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19. And on account of the cessation of the preceding one on the origination of the subsequent one.

For the following reason also the origination of the world cannot be accounted for on the view of the momentariness of all existence. At the time when the subsequent momentary existence originates, the preceding momentary existence has passed away, and it cannot therefore stand in a causal relation towards the subsequent one. For if non-existence had causal power, anything might originate at any time at any place.--Let it then be said that what constitutes a cause is nothing else but existence in a previous moment.--But, if this were so, the previous momentary existence of a jar, let us say, would be the cause of all things whatever that would be met with in this threefold world in the subsequent moment-cows, buffaloes, horses, chairs, stones, &c.!--Let us then say that a thing existing in a previous moment is the cause only of those things, existing in the subsequent moment, which belong to the same species.--But from this again it would follow that one jar existing in the previous moment would be the cause of all jars, to be met with in any place, existing in

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the following moment!--Perhaps you mean to say that one thing is the cause of one subsequent thing only. But how then are we to know which thing is the cause of which one subsequent thing?--Well then I say that the momentarily existing jar which exists in a certain place is the cause of that one subsequent momentary jar only which exists at the very same place!--Very good, then you hold that a place is something permanent! (while yet your doctrine is that there is nothing permanent).--Moreover as, on your theory, the thing which has entered into contact with the eye or some other sense-organ does no longer exist at the time when the idea originates, nothing can ever be the object of a cognition.

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