
in the systems regarding the path, the idea of a final vehicle etc.
besides the view concerning selflessness and ultimate truth. For a
run down on all these see Geshe Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins 'Cutting
Through Appearances'.
Subj: View III
Date: 95-11-29 11:09:38 EST
From: Jamyang
The argument for selflessness is simple in structure and can be
found in all the tenet systems. It is that if something truly exists
or inherently exists it must be findable either through direct
perception or by inference. The process is like the search in
chemistry and physics for the basic units of matter. If something
can be demonstrated to be capable of being broken down it isn't the
basic unit. The tenet systems in regard to the analysis of self, all
follow this basic approach. What sets them apart (other than a
number of other issues) is the degree to which it is claimed that a
basic unit is or is not established.
The purpose in performing this exercise is not the winning of
debates or of playing intellectual games. That point is reiterated
countless times by the Masters. Tsongkapa, whose reputation as a
scholar is agreed by all, including opponents as being of the first
order, said that if his work was taken in that way (being a game),
he would have failed.
Rather, the exercise is meant to explore the minds way of grasping
to the unreal as real. This grasping takes place at a level much
deeper than that of verbalization and discursive thought. However we
can use such thought nonetheless to gain a better insight. This is
done by all systems and whether the system is very elaborate or
rather simple it is still done. Even the instruction to 'just sit'
says something and it used to get to something deeper.
Vaibhasika and Sautrantika:
That being said -- the Vaibhasika and Sautrantika will be classed
together since their views on self and selflessness are essentially
the same.
Both tenet systems assert a selflessness of person but not of
dharmas. The self, they say is a mere designation imputed upon the
skandhas. Vasubandhu says:
'How do we know that the word 'soul' is only a designation for a
series of skandhas, and that no soul exists in and of itself?
We know this because no proof establishes the existence of a soul
apart from the skandhas, no proof by direct perception, nor any
proof from inference. If the soul were a real entity, separate like
other entities, it would be known.'
Basically, when we look for a self at any given time we only find
something else, a part of the skandhas such as a feeling, or an
individual thought or whatever. We do not find something totally
apart from these units (dharmas) that constitutes what we generally
call the self. If the self were different that the skandhas, we
should be able to remove all the skandhas and find it. That hasn't
happened. If the self were equivalent to the skandhas, then as soon
as the skandhas changed a bit it would disappear but it doesn't.
Ergo the self is imputed on the skandhas.
Note that it is not said that the self doesn't exist at all, but
rather that its mode of existence is not basic unit we generally
take it to be.
An example: Take a pot (a favorite Buddhist example), there is a pot
perceived sitting on a table. If we smash it to pieces, the pot no
longer appears. What we had thought of as 'pot' was merely a
designation imputed upon a collection of multiple units of matter.
If we think of the terms 'general' and 'particular', in Sautrantika
philosophy, 'generals', 'universals' etc. are like conventional
truth and the 'particular', the ultimate truth. In Vaibhasika and
Sautrantika, the particulars are the basic units called dharmas. The
Vaibhasikas divided the five skandhas into 72 such dharmas. Eleven
made up the physical world, matter(rupa), one for feeling(vedana),
one for ideation(samjna), one for pure consciousness(without
content)(vijnana), and 58 for all the other mental elements not
previously mentioned(samskara). There are different ways to further
categorize these so one could argue that there were more or less
than 72 and indeed many did so argue.
(The book Ways of Enlightenment put out by Dharma Publishing has a
description of these dharmas plus much much more. I have used the
book heavily in classes I've taught on Abhidharma. You could get the
Abhidharmakosabhasyam by Vasubandhu and get the extensive
explanation as well, it is now in English, however it costs $300.)
Subj: View IV
Date: 95-12-01 00:49:08 EST
From: Jamyang
Before passing to Yogacara, a few words: Vaibhasika and Sautrantika
are referred to as Hinayana schools, Yogacara and Madhyamika as
Mahayana. However on examination, this is true mainly from the point
of view of their main expositors. Vai/Sau recognized the path of the
bodhisattva as does Theravada as a perfectly legitimate one and they
outlined the path a bodhisattva would take to become a Buddha.
However to them, a bodhisattva's wisdom took/takes the view of the
respective philosophies. A bodhisattva basically just puts off
nirvana and works for the benefit of beings and through merit
acquires the 10 powers of a Buddha not held by Sravakas and
Pratyekas. Similarly, within Yogacara and Madhyamika, there are
Arhats and Pratyeka Buddhas who have the Yogacara and Madhyamika
viewpoints but simply meditate on emptiness to the point where they
do not cultivate the perfections and work up to Buddhahood i.e. they
stop short. The Gelug call this a Mahayanist holding Hinayana tenets
and vice versa. I think it might be better to say simply that tenet
systems have a certain independence from the vehicle. That is, they
are not the defining characteristic. It is of course a little more
complex than that but this is the short version.
Yogacara:
There are a number of different subgroups like the true aspectarians
and false aspectarians. There is also a spectrum as to the degree of
idealism asserted. Also, although the alaya vijnana is held by many
to be a key Yogacara tenet, there are those who are considered
Yogacara who assert only the six conscioussnesses, denying the alaya
and klista vijnana. For instance, Dharmakirti is held by the Gelug
to be an example of the latter. (See 'Cutting Through Appearances'
by Sopa and Hopkins for a run down on the different groupings for
Yogacara as well as the other tenet systems.)
For scope purposes, I am going to limit myself primarily to Asanga,
using the Tatvartha chapter of his Bodhisattvabhumi and his
Mahayana Sangraha.
Subj: View V
Date: 95-12-02 11:20:24 EST
From: Jamyang
History
Madhyamika and Yogacara are said to be Mahayana tenet systems. The
systems arose historically with the discovery of the Mahayana sutras
of the second and third turning of the wheel. Nagarjuna is said to
have discovered the Prajnaparamita texts on a visit to the naga
realm. These texts are the main ones of the second turning. As most
know, the texts are filled with descriptions of the ultimate which
are negative in tone. The 100,000 versed version tones the rhetoric
down a little by saying that things are ultimately empty, not just
empty. Nagarjuna states in many places that emptiness was not
nothingness but dependent origination/arising. Nonetheless many took
it to be nihilistic.
It is said that the third turning of the wheel is meant to correct
this notion of nihilism. The main example of a sutra of this class
is the Sandhinirmocana, (The Unraveling of the Intent).
(In Tibet, there are a number of views concerning the three turnings
and what is definitive v. interpretive. The issue however is beyond
my present scope.)
Asanga made use of the schema presented in the third turning to
delineate what they consider to be the correct interpretation of the
Prajnaparamita. They felt that the view of there being no basis at
all was too extreme and that the correct view was a non-dual one
wherein one did not hold that designations, names, constructs etc.
were truly existent and that the support or basis of the names etc.
were not truly absent.
This particular point is made strongly by Asanga in the
Bodhisattvabhumi in the chapter on reality. To Asanga, correct view
meant knowing exactly how something existed and did not exist. The
ordinary person, he says, just goes on and says 'this is that is'
without thinking or analyzing. To discover the truth, he said one
had to analyze and investigate.
There are designations, expressions, etc. which are imaginary, and a
real basis for the imputation of those designations. This basis had
to be of necessity 'beyond expression and concepts'. This idea is
presented by Asanga both directly as I just did, but most often,
using the schema of the 3 natures so elaborately explained in the
Sandhinirmocana.
The 3 are:
1. Parikalpita, imaginary nature
2. Paratantra, other-powered/dependent nature
3. Parinispana, perfected/reality
There is a classic metaphor used to understand this.
Imagine a rope in a dark room which is mistaken for a snake. The
snake is the imaginary, the rope is the basis on which the snake
depends and the absence of the snake in the rope is how the rope
actually is, i.e. in its real or perfected nature.
The 3 natures are neither the same nor different from each other. In
the Mahayana Sangraha, in the chapter on the knowable, Asanga
explicitly says that the dependent nature is both the cause for
imagining as well as that which is imagined. It can be considered
reality or perfected when it is seen that it does not really exist
as it was imagined.
Subj: View VI
Date: 95-12-02 12:03:31 EST
From: Jamyang
Asanga said that the dependent nature consisted of all the
constructed differentiation's that had arose from the
foundation/store consciousness(alaya vijnana). the alaya consists of
all the seeds resulting from action. To illustrate, if a person
engages in acts of lust, that person becomes permeated (lit.
perfumed, skt .vasana, tib. bag chag) with lust. As the mind
repeatedly arises and passes away in tandem with lust it becomes the
generative cause for the lustful evolutions of the mind. The
consciousness arises as a result of these permeation's. The
differentiation's arising therefrom are said to be the construct of
the body and the embodied, the construct of the experiencer and the
experience, the constructs of validity, time, number place,
language, difference and rebirth. Thus all of these have the same
cause and the same nature.
Constructive thought arises for beings and eventually creates the
worlds of those beings. The creation process consists of thought and
support for the thought. The two are mutually caused. A previous
thought is the cause of a present thing which becomes the support of
another thought and so on. There is not independent external object
apart from this process.
If one thinks about it, this is like the description of karma.
Karma to the Vaibhasikas as well as to the others was linked if not
equated with intent (cetana). Intent causes and forms the basis of
action, action causes all the results we experience and it is the
support for our reactions which in turn cause more results.
Sometimes persons mistake the phrase non-duality of subject and
object for subject only. In fact, in means the two are not
independent and have the same nature. As Vasubandhu pointed out 'if
there is no object, there is no subject either'.
Subj: View VII
Date: 95-12-03 23:58:06 EST
From: Jamyang
Madhyamika
Madhyamika traces back to Nagarjuna who discovered the
Prajnaparamita texts hidden in the realm of the nagas. Its prime
mark is the attack on the extremes of existence and non-existence
along with the identification of emptiness with dependent arising.
When Nagarjuna argued against cause and effect he argued against an
independent cause and an independent effect. It seems to some that
he totally denied cause and effect and therefore the path. In fact,
he considered that only with dependent arising i.e.without
inherent/independent could there be cause and effect, the path etc.
Sometime after Nagarjuna, Buddhapalita used a form of reasoning
called a prasanga to demonstrate Nagarjuna's point. A prasanga is a
consequence. That is, one takes the opposing thesis and demonstrate
what its consequences are. Another Madhyamika, Bhavaviveka,
criticized this technique saying in effect that anargument to be
successful had to be a full syllogism and not just a consequence.
Bhavaviveka's method is called a svatantra.
To illustrate without giving a full lesson in Indian logic (I would
lose everybody):
The sentence:
Sound is impermanent because of being a product.
The word 'product' is called a sign. It is the basis on which an
inferential valid cognition is created. The sign has 3 modes of
relating to the other elements of the syllogism.
1. The property of the subject. Here 'sound is a product' that is
product is a property of sound.
2. Forward pervasion: product is a member of the set of impairment
phenomena
3. Counterpervasion: the negative of the product is pervaded by the
negative of the sign. that is, permanent phenomena are non-products.
A svatantra contains all three modes. A prasanga contains only the
last two. The argument, as the Indians saw it, was over a method
best suitable to persuade someone. (It is important to keep in mind
that in India the purpose of arguing was persuasion.)
Later, Chandrakirti defended Buddhapalita's method quite strongly.
Those who follow Chandra's method are called Prasangikas.
Bhavaviveka and those following his method are called Svatantrikas.
The terms were developed later to apply to the two methods. The
persons themselves just saw themselves as Madhyamika.
In Tibet, Madhyamika was first introduced by Shantiraksita who is
considered a Svatantrika. He had a method which later persons called
Yogacara-Madhyamika because he recommended meditating first on all
things as mind using a method similar to the Yogacaras, and then
meditate that the mind itself was empty of inherent existence. This
method became extremely popular in Tibet.
Chandra's writings were introduced at a later time. In the next and
final post, I will be presenting Tsongkapa's(1357-1419)
interpretation of Prasangika Madhyamika as being superior to
Svatantra while noting the arguments of those Tibetan scholars that
disagree.
Subj: Final View
Date: 95-12-04 23:06:57 EST
From: Jamyang
First let me explain that I am trained in this as a Gelug. Obviously
there is some interpretation. The lineages have some differing views
on Madhyamika as it is so important. Some think the views differ
greatly, some don't. I belong to the latter. I encourage with all my
heart that persons who are stimulated and feel benefited by this
series to study more.
Tsongkhapa felt that the cause of being bound to samsara was a
deeply rooted habit that grasped to the concept of inherent
existence. To exist inherently means to have a basis independent of
imputation. Tsongkhapa argued in essence, that all the tenet systems
below prasangika asserted such a basis either explicitly (i.e. they
said so and one can find it stated as such) or implicitly (it may be
hard to find the passage and there is a question about it but such a
conclusion might be drawn from other things). In the case of
Vaibhasika and Sautrantika it was the dharmas. In Yogacara, it was
paratantra and parinispanna or mind. The Madhyamikas argued that
there was no such basis ultimately at all. The Svatantrikas,
however, because they used syllogisms instead of consequences
implicitly asserted a type of independence on the conventional level
known as svalaksana or inherent characteristic.
This is extremely subtle. The argument is that if a syllogism is
used, there is an assumption that the two parties will see the first
mode the property of a subject in the same way, implying some sort
of independent existence. Seeing the property in the same way
demands recognizing that the property has at minimum some sort of
characteristic which is independent of the imputing mind. The use of
a consequence does not do this, but merely takes the assumption of
the opponent as a basis as opposed to making an assumption oneself.
Therefore the Prasangika do not have the fault of asserting iherent
existence/characteristic even conventionally.
Other scholars in Tibet hold that Tsongkhapa's differentiation is
incorrect since the Sautrantikas do not assert svalaksana ultimately
and only use it conventionally as a means to lead persons to the
truth and do not hold it as a view. They further argue that the
Indians did not view the Svatantrikas and Prasangikas in the way
Tsongkhapa did and rather seemed to agree that the difference was
pedagogical. They say svatantra is for converting non-buddhists,
prasanga for converting buddhists.
Tsongkhapa's point though, however the intent or history of the
issue, was that even grasping at something this subtle had to be
done away with. Tsongkhapa agreed with Chandra that inherent
existence didn't exist even conventionally. In the conventional
world people just use words and agree on things in an unanalytic way.
I say I am Jamyang. I don't say I am inherent Jamyang. By negating
inherent existence, one allows convention and there is no
incompatibility between samsara and nirvana, between form and
emptiness. Once inherent existence is negated then what is left is
just dependent arising. Then everything is pure. The negation of
inherent existence is intended as an arrow to shoot the root cause
of defilement. It cuts out the core of that which is grasped. things
appear then as mirage, a reflection, a plantain tree, a bubble etc.
a play of stainless mind and wind.
Sarva Mangalam
Precious Bodhicitta, where it is not arisen, may it arise.
Where is has arisen, may it not decline but grow ever fuller.
By the merit of this presentation, may all beings obtain the state of
Vajradhara. May the dharma take solid root in the West and may no
obstacles arise to its practice and flourishing.
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